

NPS-CM-05-015 (Revised)



ACQUISITION RESEARCH SPONSORED REPORT SERIES

JOINT CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

(Revised)

30 JUNE 2005

by

MAJ Ellsworth K. Johnson III, USA

CAPT Bryan H. Paton, USMC

CAPT Edward W. Threat, USA

Lisa A. Haptonstall

**Advisors: Jeffrey R. Cuskey, E. Cory Yoder and
Keith F. Snider**

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

Prepared for: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943



ACQUISITION RESEARCH
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Chair of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.

To request Defense Acquisition Research or to become a research sponsor, please contact:

NPS Acquisition Research Program
Attn: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret)
Acquisition Chair
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy
Naval Postgraduate School
555 Dyer Road, Room 332
Monterey, CA 93943-5103
Tel: (831) 656-2092
Fax: (831) 656-2253
e-mail: jbgreene@nps.edu

Copies of the Acquisition Sponsored Research Reports may be printed from our website www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/acqn/publications



ACQUISITION RESEARCH
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

JOINT CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this Master Business Administration (MBA) Professional Report is to investigate and analyze the means by which Contingency Contracting Officers (CCO) can effectively operate in a Joint contingency environment and to validate the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) entry and exit criteria for contingency contracting missions. Joint contingencies encompass regional conflicts, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, and international or domestic disaster relief missions supported with the immediate deployment of military forces.

This research was accomplished by reviewing the current guidance, policies, and doctrine pertinent to contingency contracting operations and conducting personal interviews. The researchers conducted interviews with representatives of the Joint Staff, J4 (Logistics), each Service Component's acquisition headquarters, U.S. Central Command's J4 (Logistics), U.S. Pacific Command's J4 (Logistics, Engineering, and Security Assistance), and the DCMA to explore how contingency contracting operations are planned and executed; current issues and lessons learned; and understand the current structure/organization of Service Component and Combatant Command for accomplishing contingency contracting.

Conclusions and recommendations address perceived shortfalls in the methodologies the Services use to plan, communicate, integrate and execute contingency contracting operations. Three possible solutions to these shortfalls include adoption of the Yoder Three-Tier Model, establishment of the Joint Contingency Contracting Command (JCCC), and the creation of universal language for conducting contracting in contingencies.





ACQUISITION RESEARCH
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge those individuals who provided their support throughout this research. We would like to express our thanks to Professor Jeffrey Cuskey for his guidance, patience, and attention to detail. Also, we would like to thank Professor Cory Yoder and Dr. Keith Snider for their support.

The authors would also like to thank the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) for sponsoring this Report. In addition, we would like to thank the Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management (DACM), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) for providing travel money.

We want to thank all the people who allowed us to interview them and Debra Green for editing this Report.

From MAJ Ellsworth K. Johnson III:

I would like to thank my wife, Terri Johnson. I appreciate your love, support, and for taking time to listen me as I recounted the events of each day. Thanks for tolerating my long hours at the library, not just throughout this thesis process but over the 18 months of graduate school. In addition, I appreciate the sacrifice you have made as a military wife and stay-at-home mother. I love you.

I would like to thank my son, Nicholas. Nicholas, I want you to know that the best part of coming home was seeing you, getting a big hug, and hearing you say “Hi, Daddy.” It really warms my heart. You mean the world to me and I love you very much.

Lastly, I would like to acknowledge my parents, Ellsworth K. Johnson, Jr. and Helen E. Johnson, for their lifelong love and support. Mom, thanks for always being there when I needed you. I love you both.

From Capt Bryan Paton:

I would like to thank my parents, Bill and Karen Delgado, for instilling in me the virtues of patience and tenacity, without which, this research project would have been more difficult. They have and continue to be an endless fount of motivation and support.

From CPT Edward W. Threat:



ACQUISITION RESEARCH
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

I would like to acknowledge the depth and support I received from my family. My wife's and love and understanding and my daughter's patience, allowed me to make my academic endeavor a success.

Lastly, to my Mother for her perseverance and my Dad, a model father, Army Officer and citizen.

From Mrs. Lisa A. Haptonstall:

To my husband, friend and stalwart supporter, Henry Judson Haptonstall, for all his love and support. You are my soul mate and being with you makes me a better person. Thank you for listening to me at the end of a long day, giving me a reason to laugh when I was low and rebuilding my confidence when I was filled with self-doubt. Your love is limitless as evidenced by your continued self-sacrifice so I can pursue my dreams. I could not have accomplished this project without your constant encouragement and unconditional love. I am proud to have the opportunity to love, honor and obey.

To my beloved West Highland White Terriers, Berkeley and Glacier, I promise to make up for all the missed walks, beach time and play sessions. Your unbridled passion when I returned home in the wee hours of the morning always provided additional motivation for completing this project.

Finally, a special thank you to my Father, Ray Eugene Jones, who taught me that every day was truly fantastic if you could learn at least one new thing between waking in the morning and returning to the solitude of silent slumber in the evening. Your time with us was far too short and you are missed every day.



ABOUT THE AUTHORS

MAJ Ellsworth K. Johnson III, USA

MAJ Ellsworth K. “Ken” Johnson III graduated from the University of Virginia with a BA in Psychology. He obtained his commission in the U.S. Army as a 2nd Lieutenant in May 1992. MAJ Johnson began active duty as an Armor officer and soon attended the U.S. Army Armor Basic Course located in Fort Knox, KY. He then served in the following operational assignments in the 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment at Fort Hood, TX: tank Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer, Battalion Maintenance Officer, and Battalion Assistant Operations Officer.

Upon completion of that duty in Texas, MAJ Johnson attended the Armor Advance Course at Fort Knox, KY and the Combined Arms Services Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Following that his operational assignments were with the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division at Fort Riley, KS as a Brigade Assistant Operations Officer (Plans), and then as a Company Commander in the 2nd Battalion, 70th Armored Regiment.

MAJ Johnson was accessed into the U.S. Army Acquisition Corps in January 2001. He then served in the Digital Force Coordination Cell (DFCC) at Fort Hood, TX. While in the DFCC MAJ Johnson was the Mounted Maneuver Coordinator and later became the Dismounted Maneuver Chief. His duties included monitoring the status of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) systems being fielded to the 4th Infantry Division as they trained up to become the Army’s First Digital Division.

His next Acquisition Corps assignment was in the Requirements Integration Directorate (RID) at Fort Monroe, VA. This directorate was part of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). MAJ Johnson served as a Combat Development staff officer and coordinator. His duties included leading Integrated Product Teams to facilitate TRADOC’s role in the Unit Set Fielding of Army Force XXI heavy divisions.

MAJ Johnson is currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA and will graduate in June 2005 with a MBA in Systems Acquisition Management. In addition, he will meet the curriculum requirements to receive Defense Acquisition University (DAU) certifications from the MBA Acquisition and Contracting Management program. He is Level I certified in Program Management. His awards include the Army Meritorious Medal, Army



ACQUISITION RESEARCH
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Commendation Medal, and the Army Achievement Medal. He has also earned the Parachutist Badge.

Capt Bryan H. Paton, USMC

Capt Bryan H. Paton enlisted in the Marine Corps in October 1990. As an enlisted member he was selected to be a Marine Security Guard and subsequently served at American Embassies in Prague, Czechoslovakia; Ankara, Turkey; and Rome, Italy. In 1995, at the rank of Sergeant, he was selected for the Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program. Three years later, Sgt Paton was commissioned when he graduated from Purdue University with a BA in Political Science.

After attending The Basic School in Quantico, Virginia, 2nd Lieutenant Paton entered the administrative field and became an Adjutant. His follow on duty stations included Combat Assault Battalion in Okinawa, Japan, and Marine Aircraft Group 11 (MAG-11) in San Diego, CA. His tour of duty at MAG-11 took him to Kuwait from January to May of 2003. At that time he was selected to attend the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Capt Paton's personal awards include two Navy Commendation Medals and one Navy Achievement Medal.

Captain Edward W. Threat, USA

Captain Edward W. Threat, USA holds a Master of Business Degree with a concentration in Systems Acquisition, from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Master of Administration Degree, with a concentration in Public Administration, from Bowie State University. His previous assignments include serving as the Logistics Operations Officer and Headquarters and Headquarters Company Commander, 35th Supply and Service Battalion, United States Army Japan/9th Theater Support Command, Sagami General Depot, Japan. His next assignment is at the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System Joint Program Office, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California.

Mrs. Lisa A. Haptonstall

Lisa Haptonstall is a Program Integration Specialist with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) assigned to Northrop Grumman's Airborne Ground Surveillance and Battle Management Systems (AGS&BMS) facility in Melbourne, FL. She has been with DCMA since March 2000, when the agency was created. When in Melbourne, she is responsible



ACQUISITION RESEARCH
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

for two U.S. Air Force (USAF) major defense acquisition programs: Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) and E-10A Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft (MC2A); the USAF's next generation ground surveillance and battle management weapon system.

- Past assignments within the Department of Defense (DoD) include:
- DCMA Northern Europe – United Kingdom (Bristol): Program Integration Specialist, Industrial Specialist and Quality Assurance Specialist
- Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) Dallas: Quality Assurance Specialist
- Defense Contract Administration Services Region (DCASR) Atlanta, Puerto Rico: Quality Assurance Specialist
- Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC), Philadelphia: Quality Assurance Specialist

In addition to her work with the DoD, Mrs. Haptonstall's private sector experience includes positions with International Playtex, and she served as a Texas Quality Award examiner from 1993 to 1996.

Mrs. Haptonstall has a BS in pre-veterinary medicine from Delaware State College. She is a graduate of the Defense Acquisition University Advanced Program Managers Course, Simmons Graduate School of Management Program for Developing Managers, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Mid-Level Development Program. She is currently matriculated in the Naval Postgraduate School MBA Acquisition and Contracting Management program.

Lisa Haptonstall is a certified acquisition professional and is Level III certified in Program Management and Level II in Production, Quality and Manufacturing. She also holds DLA certifications in Quality Systems and the aircraft, electronics, mechanical, and clothing and textile commodities. Her professional certifications granted by the American Society for Quality include: Quality Engineer, Quality Auditor and Mechanical Inspector.





NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT

Joint Contingency Contracting

By: Ellsworth K. Johnson III
Bryan H. Paton
Edward W. Threat
Lisa A. Haptonstall
June 2005

Advisors: Jeffrey R. Cuskey
E. Cory Yoder
Keith F. Snider

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
I. INTRODUCTION.....	5
A. BACKGROUND	5
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH	6
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS	6
D. METHODOLOGY	7
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	7
F. DEFINITIONS	8
G. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH	11
II. POLICY, GUIDANCE AND DOCTRINE	13
A. OVERVIEW	13
B. CONTINGENCIES	13
1. Types of Contingencies	13
2. Phases of Contingency Contracting	14
<i>a. Phase I: Mobilization/Initial Deployment.....</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>b. Phase II: Build-Up.....</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>c. Phase III: Sustainment.....</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>d. Phase IV: Termination/Redeployment.....</i>	<i>17</i>
C. BACKGROUND	17
1. Command Relationships	17
2. Joint Publications.....	19
3. Contracting Regulations, Directives and Instructions	19
<i>a. Contracting Regulations</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>b. Department of Defense Directives and Instructions.....</i>	<i>21</i>
4. Education and Training	21
D. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS.....	23
1. Issues	23
2. Operation Plans.....	24
3. Command Relationships	25
4. Contracting Officer Qualifications.....	28
5. Contracting Billets	29
6. Executive Agent.....	30
E. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY	31
III. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONS	35
A. OVERVIEW	35
B. CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONS.....	35
1. U.S. Army (USA).....	35
2. U.S. Air Force (USAF).....	37
3. U.S. Navy (USN).....	38

	4.	U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)	39
	5.	Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).....	42
C.		CONTRACTING AUTHORITY	44
D.		JOINT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS	44
	1.	The Unified Combatant Commands	44
	2.	The Joint Commander.....	47
	3.	The Joint Staff.....	48
	4.	Inter/Intra Service Relationships	48
E.		THE ACQUISITION TEAM.....	49
	1.	The Commander	50
	2.	The Comptroller.....	51
	3.	Staff Proponent	51
	4.	Requiring Activity.....	51
	5.	Contracting Officer.....	52
	6.	Contingency Contracting Officer	52
	7.	Judge Advocate General.....	52
	8.	Finance Officer.....	52
	9.	Paying Agents.....	53
	10.	Ordering Officer	53
	11.	Receiving Official	54
	12.	Contracting Officer Representative	54
	13.	Property Book Officer	54
	14.	Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card Holders	54
F.		CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENTS.....	55
	1.	Multinational Environment	55
		a. Overview	55
		b. Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements	56
	2.	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	57
G.		CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAMS.....	58
	1.	Overview	58
	2.	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program	58
	3.	Air Force Contract Augmentation Program.....	60
	4.	Construction Capabilities.....	61
	5.	Conclusion	62
H.		ISSUES AND ANALYSIS.....	63
	1.	Issues	63
	2.	Filling the Acquisition Pipeline.....	63
	3.	DCMA CCAS Support Team Assignment Model.....	67
		a. Overview	67
		b. The Limitre Personnel Assignment Model	69
		c. Lessons Learned.....	72
		d. Areas for Follow-on Analysis	72
I.		CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY	73
IV.		COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO COMBATANT COMMANDS	75
A.		OVERVIEW.....	75

B.	OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.....	75
C.	BACKGROUND	76
1.	PACOM	76
2.	CENTCOM.....	78
D.	ISSUES AND ANALYSIS.....	81
1.	Issues	81
2.	PACOM J4 Contingency Contracting Observations.....	82
a.	<i>Lack of Appropriate Personnel.....</i>	82
b.	<i>Inefficient Organizational Structure.....</i>	83
c.	<i>Lack of Personnel with Optimum Skills and Experience.....</i>	83
d.	<i>CCSP Lacked Clear Information</i>	84
e.	<i>Lack of Service Representatives in a Contingency Cell/Branch</i>	84
f.	<i>Lack of a Theater Level Contracting Board</i>	85
g.	<i>Insufficient Manning.....</i>	86
h.	<i>J4 Staff Officers Lack Contingency Contracting Education</i>	87
3.	PACOM Service Components and Agencies.....	87
a.	USARPAC	87
b.	PACFLT	88
c.	PACAF	89
d.	MARFORPAC.....	90
4.	CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch	91
a.	<i>Lead Component for Logistics and Contracting.....</i>	91
b.	<i>CENTCOM Regulation (CCR) 700-2.....</i>	91
c.	<i>CENTCOM Contingency Contracting Observations</i>	92
d.	<i>Contracting Command & Control During OIF/OEF</i>	93
e.	<i>Contractor Management During OIF/OEF</i>	93
f.	<i>Contractor Officer Deployment in OIF/OEF.</i>	94
5.	CENTCOM J4 Plans	94
E.	THE JOINT CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING COMMAND.....	97
1.	Establishing the Need	97
2.	Background	97
3.	What to Change.....	98
4.	The Yoder Three-Tier Model	100
a.	<i>Organization.....</i>	100
b.	<i>The Foundation.....</i>	102
c.	<i>Stakeholders</i>	104
5.	The Vision of the JCCC.....	105
6.	JCCC Recommendations	106
F.	CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY	109
V.	VALIDATION OF DCMA ENTRY/EXIT CRITERIA.....	111
A.	OVERVIEW.....	111
B.	BACKGROUND	111
C.	DCMA’S PROPOSED ENTRY AND EXIT CRITERIA	112

D.	FINDINGS	114
1.	PACOM	114
a.	<i>Span of Control</i>	114
b.	<i>Customer Relationship Management</i>	114
c.	<i>Integrative Planning</i>	115
d.	<i>Initial Response Team</i>	116
2.	Service Component Contracting Offices	117
a.	PACOM	117
b.	CENTCOM	118
3.	CENTCOM	118
a.	<i>Span of Control</i>	118
b.	<i>Integrative Planning</i>	118
4.	DCMA International	120
a.	<i>The Force Deployer</i>	120
b.	<i>Planning and Communication</i>	121
c.	<i>Contract Management Authority</i>	122
d.	<i>LNO Support</i>	124
3.	DCMA Headquarters, Combat Support Center	125
E.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	126
1.	Liaison Officer	126
2.	Initial Response Team	127
3.	Mission Planning	128
4.	Entry and Exit Criteria	128
F.	SUMMARY	129
VI.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	131
A.	OVERVIEW	131
B.	CONCLUSIONS	131
1.	Planning	131
2.	Integration	132
3.	Communication	132
4.	Execution	132
C.	RECOMMENDATIONS	133
1.	Adopt the Yoder Three-Tier Model	133
2.	Establish the JCCC	133
3.	Create Universal	134
D.	RESEARCH QUESTIONS	134
E.	AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	137
	LIST OF REFERENCES	139
	LIST OF INTERVIEWS	143
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Chain of Command	18
Figure 2.	GS-1102 Educational Requirements	23
Figure 3.	Joint Contracting Command-Iraq	28
Figure 4.	Department of the Army Contingency Contracting.....	36
Figure 5.	Department of the Air Force Contingency Contracting.....	37
Figure 6.	Department of the Navy Contingency Contracting	39
Figure 7.	Marine Expeditionary Force Contingency Contracting.....	40
Figure 8.	Defense Contract Management Agency	42
Figure 9.	DCMA's Lines of Authority	43
Figure 10.	UCC's Area of Responsibility	47
Figure 11.	Organization of Joint Staff.....	48
Figure 12.	The Acquisition Team.....	50
Figure 13.	U.S. PACOM AOR.....	77
Figure 14.	PACOM J42 Logistics Organization Chart	78
Figure 15.	CENTCOM AOR.....	79
Figure 16.	CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch	80
Figure 17.	Contracting Organizations in U.S. CENTCOM AOR	81
Figure 18.	Multinational Logistics Branch Organizational Chart.....	90
Figure 19.	CENTCOM Joint Planning Summary	96
Figure 20.	The Yoder Three-Tier Model.....	103
Figure 21.	Stakeholder Analysis	105
Figure 22.	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats: Current Structure.....	107
Figure 23.	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats: JCCC	108
Figure 24:	DCMA Mission Areas	116
Figure 25:	DCMAI CCAS Support	124

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Services' and DCMA Contingency Contracting Guidance	20
Table 2.	LOGCAP Capabilities	60
Table 3.	AFCAP Capabilities.....	61
Table 4.	CONCAP Capabilities	62
Table 5.	Relative Percentage of Service Members Performing Contract Activities.....	64

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAFARS	Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
ACA	Army Contracting Agency
ACO	Administrative Contracting Officer
ACSA	Acquisition and Cross Service Agreements
AD	Administrative Directive
AEF	Air Expeditionary Force
AFARS	Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
AFCAP	Air Force Contract Augmentation Program
AFFARS	Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
ALCOM	Alaskan Command
AMC	Army Materiel Command
AMETL	Agency Mission Essential Task List
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARCENT	Army Central Command
ASA(ALT)	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology)
ASN (RDA)	Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition)
BCOT	Basic Contingency Operations Training
BPA	Blanket Purchase Agreement
BSC	Balkans Support Contract
CAP	Civil Augmentation Program
CCAS	Contingency Contract Administration Service
CCF	Contingency Contracting Force
CCO	Contingency Contracting Officer
CCR	CENTCOM Regulation
CSSH	Contingency Contracting Student Handbook
CCSP	Contingency Contracting Support Plan
CDF	Contractors Deploying with the Force
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CG	Commanding General
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CINC	Commander in Chief
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
CLPSB	Commander in Chief Logistics Procurement Support Board
CMO	Contract Management Office
CO	Contracting Officer
COCO	Chief of Contracting Office
COCOM	Combatant Command

CON 234	DAU Contingency Contracting Course
CONCAP	Construction Capabilities
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
COR	Contracting Officer Representative
COSCOM	Corps Support Command
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CRC	CONUS Replacement Center
CSA	Combat Support Agency
CSART	Combat Support Agency Review
CSC	Combat Support Center
CSG	Corps Support Group
CSO	Combat Support Operations
CSS	Combat Service Support
DA	Department of the Army
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DAWIA	Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency
DCMAE	Defense Contract Management Agency East District
DCMAI	Defense Contract Management Agency International District
DCMAW	Defense Contract Management Agency West District
DCMC	Defense Contract Management Command
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DFARS	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directives
DoDI	Department of Defense Instructions
DoS	Department of State
EA	Executive Agent
EE	Emergency Essential
EO	Executive Order
EUCOM	European Command
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FARA	Federal Acquisition Reform Act (of 1996)
FASA	Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (of 1994)
FFP	Firm Fixed Price
FRAGO	Fragmentation Order
FY	Fiscal Year

GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCPC	Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card Holders
GCTF	Global Counter Terrorism Force
GSB&PP	Graduate School of Business & Public Policy
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HCA	Head of Contracting Activity
HNS	Host Nation Support
HQ PACAF	Headquarters Pacific Air Force
HQMC	Headquarters Marine Corps
IA	Individual Augmentee
ID	Infantry Division
IDIQ	Indefinite Delivery-Indefinite Quantity
IDP	Individual Development Plan
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentees
IPE	Integrated Planner and Executor
IRT	Initial Response Team
ITV	In-Transit Visibility
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JCCC	Joint Contingency Contracting Command
JCC-I	Joint Contracting Command-Iraq
JFARS	Joint Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JLPSB	Joint Logistics Procurement Support Board
JMO	Joint Maritime Operations
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning Execution System
JP	Joint Publication
JPG	Joint Planning Group
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPS	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JULLS	Joint Uniform Lesson Learned System
KBR	Kellogg, Brown and Root
LCLC	Lead Component for Logistics and Contracting
LCO	Leveraging Contracting Officer
LNO	Liaison Officer
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LOGPLAN	Logistics Plan
LP	Linear Programming
LPAM	Limitre Personnel Assignment Model
LRC	Lesser Region Conflict

MA	Mission Area
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MAJCOM	Major Command
MANREQ/FORSIZE	Manpower Requirements/Force Sizing
MARCENT	Marine Corps Central Command
MARCORSYSCOM	Marine Corps Systems Command
MARFORPAC	Marine Forces Pacific
MAW	Marine Aircraft Wing
MBA	Master's of Business Administration
MCF-I	Multi-Coalition Force - Iraq
MCO	Marine Corps Order
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MOPS	Military On-Line Personnel System
MOS	Military Occupational Series
MOSEK	Microsoft Excel Solver
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRC	Major Regional Conflicts
MROC	Marine Requirements Oversight Council
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTW	Major Theater War
NAF	Non-Appropriated Funds
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVAIR	Navy Air Systems Command
NAVFAC	Navy Facilities Engineering Command
NAVFACPAC	Navy Facilities Engineering Command Pacific
NAVSEA	Navy Sea Command
NAVSUP	Navy Supply Systems Command
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
NGO	Non Governmental Organizations
NMCARS	Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement
NMS	National Military Strategy
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command

NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NRCC	Naval Regional Contracting Center
NSS	National Security Strategy
NWC	Naval War College
OCONUS	Outside Continental United States
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OJE	Operation Joint Endeavor
ONS	Other Nation Support
OO	Ordering Officer
OPE	Operations Planning Element
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
	Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
OSD(AT&L)	
P&CO	Project and Contracting Office
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PARC	Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting
PBO	Property Book Officer
PCCOWG	PACOM Contingency Contracting Officer Working Group
PCO	Procuring Contracting Officer
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PD ²	Procurement Desktop Defense
PEO	Program Executive Office
PIIN	Procurement Instrument Identification Numbers
PL	Public Law
PM	Program Manager
PMOS	Primary MOS
POC	Point of Contact
QAR	Quality Assurance Representative
RCO	Regional Contracting Office
RFF	Request for Forces
RMS	Readiness Management Support
SAC	Supreme Allied Commander
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SAP	Simplified Acquisition Procedures

SAT	Simplified Acquisition Threshold
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SEP	Special Education Program
SF	Special Form
SMSGt	Senior Master Sergeant
SOCOM	US. Special Operations Command
SOCPAC	U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOFARS	Special Operations Command Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
SOW	Statement of Work
SPAWAR	Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
SPMAGTF	Special Marine Air Ground Task Force
STAMIS	Standard Army Management Information System
TDY	Temporary Duty
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
U.S.	United States
U.S.C.	United States Code
UCA	Unfinitized Contract Actions
UCC	Unified Combatant Command
UN	United Nations
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USARPAC	United States Army Pacific
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USD(AT&L)	Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)
USFJ	United States Forces, Japan
USFK	United States Forces, Korea
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Contingency contracting has been performed in one shape or another in every war the United States (U.S.) has ever fought. That being said, are the Department of Defense (DoD), Military Services, and DoD defense agencies conducting contingency contracting the best way? Are there areas that can be improved? If so, what areas could use improvement? These questions form the backdrop that prompted the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) to request a team to investigate and analyze the means by which Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) can effectively operate in a Joint contingency environment. In addition, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) wanted a team to validate its Contingency Contract Administration Services (CCAS) support proposed entry and exit criteria. How would these criteria affect DCMA's ability to effectively prepare for and execute contingency operations?

There are many definitions for the word contingency. Specifically, the Contingency Contracting Student Handbook (CCSH) defines a contingency as "an emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversions, or by required military operations." The U.S. continues to deploy troops to many foreign countries including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Djibouti, in response to the above mentioned contingencies. Since most of these operations are precipitated by unforeseen events, they often require the quick deployment of troops. CCOs are sent to provide direct support to these warfighters.

Within the Joint, multi-Service, and multi-National areas, CCOs are responsible for acquiring or procuring supplies, services and construction that help to provide combat support, combat service support, and other logistics support to deployed units since they are the only personnel authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of the U.S. Government. One of the principal ways the CCO gets the information needed to execute their mission is from the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP), which is the vehicle that describes the support required when troops are rapidly deployed. Part of this

research focused on the robustness and execution of the CCSP at both the Service Component and Combatant Command (COCOM) level.

Two methodologies were employed to complete this research: (1) subjective literature reviews of U.S. Joint contingency contracting policies and guidelines; library information resources; books and magazines; and websites, and (2) qualitative personal interviews with representatives from the Joint Staff J4; Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD(AT&L)); Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition); Army Contracting Agency (ACA); ASN(RD&A); Headquarters, Marine Corps; DCMA Headquarters Combat Support Center (CSC); DCMA International District (DCMAI); U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). While the principal focus was on preparation for contingency operations and validation of DCMA's entry and exit criteria, recommendations emerged on how the DoD might improve manning, experience, and structure to accomplish contingency contracting operations, and the feasibility of creating a Joint Contingency Contracting Command (JCCC) within DoD to serve as a central point for all contingency contracting. Other key issues discovered during this research: (1) there is contingency contracting guidance from DoD and each Service, but a combined Joint publication would be useful; (2) each Service and most DoD agencies collect information on lessons learned, some of which is put into the Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS), but some Components do not take advantage of this wealth of information before a person deploys for a contingency; (3) some Service Components and COCOMs do not have fully qualified contracting officers fulfilling the necessary roles given specific contingency contracting mission requirements; (4) the current structure/organization of Service Components and COCOMs in terms of contingency contracting may need to be altered to better support the warfighter; and (5) DCMA CSC and DCMAI are critical participants of the contingency contracting team and need clear entry and exit criteria.

While this report covers many issues dealing with Joint contingency contracting, there is still much research that could be done in this area. Areas of interest for further research include: (1) conducting a more thorough analysis of Joint Publications (JP) and Service specific information on contingency contracting; (2) reviewing the background as

to why DCMA was asked to perform preaward activities as well as contract administration at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom; (3) conducting a critical analysis on why DCMA needs clear contingency contracting entry and exit criteria; and (4) conducting an analysis as to how each Service and DCMA can ensure that for contingency contracting, the right person is put in the right job with the right education.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

There are many definitions for the word contingency. To have a common knowledge base, the research team used the one from the Defense Acquisition University's (DAU) Contingency Contracting course. Specifically, the Contingency Contracting Student Handbook (CCSH) defines a contingency as "an emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversions, or by required military operations." The U.S. continues to deploy troops to many foreign countries including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Djibouti, in response to the above mentioned contingencies. Since most of these operations are precipitated by unforeseen events, they often require the quick deployment of troops. Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) are sent to provide direct support to these warfighters.

As one can imagine, contingency contracting has played an important combat support and logistics role in the success of those deployments that ultimately become military operations. What is contingency contracting? There is no agreed-to term, so again the team referred to the CCSH definition.

Direct contracting support to tactical and operational forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and Military Operations Other Than War, both domestic and overseas.

Within the Joint, multi-Service, and multi-National areas, CCOs are responsible for acquiring or procuring elements that help to provide combat support, combat service support, and other logistical support to deployed units. Since they are fundamentally contracting officers, they are the only personnel who can obligate Government funds. One of the vital ways the CCO gets the information they need to execute their part of the mission is from the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP). The CCSP is the vehicle that describes the support required when troops are rapidly deployed. Part of this

research focused on the use of the CCSP at Service Component and Combatant Command (COCOM) level.

B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH

The objective of this report is to investigate and analyze the means by which CCOs can effectively operate in a Joint contingency environment and to validate the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) entry and exit criteria for contingency contracting missions. Through this research and analysis, the research team provides information that will improve how CCOs from the U.S. Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Contingency Contract Administration Services (CCAS) support teams from the DCMA operate in a Joint contingency environment. The research focused on contingency contracting guidance, policy, doctrine, lessons learned; contracting officers' roles, responsibilities, education; and the current structure/organization of Service Component and COCOM contingency contracting.

Recommendations will include how the Services' CCOs and the DCMA CCAS support teams can effectively prepare for and execute their contingency contracting missions; how the Department of Defense (DoD) can improve manning, experience, and structure to accomplish contingency contracting operations; and to determine if the establishment of a Joint Contingency Contracting Command (JCCC) within the DoD, which would have the responsibility of controlling the actions of contingency contracting in theater, is feasible.

C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The focus of this research effort includes: (1) an overview of the current guidance, policy and doctrine shaping today's contingency contracting environment; (2) an overview of the Services' and DCMA's contracting organizations; (3) a comparative analysis of two COCOM's--Pacific Command (PACOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM)--approach to contingency operations; and (4) a validation effort of DCMA's entry and exit criteria.

This research is limited to the roles and responsibility of the Joint CCOs we interviewed in the acquisition headquarters of the Service Components, CENTCOM, and

PACOM. The research team believes that DoD might be able to apply some of these recommendations to improve all contingency contracting. Also, the majority of the contingency contracting lessons learned come from operations over the last 15 years. Since Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990-1991, there has been a conscious effort in DoD to collect this information and place it into the Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS). That information is only as good as the people who make the effort to write down those lessons and the Commands who capture it while it is still relevant.

Throughout this research it is assumed that the reader has a basic knowledge and understanding of: (1) the organization of the U.S. military; (2) contracting procedures and regulations including both the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS); and (3) essential tools used to plan contingency operations such as Joint Operation Plans (OPLAN), CCSP, the Joint Operation Planning Execution System (JOPES), and Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD).

D. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this report includes a literature review of U.S. Joint contingency contracting policies and guidelines, library information resources, websites, books, and magazines. The researchers also conducted personal interviews with representatives from the Joint Staff J4; Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition); Army Contracting Agency (ACA); Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) [ASN(RD&A)], Headquarters, Marine Corps; DCMA Headquarters Combat Support Center (CSC); DCMA International District (DCMAI); CENTCOM; and PACOM.

E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary research question is: How can the U.S. Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and DCMA organize to better conduct Joint contingency contracting? The secondary research questions are:

1. Is the current Joint contingency contracting guidance/policy/doctrine useful?

2. Is it appropriate that only one Service is designated the Executive Agency for contingencies?
3. Do PACOM and CENTCOM have qualified personnel and the appropriate structure to effectively plan contingency contracting operations?
4. Are we truly moving to a Joint contingency contracting environment?
5. Should all the Services recognize each other's warrants during contingency contracting operations?
6. Should all Services' CCOs have the same length (time) of deployment?

F. DEFINITIONS

Acquisition – The FAR 2.101: Definitions of Words and Terms, defines acquisition as acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services (including construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase or lease, whether the supplies or services are already in existence or must be created, developed, demonstrated, and evaluated. Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing, contract performance, contract administration, and those technical and management functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by contract.

Contingency – An event that requires the deployment of military forces in response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and order, political instability, or a military operation.¹ Contingencies require plans for rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations and equipment.

¹ Defense Acquisition University, *Contingency Contracting (CON 234) Student Handbook*, November 2000, p. 2-3.

Contingency Contracting – Direct contracting support to tactical and operational forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and military operations other than war (MOOTW), both domestic and overseas.²

Contingency Operation – Title 10 (10 [United States Code] U.S.C. 101(a)(13)) defines a contingency operation as a military operation that—

(1) Is designated by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the U.S. or against an opposing military force; or

(2) Results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, or 12406 of 10 U.S.C., chapter 15 of 10 U.S.C., or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.

Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) – A person with delegated contracting authority to enter into, administer and terminate contracts on behalf of the U.S. Government in support of a local contingency, steady-state deployments, or other contingency operations. The CCO also acts as the primary business advisor to the deployed or on-scene commander.³

Contract – The FAR 2.101 defines a contract as a mutually binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish the supplies or services (including construction) and the buyer to pay for them. It includes all types of commitments that obligate the U.S. Government to an expenditure of appropriated funds and that, except as otherwise authorized, are in writing. In addition to bilateral instruments, contracts include (but are not limited to) awards and notices of awards; job orders or task letters issued under basic ordering agreements; letter contracts; orders, such as purchase orders, under which the contract becomes effective by written acceptance or performance; and

² Ibid.

³ Department of the Air Force. (2002) *Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS)*. Washington D.C. Appendix CC-102, p. 1.

bilateral contract modifications. Contracts do not include grants and cooperative agreements covered by 31 U.S.C.6301, *et seq.*

Contracting – The FAR 2.101 defines contracting as purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise obtaining supplies or services from nonfederal sources. Contracting includes description (but not determination) of supplies and services required, selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and award of contracts, and all phases of contract administration. It does not include making grants or cooperative agreements.

Contracting Officer (CO) – The FAR 2.101 defines a CO as a person with the authority to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings.

Executive Agent (EA) – The DoD Directive 5101.1 defines the DoD EA the head of a DOD Component to whom the SECDEF or the Deputy SECDEF (DEPSECDEF) has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD Components. The nature and scope of the DoD EA’s responsibilities, functions, and authorities shall be prescribed at the time of assignment and remain in effect until the SECDEF or DEPSECDEF revokes or supersedes them.

Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) – Authorized streamlined purchasing methods in FAR 13: SAP is used to expedite purchasing support to the warfighter. SAPs are authorized for construction up to the Simplified Acquisition Threshold and commercial commodities and services up to \$5 million.⁴

Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) – The FAR defines the SAT term as \$100,000, except for acquisitions of supplies or services that, as determined by the head of the agency, are to be used to support a contingency operation or to facilitate defense against or recovery from nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack (41 U.S.C. 428a); the term means--

⁴ Ibid. Appendix CC-102, p. 2.

(1) \$250,000 for any contract to be awarded and performed, or purchase to be made, inside the United States; and

(2) \$1 million for any contract to be awarded and performed, or purchase to be made, outside the United States.

G. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH

This report presents the information gained from this research in what the research team believes is a logical manner. Chapter I outlines the report's structure and direction. It discusses the objectives of the research, scope, limitations, assumptions and methodology. Chapter II presents an overview of today's Joint contingency contracting environment and its issues. Current guidance, policy and doctrine; command structures; phases of contingency contracting; designation of executive agents (EAs), and how each Service applies their FAR supplement are but a few of the topics discussed. Chapter III explores how various DoD (Service Component and DCMA) contingency contracting organizations are structured to perform their contracting roles and responsibilities and the issues related to performing the same in a contingency contracting arena. Chapter IV compares two unified combatant commands--PACOM and CENTCOM--approach to theater logistics support through contracting. Chapter V highlights issues related to the validation of DCMA's entry and exit criteria. The research team's overarching conclusions, recommendations and areas for further research are found in Chapter VI.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. POLICY, GUIDANCE AND DOCTRINE

A. OVERVIEW

Before examining Joint contingency contracting issues and challenges facing Contingency Contracting Officers (CCO) in today's Joint area of operations, it is essential to establish a basic level of understanding of the policy, guidance and doctrine that shapes that environment. In order to improve the reader's understanding of the contingency contracting environment, the first section of this chapter describes the types of contingencies and typical phases of contingency contracting. The second section provides a brief synopsis of the command relationships; Joint Publications (JP); and Department of Defense (DoD) contracting regulations, directions and instructions that shape the contingency contracting environment. In addition, the education and training requirements that affect contracting officer (CO) certifications and actions in a Joint contingency contracting environment are explored. Issues surrounding the current policy, guidance and doctrine are highlighted and analyzed in the third section; conclusions are presented in the following section. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the policy, guidance and doctrine findings and highlights previews of the upcoming chapter.

B. CONTINGENCIES

1. Types of Contingencies

The definition of contingencies is purposely broad enough to include four types of contingencies: Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRCs), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and Domestic Disaster/Emergency Relief. However, it is also purposely exclusive of military training exercises, routine installation and base operations, and systems and inventory control point contracting, both in the continental United States (CONUS) and land outside the CONUS (OCONUS). Contracting for contingencies is set apart from these later types of contracting efforts because each of these exclusions lacks an element of immediate risk to human life or national interests.

MRCs are conflicts where hostilities are on-going, imminent or likely and where there is a substantial commitment of United States (U.S.) military forces. Operation Unified Assistance, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) are examples of MRCs.

LRCs are also conflicts involving on-going, imminent or likely hostilities involving U.S. military, but where there is less than substantial commitment of forces. Operation Just Cause (Panama) is an example of a LRC.

Per JP 3-05, MOOTW encompasses a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than large scale combat operations usually associated with war. MOOTW are usually conducted outside the U.S.; however, they also include military support to U.S. civil authorities. JP 3-0 lists the following categories of MOOTW: Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, Counter-Drug Operations, Nation Assistance, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Civil Support Operations, Peace Operations, and Support to Insurgents. Operations Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq), Uphold Democracy (Haiti) and Joint Endeavor (Bosnia) are examples of MOOTW conducted in recent years.

Domestic Disaster Emergency Relief is technically a subset of MOOTW. These operations can range from natural and man-made disasters to civic disturbances to terrorist activity. Military missions in this area include efforts to mitigate the results of natural or man-made disasters such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, oil spills, riots, and major air, rail or highway accidents. Support to Hurricanes Charley, Jeanne and Andrew are examples of domestic disaster emergency relief.

2. Phases of Contingency Contracting

Contingency contracting will be conducted in two types of environments: mature and immature. A mature contracting environment is one characterized by a sophisticated vendor base and distribution system that can rapidly respond to changing requirements

⁵ Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 Sep 01, page V-1.

and priorities.⁶ Typically, the vendors in a mature environment have prior experience with U.S. Government contracting requirements and regulations and can readily satisfy most contingency requirements. In the best case, there is an existing DoD contracting office in place to process contingency force requirements. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Korea and Western Europe are examples of mature contracting environments.

On the other hand, an immature contracting environment is in an area with little or no built-up infrastructure. There are few vendors and of the available vendors few, if any, have previous experience contracting with the U.S. Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda are examples of immature contracting environments.

There are basically four phases⁷ of contracting support that can occur during contingencies: Mobilization/Initial Deployment, Build-Up, Sustainment, and Termination/Redeployment. While not all operations will follow the framework outlined below, it is useful for conceptualization and discussion of the contracting actions necessary to support contingencies.

a. Phase I: Mobilization/Initial Deployment

This is normally the first 30-45 days of a deployment and is characterized by an extremely high operations tempo, confusion and controlled chaos. The CCO's first priority will be responsiveness to basic life support requirements including billeting, food service--especially potable water, transportation and equipment rental, ground fuel, laundry and bath services, and refuse and sanitation services. During this phase, CCOs may find themselves in the undesirable position of being the requestor, approving official, certifying officer and transportation office for deliveries. Detailed planning can preclude some of these additional duties; however, physical limitations on the number of support personnel deployed in the early stages of a contingency will require a high degree

⁶ Defense Acquisition University, CON 234, Contingency Contracting Student Handbook, (2000), p.2-5.

⁷ The four phases of contracting support required during contingencies were developed by the authors from material reviewed and lessons learned from coursework at the Naval War College (NWC) and Graduate School of Business and Public Policy (GSB&PP). Specifically NW3276 Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) – Part 2 described and provided lessons learned of the typical phases of military operations. MN3303 (Principles of Acquisition and Contract Management) described and provided lessons learned about the typical tasks a CCO would face in establishing, running and disestablishing a contracting office in both immature and mature contingency environments.

of flexibility on the part of the CCO. Oral orders, use of U.S. Government charge card and cash payments will be the primary contracting actions.

b. Phase II: Build-Up

This phase is characterized by a reception and bed-down of the main body of deploying forces. In this phase, additional contracting personnel will generally arrive with their units, though not necessarily at a rate commensurate with the number of troops to be supported. The CCO's priorities during this phase will continue to be responsiveness to life support requirements, but attention must also be given to:

- (1) Gaining effective command and control over contracting and contracting support personnel.
- (2) Establishing a vendor base.
- (3) Putting requisitioning, funding and contracting controls and procedures in place.
- (4) Establishing Non-Appropriated Funds (NAF) contracting procedures to support quality of life programs.
- (5) Establishing Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA), consolidating requirements into purchase orders and contracts rather than using the high volume, and physically time consuming cash transactions.
- (6) Establishing an ordering officer (OO) network with effective control measures.

c. Phase III: Sustainment

This phase provides contracting support from the completion of the build-up phase until redeployment begins. The contracting activity will expand into contracts for additional quality of life, more permanent facilities and equipment, additional office supplies, and discretionary services. The CCO's priorities during this phase will be:

- (1) Establishing long-term contracts (indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity (IDIQ) and additional BPAs) and consolidating requirements wherever possible to achieve economies of scale, reduce costs, and mitigate risks.
- (2) Improving documentation of contracting actions and internal controls.
- (3) Increasing competition and depth of vendor base, to include off-shore sourcing for items and services not available within the immediate area.

- (4) Planning for transition to follow-on forces or termination and redeployment.

d. Phase IV: Termination/Redeployment

This phase is characterized by significant pressure and urgency to send the troops home. Typical new requirements include packing, crating and freight services; construction and operation of wash racks for vehicles; and commercial air passenger services if the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is not providing this service. The CCO will be required to terminate and close out existing contracts and orders. Ratifications and claims must be processed to completion. Contracting for life support services must continue until the last troop leaves. When a follow-on force is required, the CCO must prepare contracts and files for delegation or assignment to the incoming contracting agency such as the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the United Nations (UN). Often, the CCO can expect to be the one of the last persons to leave the area.

Hostilities may break out during any phase of a contingency. The more rapidly the contracting operation matures, the better support CCOs will be capable of providing when hostilities do occur. During hostilities several problems are unavoidable. Contractor employees may not report for work, abandon the job site or refuse to drive vehicles in certain areas; vendors and shops may close during hours of darkness or completely; the threat of snipers, terrorists and enemy action against the CCO while traveling in the local community may increase significantly. The CCO must advise supported units of these likelihoods so they can plan to perform essential contracted tasks with military manpower, or they will be forced to do without.

C. BACKGROUND

1. Command Relationships

The chain of command begins with the National Command Authority (NCA), which is comprised of the President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), who control the armed forces. The chain of command follows two distinct branches (Figure 1). The first branch of authority runs from the President, through the SECDEF, directly to the Combatant Commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The

second branch, used for purposes other than the operational direction of forces assigned to the Combatant Command (COCOM), runs from the President, through the SECDEF, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

The chain of command for contracting follows both branches. Planning for and executing contracting operations follows the first branch while the official authority to contract follows the second. The chain of command at every level should be involved in planning and providing for contracting support. In addition, communication and integration are both critical and need to occur in order to have successful contracting support.




Figure 1. Chain of Command
(Source: From JP 3.0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, p. II-5)

The Military Departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the SECDEF. The Secretaries of each Military Department direct and control their forces through the Service chiefs. In addition, the Secretaries provide administrative (personnel and finance), legal, and logistical support to their own forces. Contracting authority begins at the Military Department level. For example, COs in the Army get their

authority from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)). The ASA(ALT) has the authority to appoint a command or theater contracting executive (Head of Contracting Activity (HCA)) or Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC).

2. Joint Publications

A myriad of JPs address various aspects of planning for and executing contracting missions in a Joint environment. The subjective literature reviews and qualitative personal interviews exposed the research team to several of these publications, especially JP 3.0 – Joint Operations, JP 4.0 – Joint Logistics, JP 4.07 – Common User Logistics, and JP 4.08 – Logistics in Multinational Operations, which contain cursory language pertaining to the acquisition of contracted supplies, services and construction in support of military operations. While all of these publications touch upon broad, top-level aspects of contracting, none provide a detailed strategic approach for articulating and understanding the mission, objective, purpose of the operation, and commander's intent.

3. Contracting Regulations, Directives and Instructions

a. Contracting Regulations

Normally, DoD contracting is performed in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and various Service or COCOM supplements including: Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS), Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS), Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS), and Special Operations Command Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (SOFARS).

The FAR is the primary regulation used by COs to purchase supplies, services and construction, and the DFARS specifically applies to DoD contracting activities. The DFARS does not specifically address contingency contracting; therefore, each Service and the DCMA have developed tailored guidelines and procedures to fill this void. The following Table outlines the various Services' and DCMA's Contingency Contracting guidance.

Table 1. Services' and DCMA Contingency Contracting Guidance⁸

SERVICE/AGENCY	SUPPLEMENT
Air Force	AFFAR Supplement Appendix CC
Army	AFARS Manual No. 2
Navy	Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Instruction 4230.37A and NAVSUP 713
Marine Corps	Marine Corps Order (MCO) P4200.15, Appendix B
DCMA	DCMA Instructions and DCMA Guidebook; chapter entitled <i>Contingency CAS</i> ⁹

While these procedures are similar and typically include discussions on policy, authority, funding and structure, each is different. These differences manifest themselves when COs from different Services are brought together to perform contingency contracting operations.

During contingency operations, several common exceptions¹⁰ to the normal DoD contracting procedures may be invoked. These include:

- Limiting sources in solicitations when an urgent and compelling requirement precludes full and open competition.
- Omitting synopses of proposed contract actions when it would delay award and injure the U.S. Government.
- Using oral solicitations, awarding letter contracts and other forms of undefinitized contract actions to expedite the start of work.
- Requesting authority to award emergency requirements before resolving a protest against contract award.
- Raising the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) to allow for the acquisition of supplies or services in support of a contingency operation; the SAT is raised to \$250,000 for any contract awarded inside the U.S. and \$1,000,000 outside the U.S.

⁸ Created by the research team based on research data collected/analyzed.

⁹ The *Contingency CAS* chapter of the DCMA Instruction and DCMA Guidebook is currently unavailable pending rewrite. New instructions and/or guidance are anticipated in the third quarter of Fiscal Year 05.

¹⁰ McMillon, Chester L. *Contingency Contracting within the Department of Defense: A Comparative Analysis*, p. 5

b. Department of Defense Directives and Instructions

Literature reviews of current DoD directives and instructions (DoDD/DoDI) such as DoDD 1400.31 and DoDI 3020.37, which discuss DoD policy and guidance regarding contractors deploying with the force (CDF), or accompanying the force (CAF), do not reflect current realities. Interviews with senior officials on the Joint Staff (J4) and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)), Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy reveal that these policies and guidance are being updated to reflect lessons learned during OEF and OIF. Additionally, DFARS Case 2003-D087 is expected to be approved shortly, which will redefine contract language for contractor personnel supporting a force deployed outside the U.S.

4. Education and Training

When the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1991, was signed into law¹¹ on November 5, 1990, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) was enacted. Essentially, the DAWIA requires the SECDEF, acting through the USD(AT&L), to establish education and training standards, requirements, and courses for the civilian and military acquisition workforce. Its impact on the contracting career field was immediate and far-reaching.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2002, signed into law¹² December 28, 2001, amended the DAWIA CO qualification requirements as originally in Public Law (PL) 101-510. The amendment raised the educational bar that new entrants in the contracting career field must meet to serve as a CO with authority to award or administer contracts exceeding the \$100,000 SAT, yet exempted some personnel already in place. Specifically, Section 824 of this Act amended 10 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) § 1724 to include a requirement for a baccalaureate degree and 24 semester credit hours of study in a business-related discipline and to exempt the following DoD employees or members of the military from the requirement that COs and others in GS-1102 series contracting

¹¹ PL 101-510 applies

¹² PL 107-107 applies

positions and similar military positions had to meet: (1) those who served as a CO with authority to award or administer contracts in excess of the \$100,000 SAT on or before September 30, 2000; (2) those who served as an employee in the GS-1102 series or as a member of the armed services in a similar occupational specialty on or before September 30, 2000; (3) those in the contingency contracting force (e.g. "members of the armed forces whose mission is to deploy in support of contingency operations and other operations of the DoD"); and (4) those appointed by the SECDEF to developmental positions.

COs must meet all DAWIA career field and level certification education, experience, and training requirements before requesting or being approved for certification. Under DAWIA, incumbents of all acquisition positions (officer, enlisted and civilian) are expected to meet these requirements. A graphic depiction of these changes is provided in Figure 2. On April 10, 2003, in accordance with the exemption provision of PL 107-107, then USD(AT&L) Aldridge issued a memorandum that established "minimum qualification criteria for accession, development, and deployment of the contingency contracting force workforce." In turn, each Military Department was authorized to establish additional policies and procedures for its contingency contracting force (CCF).




Figure 2. GS-1102 Educational Requirements
 (Source: From DCMA website, <http://www.dcma.mil>)

D. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

1. Issues

Several issues were identified that reflect shortcomings in current policy, guidance and doctrine; specifically:

- Operation Plans (OPLAN) do not address contracting for contingency operations on a strategic level.
- Command relationships are unclear and contribute to inefficiencies and ineffective accomplishment of the contracting mission.

- Unqualified COs are deployed to support the OIF contingency contracting effort.
- Contracting billets are filled based on rank versus capability.
- Designation of a single executive agent (EA) leads to confusion when deployed CCOs are mandated to use another Services' FAR supplement.

The following sections explain and analyze these issues in more detail.

2. Operation Plans

Interviews with senior officials on the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) J3, J4 and J5 staff found PACOM does not address contingency contracting on a strategic level. The strategic level is defined as, "The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives."¹³ OPLANs do not fully address contracting; however, J4's annexes designate a lead service or EA for each plan. For example, Appendix 9 to Annex D (Logistics) for one of PACOM's concept plans (CONPLAN) states "[Headquarters, Pacific Air Force] HQ, PACAF is designated EA and lead contracting service for coordinating contingency contracting planning and support. HQ PACAF/LGC is the designated Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) for this CONPLAN."

The designation of lead service or EA is rotated between Services for Joint exercises and crises. No personnel with a contracting background were found on either the J3, J4 or J5 staffs. Neither J3 nor J5 had contact with the DCMA liaison officer (LNO). PACOM staff indicated that, while they would like to have a knowledgeable contracting person on staff, current resource levels would not support it. PACOM recently experienced a 15 percent staff reduction and are currently staffed at about one person for every four in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

Planning for today's contingency contracting operations must occur at a strategic level. Gone are the days when the Services cultivated their own organic logistic capabilities. The end of the Cold War contributed to this loss. Following the fall of the

¹³ DoD Dictionary of Military Terms. Retrieved on June 7, 2005 from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/s/05084.html>

Berlin Wall, each Service's end strength was reduced. Decisions made at the highest echelons meant that non-combat roles would be reduced and combat related positions would be maintained or even grown (more teeth than tail). To supplement their reduced capabilities, the Services turned to civil augmentation programs (CAP) to provide logistic support for deployed troops; however, they did not change their approach to planning operations. Key partners are not included in deliberate or crisis action planning, and the rationale as to when to initiate, execute and disengage CAP support is not adequately documented. JPs should be revised to reflect this new era of logistic support.

Recently, the Joint Staff (J7) has appointed the U.S. Army as the Lead Agent for the development of JP 4-XX, Contracting and Contractor Management in Joint Operations; Joint Staff (J4) is assigned as the Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor. Joint doctrine is to be developed at the tactics, techniques, and procedures level for contracting and contracting management.

The researchers believe that language of the following nature be considered by the Army in their development of the new JP: *Future CAP requirements should be considered early in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process, (e.g. in the initial phase of both the Deliberate Action and Crisis Action Planning processes)*. By considering the types of requirements that the Services will need prior to actually deploying, arrangements through Host Nation Support (HNS) and "husbanding" contracts can be made. This will ensure the Services only use the CAP contracts for a limited amount of time and not for extended periods. By doing this, they are able to both save money and guarantee the best possible support for deployed forces.

3. Command Relationships

The Army Contracting Agency (ACA) was established on October 1, 2002. Regional Contracting Office (RCO) Hawaii reports to ACA Pacific Region. While contracting personnel are assigned to the RCO, individual service members belong to either the 25th Infantry Division (ID) (now U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)) or 45th Corps Support Group (CSG). At the time of the research team's January 2005 visit, the Chief, Contingency Contracting Division, was assigned to the 25th ID and attached to the RCO. This matrix organization structure results in a conflict between the contracting and

operational chains of command. The research team observed high levels of frustration with the current structure especially with regard to evaluations, career progression, and securing funds for mission-related activities such as participation in theater exercises and execution of the contracting mission.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) delegated the Department of the Army (DA) responsibility for acquisition and program management support for all efforts supporting security, humanitarian relief and reconstruction in Iraq, yet the DA was not ready to fully execute the contingency contracting mission shortly after OIF was initiated. In the beginning, the command structure led to inefficiencies as Services competed against one another for scarce resources. Not having the proper structure to integrate contingency contracting led to a misalignment of contracting plans and OPLANs via the Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN).¹⁴ In the 3rd Infantry Division's (Mechanized) after action report, several problems were noted that resulted from inadequate prior planning (e.g., lack of appropriate amounts of vehicular fluids and repair parts). The lack of these products had a lasting effect on fleet readiness. Units had to purchase these items on the local economy, competing in effect with other Service components. Additional items in high demand throughout OIF were vehicle leases, concrete, and bottled water. A senior official with CENTCOM J4 concurs that poor initial planning caused various contracting offices to compete for items on the local economy. (Despite subsequent research and telephonic inquiry, the research team was not able to validate specific details on how these problems adversely impacted actual missions.)

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which later became the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), was not ready to execute its contracting mission. Historically, the Department of State (DoS) has taken the lead in reconstruction and humanitarian assistance projects. In this case however, DoD asked for and was granted the authority to assume this responsibility. This authority was given in late January, and by March, U.S. forces were engaged in war. Due to the insufficient

¹⁴ Anderson, M. and Flaherty, G. MBA Professional Report: *Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan within the Joint Planning Process Framework* (Monterey: NPS, December 2003), 41.

amount of time ORHA had to plan, they were not able to adequately set up and staff this office.

Initially ORHA did not have sufficient contracting personnel in country to handle the enormous amount of contracting required to support the war effort. Additionally, those personnel they did have were missing the necessary forms and equipment to prosecute the mission. As a result, they requested assistance from DCMA, which led to DCMA Iraq being granted a waiver to perform preaward contract activities, contract award and contract management. Today, through missteps and lessons learned, the command relationships have matured. This proves the critical nature of planning in the success of any mission. When planning, it is paramount that you have early involvement of key stakeholders, because only then can you mitigate future risks and ensure all interests are covered. During this early planning, there needs to be a clear delineation of each stakeholder's roles, responsibilities, and function.

In October 2004, U.S. CENTCOM established the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq¹⁵ (JCC-I in Figure 3). JCC-I was established to provide a unified contracting effort and complete visibility over all contracting forces in Iraq as well as reconstruction projects. Brigadier General Seay was appointed the first HCA; Major General Urias is the current HCA. Time will tell if the JCC-I is able to: (1) achieve through unity of effort economies of scale that exemplify best business practices; (2) establish common procedures for other Service component contracting offices; (3) establish theater contracting officer warrant procedures; (4) establish a Joint Logistics Procurement Support Board (JLPSB); and (5) serve as a model for commerce in Iraq and a catalyst for economic growth.

¹⁵ Bolton letter to General Seay, 27 Oct 04, re: HCA Appointment.




Figure 3. Joint Contracting Command-Iraq
(Source: From U.S. CENTCOM Interview, February 22, 2005)

4. Contracting Officer Qualifications

ACA utilizes the Individual Development Plan (IDP) concept coupled with DAWIA guidelines to train their members of the Army Acquisition Corps (51C). During the research group's interview in September 2004 with a senior officer in RCO Hawaii, the team was told that a junior officer deployed to Afghanistan as a CCO despite the fact that he had not completed CON 234, Contingency Contracting, or fulfilled all the DAWIA mandated education, training and experience required for Level I certification. Due to his lack of qualifications, this CCO's ability to effectively contribute to the contingency contracting mission was severely limited. During his time in theater, a more experienced senior Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) mentored this "green" CCO. The

officer was basically doing a contracting specialist's job (for which he was also not trained), where he was writing contracts and then submitting them to the NCO for review. He did not know how to work the Procurement Desktop Defense (PD²); the NCO negotiated all the contracts, and the officer worked under his supervision.

This above situation developed because of the matrix organization structure. The matrix organization structure can often lead to an internal power struggle. The power struggle in this case was waged between the CCO's operational and administrative chains of command. RCO Hawaii (his administrative chain of command) did not want to deploy this junior officer. Instead they wanted to give him extensive on-the-job training and formal training. In this case, the 25th ID (his operational chain of command) had a requirement to meet and ordered the billet filled. The 25th ID commander knew that he had a CCO that "belonged" to him and wanted him back at his unit. He did not take into consideration the fact that this CCO was one month out of school and had not yet received the required certification for contingency contracting, and had minimal experience in the field. Unfortunately, this conflict adversely impacted the contingency contracting mission. Had there been a clear chain of command, (e.g. resulting from placing this individual under some form of contingency contracting command), this power struggle would not have occurred. By establishing a Joint Contingency Contracting Command (JCCC), there would be a larger pool of COs to pull from, and the command would be better prepared to match mission requirements with the correct CO's rank, education, experience, and warrant levels. The establishment of a consolidated contingency contracting organization could alleviate this type of issue in the future.

5. Contracting Billets

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) uses the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept to plan, train and execute contingency/war operations. The USAF contains 10 AEFs which operate on 20-month cycles. For 14 months of each cycle, members of an AEF will work at their assigned duty stations completing their 'normal' job. Then, for the next two months, they train and prepare for possible deployment. If a contingency arises needing a unit to deploy, and it is their unit's "turn", they will be the deploying unit during the following four months. If no operation/contingency arises, then that specific unit will not

deploy, and the next AEF (in sequential order) will be the deploying unit during the following four-month time block. While the known yet short deployment period promotes retention, it can create a continuity problem in theatre. For example, a contractor will outwait a CCO they do not want to deal with.

The USAF approach for fulfilling mission requirements is not necessarily based on rank. The USAF fills billets to the mission requirement versus filling billets based upon a rank requirement. For instance, a Level II/7 Senior Master Sergeant (SMSgt) who is fully qualified will be deployed instead of a Captain. This approach often creates conflict with other Services or lead agents who may be expecting an officer. Joint language needs to be drafted that addresses filling billet requirements based upon mission requirements and experience levels versus filling billets solely upon rank. This allows the Joint Commander to take advantage of the significant experience and expertise that resides within the Services professional enlisted contracting specialists.

6. Executive Agent

In September 2004, a senior official with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition) (ASN(RDA)) expressed concern that other Services were apprehensive about executing contracting in accordance with the AFARS instead of their own Service supplements. Examination showed that this unease is based on CCOs' familiarity with their own doctrine versus that of other Services. The steep learning curve associated with gaining familiarity with another Service's acquisition supplement may have an adverse impact on the CO's ability to support the contingency operation. The research team's initial recommendation is to require that all Services exclusively follow the FAR and DFARS while in theater. This would create a level playing field for all participants by forcing each Service to follow the same regulations. The second possible solution is for Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff to create a Joint Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (JFARS) that will be specifically used in theater for Joint operations.

Operating solely under the FAR/DFARS is a good first step measure to moving to a new supplement. The reason is the Services are familiar with these documents, and it would require no additional training and would not subject one Service to follow another

Service's supplement. The disadvantage is that each Service would still need to change the way they typically conduct business by diverting from their supplement to the FAR/DFARS.

Contingency contracting in a Joint environment should be governed by the FAR and DFARS. Individual Service supplements should be set aside, and a single supplement encompassing Joint contingency contracting guidance should be introduced. In developing this new supplement, the best of the best from the current Service supplements (as detailed in Table 1 of Chapter II), should be brought together to form a single cohesive and comprehensive document.

Another problem the researchers discovered was that CCOs must also await their new warrant even though they probably already have a valid warrant from their home station. Often the HCA is reluctant to take on the responsibility of awarding a warrant to a person he or she believes is not fully compliant with the required education, certification, and in particular, experience levels. It was mentioned in the interviews that in the case of Iraq, the Army HCA was concerned about awarding a warrant to Marine COs. The reason noted has to do with the impression that Marines tend to be COs "part-time," (e.g. they only do a three year payback tour) and their lack of experience worried him. The Air Force also experienced some problems relating to the fact that some of their personnel, although warranted by their home unit, did not have all the required certifications. Since they were missing some of these prerequisites, the HCA did not feel comfortable awarding them a warrant, even though they were perhaps the most experienced in contracting. This proves a significant burden considering that Air Force personnel were deploying for four-month cycles—a two-week delay in awarding a warrant means the CCO personnel were inefficient a large portion of the time they were in country.

E. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

All the issues described above are symptoms of inadequate planning, ineffective communications, limited integration and poor execution. To resolve these issues, the research team recommends adoption of the following courses of action:

1. OPLANs do not address contracting for contingency operations on a strategic level.

- Ensure the planning for today's contingency contracting operations occurs at a strategic level.
- Involve key stakeholders in every stage of the planning process, but especially during the initial phases when the requirements are being shaped.
- Reflect new era of logistics support in revised JPs. The Joint Staff (J7) has recently appointed the U.S. Army as the Lead Agent for the development of JP 4-XX, Contracting and Contractor Management in Joint Operations, which should deal with this problem.

2. Command relationships are unclear and contribute to inefficiencies and ineffective accomplishment of the contracting mission.

- COs should be assigned to the RCO instead of assigned to their operational unit.

3. COs were not qualified before they were deployed to support the OIF contingency contracting effort.

- Each Service needs to conduct early identification of roles, functions and missions to alleviate some of the problems that occurred with the contingency contracting operation.
- Each Service has a limited number of COs available. With the increasing regularity of contingencies throughout the world, the chances of them deploying are increased. The onus remains on the individual and the units to ensure their personnel are properly trained and have the requisite knowledge and certifications to fill a contingency contracting billet when required.

4. Billets for contracting are filled based on rank versus capability.

- When requesting contingency contracting personnel from sister Services, the requestor must be aware of the differences in the rank and experience of their personnel, and make sure our requirements are based on the experience and capability of an individual vice that person's rank.

5. Designation of a single EA leads to confusion when deployed CCOs are mandated to use another Service's FAR supplement.

- Conduct all contracting actions in accordance with the FAR and DFARS only; this mandate would level the playing field.

- Develop, as an alternative, a contingency contracting FAR supplement that all Service contracting components would adhere to for conducting contracting operations in theater.

This chapter provides an overview of the current policy, guidance and doctrine that shapes the contingency contracting environment. It highlights issues that have the potential to degrade CO support of a contingency operation and provides several recommendations to improve contingency contracting efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally, it sets the framework for the next chapter that will analyze the structure of each Service's and DCMA's contracting organizations.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONS

A. OVERVIEW

This chapter describes the various Services' and the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) contingency contracting organizational structure. After exploring the various contracting organizations, the chapter examines contracting authority, Joint contingency operations, the acquisition team, the contingency contracting environment and the three civil augmentation programs (CAP) that support them: the United States (U.S.) Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), and Construction Capabilities (CONCAP) for the Navy and Marine Corps. The chapter concludes with a thorough analysis of the acquisition pipeline¹⁶ and the Limitre¹⁷ Personnel Assignment Model (LPAM).

B. CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONS

1. U.S. Army (USA)

The Army is organized by corps, divisions, brigades, battalions and companies (Figure 4). In addition, support commands such as Corps Support Command (COSCOM) and Division Support Command (DISCOM) support tactical units (the warfighters).

Typically, contracting officers (CO) are assigned to the COSCOM and/or DISCOM for administrative purposes, but are really assigned to the installation contracting office for day-to-day activities, as an installation CO. When called upon to assist their unit in real world contingencies, COs prepare contracting support plans in concert with the senior COs and/or the respective Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC). COs take part in site surveys and establish contact with local

¹⁶ Acquisition pipeline is a reference to the Services' ability to recruit, train, promote and retain qualified members for the contracting career field.

¹⁷ In parallel to this research, one member of the research project along with two members of her cohort developed the Limitre (Lisa Haptonstall, Michael Lassen and Gordon "Tres" Meek) Personnel Assignment Model based on the principles presented in the Naval Postgraduate School's Graduate School of Business and Public Policy course GB4043, Business Modeling. The working paper, dated 15 March 2005, is entitled Contingency Contract Administration Services (CCAS) Team Assignment Model.

embassies or existing Department of Defense (DoD) contracting personnel in or near the mission area.




Figure 4. Department of the Army Contingency Contracting
(Source: From CON 234, Contingency Contracting Student Handbook)

When deployed, the COs usually co-locate with the established contracting offices in or near the mission area from which they might derive support and determine the location of the local vendor base and the availability and suitability of commercial goods and services. In addition, they fill support requirements, as directed by their commander.

COs are usually company or field grade officers with limited contracting experience. Unlike other Services, COs begin their careers in another field other than contracting. Once accessed into the acquisition career field, COs receive contracting education, training and experience and earn their contracting warrants. Once officers have been accessed into the Acquisition Corps, they will remain in the acquisition career field for the remainder of their military career.

In addition to the CO, the USA also recruits Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) for its acquisition career corps. Once accessed, NCOs are given skill identifiers and are

exclusively assigned to contracting enlisted billets alongside the CO. Though this mentoring program is still in its infancy, the Army has plans to increase these pairings over the coming years.

2. U.S. Air Force (USAF)

The Air Force is organized by numbered wings, groups, squadrons and flights (Figure 5). COs and NCOs are located in the contract squadron under the logistics group of an air wing. The Air Force maximizes the use of its Officer and NCO ranks by assigning them to the contracting field upon entry.

The Air Force has a well-defined and long-established career Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for enlisted contracting personnel. Enlisted personnel can be accessed into the contracting field upon entry into the service. This is not to say the Air Force does not assign enlisted personnel of other grades into contracting. The Air Force accesses NCOs from all other MOSs in grades E-4 to E-7. However, the USAF considers accession at the earliest opportunity in the career development process vital to developing the future acquisition work force. Using two sources of accessions provides the Air Force with a mixture of enlisteds promoted within the system and personnel with prior field MOS experience in contracting.




Figure 5. Department of the Air Force Contingency Contracting
(Source: From CON 234, Contingency Contracting Student Handbook)

The Air Force contingency contracting office reviews contingency taskings and designates a sufficient number of qualified individuals to perform those assignments. If the contracting office requires more manpower to support Operation Plans (OPLAN) than can be reasonably provided without degrading home station functions, then the chief of the contracting office notifies the Major Command (MAJCOM) of the shortfall. MAJCOM functional areas will identify these manpower shortfalls through the Wartime Manpower Requirements/Force Sizing Exercises (MANREQ/FORSIZE) computation for their command and designate alternate resources to meet the tasking to include Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) if necessary.

3. U.S. Navy (USN)

The Navy is organized by five fleets¹⁸ and the supporting commands that sustain them. The Pacific Fleet is composed of the THIRD and SEVENTH Fleets. SEVENTH Fleet units serve throughout the western Pacific and Indian Ocean region, while THIRD Fleet units serve in the eastern and northern Pacific Ocean including the Bering Sea, Alaska, the Aleutian Islands and a sector of the Arctic. The SECOND (LANTFLT) and SIXTH (Naval Forces Europe) Fleet units serve in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, respectively. FIFTH Fleet (Naval Central Command) units serve throughout the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Other major claimants consist of the major weapon system commands such as Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR). Two major commands—Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) and Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC)—play a significant role in Navy and Joint contingency contracting (Figure 6).

¹⁸ Description of Navy's five fleets found online at <http://www.c3f.navy.mil/> (Last accessed June 7, 2005)




Figure 6. Department of the Navy Contingency Contracting
 (Source: From CON 234, Contingency Contracting Student Handbook)

Navy forces afloat are self-contained and self-supporting. As such, in some ways the contingency contracting mission is built-in to the logistical support for the fleet. Each ship's Supply Officer has a simplified acquisition threshold warrant for emergency purposes, but they rely on their port based contracting officers for replenishment purchases.¹⁹

4. U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)

The Marine Corps can rapidly shape and reshape itself to meet existing and emerging mission requirements. A pre-existing infrastructure is not required to assemble a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to meet an operational requirement. The MAGTF may be comprised of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Brigade (MEB), Unit (MEU) and Special MAGTF (SPMAGTF). Each of these organizations serves a different purpose. The MEF is designed to fight the Nation's wars, the MEB responds to crises, the MEU promotes peace and stability, and the SPMAGTF is designed to accomplish a specific mission such as riot control in Los Angeles (SPMAGTF LA), disaster relief (SPMAGTF Dade County), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) in Somalia (SPMAGTF Somalia).

¹⁹ Source CON 234, Student Handbook

The Marine Corps is organized around three MEFs²⁰, which are the principal war fighting element in the active force structure. The size and composition of a deployed MEF varies depending on the needs of the mission. Primarily though, each MEF is composed of one Division and one Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) along with various supporting elements. The divisions are further broken down into regiments, battalions, and companies, and the MAWs are further broken down into groups and squadrons. A notional MEF is shown in Figure 7.




Figure 7. Marine Expeditionary Force Contingency Contracting
(Source: From CON 234, Contingency Contracting Student Handbook)

In the Corps, enlisted Marines are accessed into the contracting field at the E-5 level and can remain in a contracting MOS throughout the remainder of their careers. The primary candidates for accession into the contracting field are from the supply administration field. Before personnel are accessed into the contracting field, they must successfully complete six months of mandatory on-the-job training. This requirement

²⁰ I MEF (California): 1st Marine Division and 3rd MAW

II MEF (North Carolina): 2nd Marine Division and 2nd MAW

III MEF (Okinawa): 3rd Marine Division and 1st MAW

provides them with the basic skills and technical expertise needed to become a contracting NCO.

Officers, on the other hand, are selected via the Special Education Program (SEP) to attend the resident Master of Business Administration (MBA) course at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). These officers represent the spectrum of Marine Corps officer MOSs and are not specifically accessed from the supply field. The majority of applicants have no prior contracting experience. These officers receive defense-focused graduate education in acquisition and contracting at NPS. Upon graduation from NPS, they satisfy Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level III education requirements for the contracting career field. Once they graduate, they incur a three-year obligation in the contracting MOS (9656). Here, their primary mission is to serve as warranted COs to bases, Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), Contingency Contracting Force (CCF), and Joint/DoD Individual Augmentee (IA) positions (as required).

After this obligation is fulfilled, they revert back to their primary MOS (PMOS) and leave the contracting field, although they do maintain a secondary designation as a CO. In other words, once these officers have the rank and an appropriate matching experience level, they leave the field, resulting in a significant drain to the career fields' knowledge base.

There is a current proposal to make the Marine contracting MOS a permanent career field (within the recently introduced Acquisition MOS), similar to the Army's structure. This would allow Marine officers to move into the contracting field and continue to perform in that capacity as a CO for the remainder of their military career. The current movement aims to develop contracting capability as a skill set within the Supply and Logistic officer community. This initiative will provide a mechanism to allow for multiple tours in acquisition to further develop and refine contracting skills, and finally, to capitalize on Acquisition PMOS efforts that support multiple tour utilization of contracting skills.

5. Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

The DCMA was established in March 2000 as the DoD contract manager. Their primary responsibility is to ensure federal acquisition programs, supplies, and services are delivered on time, within cost and meet performance requirements. DCMA provides customer focused acquisition life cycle and combat support to ensure readiness, worldwide 24 hours per day every day. DCMA professionals serve as the "eyes and ears" and in-plant representatives for buying agencies throughout the acquisition life cycle. Their vision is to be an indispensable partner chosen by their customers for the best solutions.

DCMA Headquarters is supported by three Districts: East, West and International. These Districts manage Contract Management Offices (CMO) designed around geographic boundaries, major defense contractors, and product lines or service specialties (Figure 8). For contingency contracting operations, the East and West Districts (DCMAE and DCMAW, respectively) act as force providers while the International District (DCMAI) deploys with the force.




Figure 8. Defense Contract Management Agency
(Source: From <http://home.dcma.mil/command/hqorg.htm>)

In accordance with U.S. Code (U.S.C.) Title 10, Section 193, DCMA is also designated as an independent combat support agency (CSA) within the DoD under the direction and control of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology & Logistics) [USD(AT&L)]; Figure 9 depicts DCMA's relationship to other Defense Agencies, Military Departments, USD(AT&L) and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).




Figure 9. DCMA's Lines of Authority
(Source: From DCMAI Combat Support Ops Briefing, 20 Jan 05)

It is DCMA's CSA designation that gives rise to its contingency contracting management role. One of their many functions includes assembling, training and deploying contingency contract administration service (CCAS) support teams to perform contract management services in declared and/or undeclared contingency environments such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans.

Since its creation as an independent CSA in March 2000, DCMA has deployed CCAS teams to manage contracts in virtually every contingency operation supported by the U.S. military in the past five years. CCAS teams are currently deployed to the Balkans (Bosnia/Kosovo), Horn of Africa (Djibouti), Philippines, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In these contingency environments, DCMA

provides contract management services for LOGCAP and AFCAP contracts. DCMA does not usually provide contract management for the Navy's CONCAP; NAVFAC usually retains administration of this contract and its associated orders. Typical contingency contract management tasks include monitoring cost performance and quality assurance compliance, inspection of services, property administration, purchasing system reviews and surveillance of contractors' theater performance, and acquisition planning support service and technical support to negotiations.

C. CONTRACTING AUTHORITY

Unless specifically prohibited by another provision of law, authority and responsibility to contract for authorized supplies, services and construction are vested in the Head of the Contracting Agency (HCA). The HCA may establish contracting activities and delegate broad authority to manage the agency's contracting functions to heads of such contracting activities. Contracts may be entered into and signed on behalf of the U.S. Government only by COs. In some agencies, a relatively small number of high level officials are designated COs solely by virtue of their positions. COs below the level of a HCA shall be selected and appointed under FAR 1.603.

COs have authority to enter into, administer or terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings. COs may bind the U.S. Government only to the extent of the authority delegated to them. COs shall receive from the appointing authority (see FAR 1.603-1) clear instructions in writing regarding the limits of their authority. Information on the limits of the COs' authority shall be readily available to the public and agency personnel. No contract shall be entered into unless the CO ensures that all requirements of law, executive orders, regulations, and all other applicable procedures, including clearances and approvals, have been met.

D. JOINT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

1. The Unified Combatant Commands

Operational control of the U.S combat forces is assigned to the nation's Unified Combatant Commands (UCC). A UCC is composed of forces from two or more Services, has a broad and continuing mission and is normally organized on a geographic basis; however, organization may also be along functional lines of responsibility. The

Unified Command Plan establishes the mission and geographic responsibilities of the combatant commanders. The number of UCCs is not fixed by law or regulation and may vary from time to time. As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on terrorism, the Unified Command Plan changed as well as the new defense strategy articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. The new Unified Command Plan became effective October 1, 2002. Major revisions that became effective on October 1, 2002, include:

- U.S. Northern Command was established to defend the U.S and provide military support to civil authorities.
- U.S. Joint Forces Command focus shifted to transforming U.S. military forces while their geographic responsibilities shifted to the U.S. Northern and European Commands.
- U.S. Space and Strategic Commands were merged to form an expanded U.S. Strategic Command.

Effective October 24, 2002, by direction of SECDEF Rumsfeld, the Combatant Commander's title Commander in Chief was changed to Commander as only the President could claim the Commander in Chief title.

Today there are currently the following nine UCCs:

- U.S. Central Command²¹ (MacDill Air Force Base, FL) is the unified command responsible for U.S. security interests in 25 nations that stretch from the Horn of Africa through the Arabian Gulf into Central Asia.
- U.S. European Command²² (Stuttgart, Germany) is to support and advance U.S. interests and policies throughout their assigned Area of Responsibility (AOR). This unified commander also serves as the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) Europe.
- U.S. Joint Forces Command²³ (Norfolk, VA.) forms a hybrid—functional and geographic—command, which creates a unique mission. They are the chief advocate for Jointness and leaders of military transformation. This unified commander also serves as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SAC Transformation (SACT).

²¹ U.S. CENTCOM home page, <http://www.centcom.mil/home/>

²² U.S. EUCOM home page, <http://www.eucom.mil/home/>

²³ U.S. JFCOM home page, <http://www.jfcom.mil/home/>

- U.S. Pacific Command²⁴ (Camp H.M. Smith, HI) enhances security and promotes peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region.
- U.S. Southern Command²⁵ (Miami, FL) shapes the environment within their AOR by conducting military-to-military engagement and counterdrug activities throughout the theater.
- U.S. Northern Command²⁶ (Peterson Air Force Base, FL) is responsible for homeland defense/security. This unified commander also serves as the commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
- U.S. Special Operations Command²⁷ (MacDill Air Force Base, FL) is responsible for providing combat-ready special operations forces to geographic combatant commands (COCOM) in support of U.S. national security interests.
- U.S. Strategic Command²⁸ (Offutt Air Force Base, NE) is to deter military attack on the U.S. and its allies, and should deterrence fail, employ forces so as to achieve national objectives.
- U.S. Transportation Command (Scott Air Force Base, IL) is the single manager of the U.S. global defense transportation system.

For the first time, the entire surface of the world is divided among the various Unified Commands.

²⁴ U.S. PACOM home page, <http://www.pacom.mil/home/>

²⁵ U.S. SOUTHCOM home page, <http://www.southcom.mil/home/>

²⁶ U.S. NORTHCOM home page, <http://www.northcom.mil/home/>

²⁷ U.S. SOCOM home page, <http://www.socom.mil/home/>

²⁸ U.S. STRATCOM home page, <http://www.stratcom.mil/home/>




Figure 10. UCC's Area of Responsibility
(Source: From <http://www.army.mil/organization>)

2. The Joint Commander

The Commander of the COCOM has the authority to assign forces, including directive authority for logistics. This gives him or her²⁹ ability to shift support resources within the theater. In a contingency environment, the logistics authority of the COCOM Commanding General (CG) enables him to use all capabilities of all forces assigned to his command as necessary for the accomplishment of the mission. This authority includes contracting support and allows him to utilize his contracting resources in a manner he feels most appropriate for the situation.

There are a number of ways in which he can direct contracting support be provided, ranging from a consolidated, centrally managed Joint contracting activity (managed by a single Service), to contracting support being provided separately by each Service. In Iraq, CENTCOM has a Joint Contracting Command, the JCC-I, in theater.

²⁹ While the research group recognizes that non-combat or civilian positions may be filled by qualified men or women, the team unanimously decided to use the masculine pronoun for ease of readability.

Regardless of the option used, the COCOM CG or a Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) determines how contracting support is organized and structured within the theater of operations.

3. The Joint Staff

The Joint Staff assists the Joint Commander in accomplishing his responsibilities. A truly "Joint Staff" is composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.




Figure 11. Organization of Joint Staff³⁰
(Source: From JCS website, <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/>)

4. Inter/Intra Service Relationships

Within the Army, contracting support is generally a straightforward process of identifying requirements, obtaining funding and contracting for supplies and services. Numerous Army and DoD contracting organizations provide contracting support for deployed forces.

³⁰ In this figure, the acronym C4CS stands for Command, Control, Communications and Computers Systems.

In a Joint environment, the process and objectives remain essentially the same. The contracting organizations may have a different approach; however, they still seek to obtain supplies and services as quickly as possible. In a Joint or Multinational environment, it is very possible that the contracting assets of another Service will be providing the contracting support. If not designated the lead Service for contracting support, the other Services, Defense Agencies and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) personnel must still work together within the framework of the operation order's (OPORD) contracting appendix to support the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) mission.

E. THE ACQUISITION TEAM

Contracting support for an operation is not the sole responsibility of the contracting organizations in theater. To have successful contracting support, the responsibility needs to be shared by various participants. Each participant is part of the acquisition team and plays an important role in making the process work (Figure 12). Together they all make contingency contracting a force multiplier.



Figure 12. The Acquisition Team³¹

Acquisition team members include:

1. The Commander

The commander is an essential part of the contracting support process and he or she³² is responsible for contracting support within the area of operation. He ensures contracting policies and guidance along with any plans are developed and fully integrated into the overall operations planning and execution. In addition, he establishes priorities

³¹ Based on the research and data collected and synthesized, the project team created this graphic conception of the Acquisition Team.

³² While the research group recognizes that non-combat or civilian positions may be filled by qualified men or women, the team unanimously decided to use the masculine pronoun for ease of readability.

for using contracting and allocates the available resources. As the commander, he is ultimately responsible for the contractor personnel³³ working in the area of operation.

2. The Comptroller

The comptroller is responsible for preparing and maintaining the Command's budget. As part of his duties, the comptroller certifies the funds before they are obligated for purchase requests. Even though it is the CO who obligates the U.S. Government, the comptroller must first approve and provide a written certification of funds availability for locally purchased goods and services. Because of the relationship between CO and comptroller, they are usually co-located in order to expedite purchase request processing.

3. Staff Proponent

The staff proponents are responsible for contracting support requirements within their functional areas. The staff proponents provide the technical expertise and oversight of requirements under their purview. In addition, they are responsible for approving any purchasing requests before submission to their specific contracting element.

4. Requiring Activity

In general, the requiring activity is the unit, activity or organization that identifies exactly what is needed, and perhaps more importantly, when it is needed. This is accomplished via development of a purchase request and statement of work (SOW). The SOW is a description of the need. The requiring activity must also obtain a certification of funds from the comptroller and an estimation of the cost.

Once a requirement has been properly contracted, the requiring activity will receive the supplies and services. It is up to the requiring activity to make sure they have received what they requested. If required, the requiring activity may be asked to provide personnel to the CO to serve as a Contracting Officer Representative (COR).

³³ Defense contractor personnel and their subcontractors are oftentimes referred to as Contractors on the Battlefield (COB), Contractors Accompanying the Force (CAF), or Contractors Deploying (CDF) with the Force. Verbiage in latest draft DoD Direction/Instruction refers to these personnel as Contingency Contractor Personnel During Contingency Operations while DFARS Case No. 2003-D087 references Contractor Personnel Supporting a Force Deployed Outside the U.S.

5. Contracting Officer

As stated previously, COs are the only individuals who can legally obligate the U.S. Government financially above the micro-purchase threshold. COs have a warrant, and they should be trained and certified so they can acquire the requested supplies and services. The CO is also held responsible for complying with the laws and regulations of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and Service supplements to the FAR.

6. Contingency Contracting Officer

First and foremost, the Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) is a CO. In most cases, the CCO may also have received special training to prepare for deployment into a contingency contracting environment. Contingencies are usually some type of non-expected emergency, a major theater war (MTW) (e.g. Iraq), small-scale contingencies (Somali), peacekeeping (Bosnia), disaster relief (Asian Tsunami), and humanitarian relief (Haiti).

During the contingency, the CCO may face physical danger. Depending on the type of contingency, the CCO could be operating under an environment of extreme mission urgency, and therefore, could be working long hours. It is a historical fact that CCOs often deploy on short notice and by circumstance will have to operate in a location that they know very little about. Once on the ground, the CCO must quickly begin dealing with contractors who probably have little or no knowledge of U.S. Government contracting practices. The office for a CCO, especially in an immature environment, may not be as well equipped as their home offices.

7. Judge Advocate General

The Judge Advocate General (JAG) serves as the legal support for the CO's contracting options. It is important that all contract actions be done legally. Throughout the contracting process, the JAG can provide contract law advice to the CO.

8. Finance Officer

The finance officer is responsible for ensuring that payment for all contracted supplies and services is accurate and on-time. This is a critical part of the contracting

process. Finance officers have another important function; they must train, support, and supervise the paying agents (see below). Paying agents pay the contractors/vendors for the goods and services that are provided. Under most situations, the CO will not be the one disbursing funds. The finance elements perform this function. However, if there is no finance or paying agents in theater, then the CO will have to perform this function.

9. Paying Agents

Paying agents were formally referred to as Class “A” disbursing agents. The paying agents are appointed by the finance element or officer to make cash payments to vendors for supplies and services that the CO acquired. These agents have no contracting authority, and they perform their duties as specified in their appointment orders. The amount of funds that the paying agent may disburse is set by the finance element. Appointments are usually limited to commissioned officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs. An individual cannot simultaneously serve as both a paying agent and an ordering officer (OO).

10. Ordering Officer

Like COs, OOs can be appointed using FAR 1.603-3: [CO] Appointment as a guide. The OO is a person authorized to make purchases up to a specific limit, which is usually the micro-purchase threshold. Under normal circumstances, the micro-purchase threshold is \$2,500 (supplies/services)/\$2,000 (construction), but the special emergency procurement authority increases the dollar amount for supplies/services to \$15,000 inside the U.S. (CONUS) and \$25,000 outside the U.S. (OCONUS).³⁴ OOs are normally nominated by their particular command and appointed by the chief of the theater/mission contracting element. The OO uses many methods to purchase goods and services. OOs may use imprest funds, blanket purchase agreements (BPA), SF44 purchases, or the U.S. Government credit card. As with the paying agents, the appointments for OOs are usually limited to commissioned officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs.

³⁴ Final Rule, FAR Case 2003-022, effective date January 19, 2005.

11. Receiving Official

The receiving official is normally from the supply activity or the unit requiring the support. Their responsibilities include material receipt documentation, inspection and distribution of procured goods. The receiving official has to be identified to the CO when the request is originally made. After the receiving official accepts the contractor's (vendor's) goods or services the receiving official must forward a receiving report to the CO. This is done to verify the delivery of goods or services. The CO will have to review the receiving reports, make sure they are valid, and authorize payment to the vendor.

12. Contracting Officer Representative

Detailed information about the COR can be found in DFARS 201.6: Contracting Authority and Responsibilities and in each Service's FAR supplement. The COR is designated by the command and will normally be a member of the requiring activity. CORs are appointed by the CO to act as a representative in the administration or monitoring of the technical aspects of a contract. CORs have appointment orders that outline the duties they are authorized to perform.

The COR has no authority to direct any type of changes to the contract that may affect delivery, price, quantity, quality, or other terms and conditions of the contract. The COR's responsibility is to monitor and enforce the contract as it is written. In addition, the COR may document the receipt of goods and services so that the contractor may receive payment. The CO must terminate the COR's authority at the conclusion of the contract.

13. Property Book Officer

The property book officer's (PBO) main duty is to maintain accountability of U.S. Government property. This is done by recording information in the property book. Any number of individuals may serve as the PBO including commissioned officers, warrant officers, NCOs or qualified DoD civilians.

14. Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card Holders

The Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) can be used to purchase supplies and goods up to a specific dollar value. FAR 13.301: Government

Commercial Purchase Card states that the GCPC can be used for the purchase of supplies and services up to the micro-purchase threshold limit. For construction the limit is \$2,000. It can be used by the CCO, but one must be aware that vendor acceptance of the GCPC will vary outside of the U.S. The CCO needs to know when it can and cannot be used. The holders of GCPC are those people designated by the command to make purchases. The purchases are similar to those made by OOs. They are governed by the contracting rules and established limits on the value of supplies and services that can be procured using the GCPC. When in theater, the HCA/PARC determines who can be a cardholder although the CCO and OO normally perform this function.

F. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENTS

The environment in which contracting elements operate will vary with the nature and scope of the mission being supported. Normally the designated lead Service, with executive agency responsibilities to plan and administer contracting, will establish a Joint contracting structure, which includes all deployed contracting assets. While management and control of contracting functions and authority is centralized, execution of the mission is decentralized as much as possible so that the approved contracting requirements at all levels can be promptly satisfied. Local vendor base considerations often drive this decision. A limited vendor base, or other considerations, may require partial or total consolidation of contingency contracting personnel.

1. Multinational Environment

a. Overview

The U.S. has historically participated in military operations with allied nations to accomplish its missions. This trend continues, but in recent years, with operations like Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) in Bosnia and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, integration of multinational forces is occurring at a much lower command level than in the past. Multinational operations are now being conducted at the operational and even tactical levels.

Today contingency operations almost always involve not only a single Service's forces, but also those of the other Services and our allies. Because of the

variety of forces involved, contracting support assumes an entirely different character than it has when only a single Service's forces are involved. Contracting elements become more diverse and multidimensional when operating in a Joint or multinational environment; however, the overriding principle that should govern contracting support in such an environment is consolidation of contracting assets to achieve maximum operational efficiency and economy. This principle is not followed.

Normally the senior contracting official from the designated lead Service publishes the theater or Joint force contracting support plan as an appendix to the logistics annex to the OPORD and OPLAN. This plan governs the contracting structure, locations, command relationships, responsibilities, and any restrictions such as commodities reserved for procurement by theater contracting.

In theory, contracting support remains a national responsibility during multinational operations, with each participating nation being responsible for contracting support for its own forces. In practice, U.S. forces often provide unique support to other participating nations or contract in nations with business practices that differ markedly from those in the U.S. Close liaison between U.S. contracting personnel, civil affairs, legal and local embassy officials is critical to procuring required goods and services in compliance with U.S. laws and regulations and the local customs and business practices.

b. Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements

Providing or arranging for the logistic support of its forces in a multinational operation is the responsibility of each participating nation; however, many nations do not have the capability to fully support their deployed forces. To assist such nations, as well as to achieve economies of scale and increased efficiency from the vendor base, several support options are available. These options include acquisition and cross-service agreements (ACSA), lead nation designation or pooling of resources. Establishment of an overall logistic support coordinator during the planning phase will facilitate development of such arrangements.

JP 4.0 defines ACSA as flexible bilateral agreements that may be used to obtain Host Nation Support (HNS) or support from other coalition partners. Combatant

Commanders have an alternative with an ACSA -- a potentially more efficient source of logistics support to U.S. forces during joint exercises, deployments and contingency operations. ACSAs were successfully employed during such deployments as Operations Desert Storm, Restore Hope and Joint Endeavor. The availability of ACSAs and the capability of the Host Nation to provide reliable levels of support are factors the joint contracting community will need to consider when planning to contract for supplies and services in a contingency environment.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO has its procurement regulations in the Administrative Directive (AD) 60-70. AD 60-70 is very similar to the FAR in that it is based upon fair and open competition for all procurements. It must be stressed that although NATO procurement is similar, it is not identical to U.S. contracting procedures and regulations.

NATO employs trained COs and specialists. Basic controls for approval and funding of purchase requests are required. The field ordering officers and member country COs may place delivery orders against existing contracts. The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) is the executive agent for NATO procurement. NAMSA maintains offices throughout Europe.

OJE in Bosnia provides an excellent example of NATO procurement policy. In this situation, NATO is the lead agency, and NAMSA is the executive agency for procurement. NAMSA was commanded by a U.S. Naval officer from the Naval Regional Contracting Center (NRCC), Naples, Italy, and it was staffed by various NAMSA employees, military officers, NCOs, and civilians from each of the participating NATO countries.

For OJE there were three particular challenges within NATO contracting. First, NATO procurement regulations limit purchases to vendors from only NATO member countries. Because Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary were not NATO members (even though Hungary now is a NATO member), this problem was resolved through waivers. Second, NATO participating countries were reluctant to pool their funds in advance. This ultimately limited the ability of NAMSA to achieve contracting leverage and

economic order quantity discounts. Third, NATO contract award and sole source approvals are retained at a higher level than under the FAR. This limited the responsiveness of NAMS to commanders on the ground. The good news for U.S. COs and NATO members is that the above issues were resolved in June 1997. Better yet, NATO contracting has been streamlined to allow purchasing within the OJE AOR and economy of scale procurements have developed.

G. CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAMS

1. Overview

During the course of this research, the project group was introduced to four global logistics support contracts that the Military Services use to provide deployed forces with a wide range of logistics services, including operating dining facilities and providing housing, in more than half a dozen countries including Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan. Used properly, these contract vehicles emerge as important tools for the military's use of private contractors to support deployed forces. However, the General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office (GAO)) found mixed results³⁵ under these contracts between August 2003 and June 2004.

The following looks briefly across three of the four logistics civil augmentation contracts: (1) LOGCAP, (2) AFCAP, and (3) CONCAP. The U.S. Army, Europe's Balkan Support Contract (BSC) is not reviewed in this section. It is discussed in a later chapter in relation to the DCMA exit criteria.

2. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

The Army's LOGCAP³⁶ is a special contingency program to maintain worldwide contract on a multiple-region basis that is managed and administered by the Army Materiel Command (AMC). Through the LOGCAP contract vehicle, the Army is able to contract quickly for combat support and combat service support (CSS) needed in a contingency.

³⁵ Walker, David M., Comptroller General of the U.S., Testimony before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives: United States General Accounting Office

³⁶ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/logcap.htm>

Although LOGCAP was established toward the end of 1985, it was not actually used until 1988, when the Army Corps of Engineers was tasked to contract for a management plan to construct and maintain two petroleum pipeline systems to support contingency operations in Southwest Asia. The first umbrella contract was awarded to Brown and Root Services (now Halliburton Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR)) in August 1992. It was activated again the following December to support all U.S. and United Nations (UN) forces in Somalia. Since its inception, LOGCAP has been implemented in no less than a dozen foreign countries around the world.

LOGCAP contractors are chosen through a competitive process to plan for and, when tasked, provide needed construction and services worldwide. Normally the contract is in effect for an initial period of performance with option clauses that may be invoked for additional years of performance. The contract vehicle is generic and worldwide in scope. Awardees must be prepared to support U.S. forces deployed to both developed and underdeveloped countries, and must align efforts with the Services' operational and country-specific plans. The contractor is required to develop and maintain a database of available equipment, supplies and services to carry out those plans. The contractor's database must support five broad categories of support: facilities, supplies, services, maintenance and transportation. The scope of work to be performed is provided by the supported commander, and support must be tailored to each concept of operations.

DynCorp International was the next successful recipient of the LOGCAP contract for performance from early 1997 to February 2002. The U.S. Government Project Manager, in coordination with AMC's Operations Support Command, began the competitive process of awarding a new contract. LOGCAP III was awarded to Halliburton KBR. The base period of performance is one year with nine option years. Halliburton KBR must be able to provide specific services in support of two simultaneous contingencies in widely separated geographical areas. The local commander must determine the type of services required and the scope or level of support needed in each contingency. Table 2 lists typical capabilities available through the LOGCAP contract vehicle.

Table 2. LOGCAP Capabilities

(Source: From AMC PAM 70-30, http://www.amc.army.mil/amc/ci/pubs/p700_30.pdf)

LOGCAP CAPABILITIES		
<i>Supply Operations</i>	<i>Field Services</i>	<i>Other Operations & Services</i>
Class I (Rations & Water)	Laundry & Bath	Maintenance
Class II (Organizational Clothing, Equipment & Administrative Supplies)	Clothing Exchange & Repair	Transportation
Class III (POL ³⁷ -Bulk & Package)	Food Service	Medical Services
Class IV (Construction Materials)	Mortuary Affairs	Engineering & Construction
Class V (Ammunition)	Sanitation	Signal
Class VI (Personal Demand Items)	Billeting	Retrograde
Class VII (Major End Items)	Facilities Management	Power Generation & Distribution
Class VIII (Medical Supplies)	Morale, Welfare & Recreation	STAMIS ³⁸ Operations
Class IX (Repair Parts)	Information Management	Physical Security
	Personnel Support	Force Provider Module Operation
		Legal Services
		Weapons Systems Training

3. Air Force Contract Augmentation Program

AFCAP was created to provide military commanders with a worldwide “force multiplier” option to augment or relieve their forces involved in military operations other than war (MOOTW) environments. The initial program was designed with the concept that military units would provide the initial response to an event and then call upon the AFCAP for ongoing support, as needed. Accordingly, the contract is structured to provide a full range of civil engineering, logistics, and services functions; however, Mortuary Affairs and Field Exchange are not included. The primary focus of AFCAP is

³⁷ Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL)

³⁸ Standard Army Management Information System (STAMIS)

on contingency support with minimal response time and minimal bureaucratic considerations. Although initially designed for use by the Air Force, the program is open to the other Services, Federal and State government agencies.

The first AFCAP³⁹ contract was awarded to Readiness Management Support (RMS) in February 1997. RMS also won the re-competition five years later (February 2002). The contract includes a base period of performance of one year with seven option years. RMS' current contract is structured to provide worldwide support. A small planning cell is maintained, which is able to call upon the global experience, expertise, and personnel of its parent company, IAP World Services, and each of its primary subcontractors. Table 3 lists typical capabilities available through the AFCAP contract vehicle.

Table 3. AFCAP Capabilities

(Source: From RMS website, <http://www.afcap.com/capabilities/capabilities02.html>)

AFCAP CAPABILITIES		
Deployed Management	Deployed Services	Infrastructure Support
Environmental	Airfield Support	Ancillary Capabilities
Restoration	Emergency Support Services	Morale, Welfare, Recreation & Services
Reconstitution	Materiel Support	General

4. Construction Capabilities

The Navy's CAP, which was started to enhance the NAVFAC's ability to respond to global contingencies, is known as CONCAP. This program is designed to supplement the capabilities of local commanders and regional resources.

This contract vehicle provides for indefinite deliveries and quantities for design, construction, and services to support the Navy over a wide range of declared and undeclared contingencies. Halliburton KBR holds the current CONCAP contract, which

³⁹ Expeditionary Engineering Division (CEXX) website (accessed April 22, 2005); http://www.afcesa.af.mil/cex/cexx/cex_afcap.asp

was awarded in July 2004. This contract vehicle includes a base period of performance of one year with four option years, with a not-to-exceed limit of \$500 million. A broad range of both vertical and horizontal construction scenarios, such as those called out in Table 4, may be required under this contract. Time parameters for setting up quick behind the lines facility support for troops are included in the contract.

Table 4. CONCAP Capabilities
(Source: From CONCAP Briefing)

CONCAP CAPABILITIES	
<i>Horizontal/Vertical Construction</i>	<i>Specialty Construction/Engineering</i>
Runways/Roads/Piers	Aerial Photography
Housing Repairs	Soils Engineering & Surveys
Bridges/Causeways	Operation of Power Generation, Concrete & Asphalt Plants
Demo/Cleanup	Petroleum, Oils & Lubricants Facilities
Ammunition Storage Facilities	Environmental Restoration
Berthing/Messing Facilities	Dredging
Depots/Warehouses	Project Planning
Clinics & Field Hospitals	
Operation/Maintenance Facilities	
Communication Facilities	

5. Conclusion

While all three of these CAPs support Joint U.S. operations worldwide, it should be noted that LOGCAP, AFCAP and CONCAP are all cost plus award fee contracts. This contract type may be very expensive if it is not properly structured and administered. Even though CAPs prevent the dilution of military forces that would occur if the military had to provide the required services and support, these contracts should only be used when it is not appropriate for military personnel to provide the needed services and functions. Commanders must remain vigilant in the use of these programs because contract costs can easily get out of control, especially when changes or additions

are made late in the execution phase. In addition, they are subject to Congressional and media scrutiny. Despite the potentially high costs and visibility, these CAPs often are the only means of quickly acquiring the skilled people and services needed to support our deployed forces.

H. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

1. Issues

Upon review and analysis, the following two distinct issues surfaced with respect to the Services' and DCMA's diverse contracting:

- The Services' individual approaches for the accession of COs (and contracting specialists) is inconsistent and creates disparities between the breadth and depth of contracting knowledge and experience found between similar ranks or in the Military Acquisition Corps.
- DCMA's ad-hoc approach to staffing CCAS support teams does not lend itself to predictable planning and execution of its CSA role.

The following sections provide further explanation and analysis

2. Filling the Acquisition Pipeline

During an interview with the research group in September 2004, a senior official with Army Contracting Agency (ACA) in Washington, D.C. discussed some numbers (Table 5) for each of the Services' contracting corps and asked, "Is that enough?" In a subsequent interview five months later this same official asked, "Is it the mission of the Army to support non-military (contracting) missions such as nation building?" Given today's post Cold War realities, the increasing numbers of failed or failing states,⁴⁰ the widening gap between Core⁴¹ and Non-Integrating Gap countries and the increasing number of terrorist events around the world, it is difficult to simply provide a positive or negative response to the questions posed.

⁴⁰ Former eastern bloc states that were supported by the former Soviet Union are facing economic and political uncertainty; genocide, ethnic cleansing and AIDS are ravaging the African continent; the drug trade is crippling the South America; terrorists' activity threatens lasting peace in the Mid-East, etc.

⁴¹ Thomas P. M. Barnett is his new book *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* divides the world into two categories—Core and Gap—based on a country's degree of "connectedness."

The following table depicts service end strengths and respective acquisition corps figures as of September 30, 2005.

Table 5. Relative Percentage of Service Members Performing Contract Activities⁴²

SERVICE	CONTRACTING	END STRENGTHS ⁴³	RELATIVE %
USA ⁴⁴	220-230	482,400	0.047
		502,400 ⁴⁵	0.045
USAF	2300	359,700	0.639
USN ⁴⁶	24	365,900	0.006
USMC	126	175,000	0.072

Based upon the above data, it appears that the Air Force has the structure to support a large contracting organization. Their contracting career field, unlike other Services, can take recruits directly out of basic training and like the other Services, their enlisted members (in the grades of E-4 through E-7) can change to a contracting MOS at mid-career. This provides the Air Force a deep applicant pool from which to fill their acquisition pipeline.

It appears as if the Army and Marine Corps lack the correct mix of personnel and experience levels in their contracting field to support the increasing amount of contingencies. Additionally, as our forces decrease and our requirements for outsourcing increases, it is highly likely that the Army and Marine Corps will require additional contracting personnel to handle the increased contracting workload.

⁴² Based on the research and data collected and synthesized, the project team created this table to compare relative percent of contracting billets to authorized end strength.

⁴³ End strengths for active forces obtained from Section 401 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.

⁴⁴ Relative percentage based on average of range provided.

⁴⁵ Additional end strength authorization "...subject to the condition that costs of active duty personnel of the Army in excess of 482,400 shall be paid out of funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 for contingent emergency reserve fund or as an emergency supplemental appropriation."

⁴⁶ This percentage is misleading since only deployed COs were included in the equation. In reality, Supply Officers and other billets performing the contracting function should also be used; however, the immediate analysis was based on the interviewee's question.

The Marine Corps currently has 20 regularly staffed contracting billets USMC wide. Ongoing operations highlight the importance of the contingency contracting capability for the Marine Corps. Currently this small community of officers is supporting a critical capability. As the operational tempo increases and COs are pulled to do contingency contracting, their current stateside billets are often “gapped.” Recently the Marine Corps announced, as agreed upon by a Marine Requirements Oversight Council⁴⁷ (MROC), an approved “plus-up” of eight additional CO billets that will be phased in over the next few years. These additional personnel should prove adequate to provide the level of support required in today’s challenging environment.

When Services deploy into a Joint environment and personnel are required from the various services to stand up a “contracting cell,” a requirement from the Army or Marine Corps typically addresses a specific rank, but rank does not necessarily equate to experience. A requirement for an officer of a certain rank from the Air Force often does not mesh with their structure. More often than not an enlisted person (from the Air Force) can perform a superior job to the “required” officer rank. As stated previously, disconnects between rank and experience often lead to problems when Services interact in a Joint environment. In the Army and Marine Corps the majority of COs are accessed into the contracting field when they are senior company grade/junior field grade officers. They usually have little or no field level contracting experience. This is in significant contrast to Air Force officers who directly embark upon an acquisition career when they enter the Service. Where a problem may potentially exist are instances where a rank requirement is meant to maintain the proper peer-based working relationships within an office.

Since the end of the Cold War, Services and Defense Agencies alike have seen their end strength authorizations spiral downward. The Services’ natural response was to protect their “real” core competency—war fighting (teeth). The logistics support “tail”

⁴⁷ Headquarters, USMC draft briefing: MOS 9656 Contracting Officer, p. 4. As part of the restructuring effort already underway, the Marines plan to review and realign billet distribution to focus military personnel resources to support the contingency contracting mission. Today’s wide distribution makes it difficult to assemble and field contingency contracting teams. One proposal under consideration is to create “cells” aligned with the MEFs.

was cut. Unfortunately, this translates to lost organic logistic capability. In many instances, CAPs were developed to supplement this lost competency. Over the same time frame, the U.S. has deployed troops to over 150 locations worldwide mainly in the Caribbean Rim, most of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia as well. According to Barnett, “If we were to draw a line a line around the majority of those military interventions, we have basically mapped the Non-Integrating Gap.”⁴⁸ Based on these events, it is unlikely that less than one percent of the authorized total end strength is sufficient to realistically address the DoD’s contracting needs. Exponential growth of DoD’s contracting needs can be anticipated as long as they continue to successfully lobby for and win nation building missions, which have historically been performed by the Department of State (DoS) or other inter-agency entities, such as the (Iraq) Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).

In order to adequately prepare for this growth, the Services may want to adopt a hybrid approach to ensuring that the acquisition pipeline remains full. The hybrid approach would be based on the USA’s and USAF’s current individual approaches. Much like the Air Force does today, enlisted accessions and a predetermined percentage of the officer accessions would enter the acquisition career field upon enlistment/commission. This would ensure that each Service has a core cadre of contracting specialists and COs with a broad range of experience and in-depth knowledge of contracting issues, policies, regulations and best practices. However, it is possible that these career acquisition members may lose touch with the daily, real-world concerns of the warfighter.

In an effort to mitigate this risk, much like the Army does today, additional CO billets would be filled with mid- or junior grade officers from operational MOSs. In addition, enlisted members in the grades of E-4 through E-7 can also affect a mid-career

⁴⁸ Esquire (March 2003) Volume 139, Issue 3. The Pentagon’s New Map, p. 2

Thomas P. M. Barnett is his new book *The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* divides the world into two categories based on a country’s degree of “connectedness”—Core and Non-Integrating Gap.

change from other MOSs to the contracting MOS. Mid-career inductees into the contracting career field could be paired with “seasoned” contract specialists and COs through a mentoring program. Once accessed into the acquisition career field, these contract specialists and COs would receive contracting education, training and experience eventually earning their contracting warrants. Once certified in the contracting career field, they will remain in the acquisition corps for the remainder of their military career.

If this approach is adopted, the Services would need to ensure that continued promotion opportunities exist for those entering the contracting career field at a mid-career point. This hybrid approach could provide the Services a deep applicant pool from which to fill their acquisition pipeline.

3. DCMA CCAS Support Team Assignment Model

a. Overview

Interviews with senior DCMA officials at the COCOM, DCMAI and Headquarters’ Combat Support Center (CSC) revealed that contingency contracting services account for approximately five to seven percent of DCMA’s current workload. The remaining 95 percent of workload is attributed to major program support. DCMA directly contributes to the military readiness of the U.S. and its Allies, and helps preserve the nation's freedom through its CSA role. DCMA provides resources to support contingency operations as identified by the COCOM and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and tasked through the USD(AT&L). While the DCMA Chief of Staff is responsible for leading integration of the CCAS support operations instruction, the CSC is responsible for day to day contingency operations support.

Over the years, the nature, length and frequency of these support requirements have increased, yet DCMA continues to manage personnel selection and assembling, training and deploying teams from on-hand assets. DCMA currently staffs these contingency contracting requirements on an ad hoc basis with no permanent resources allocated to this on-going CSA mission. While this approach has worked in the past for relatively small scale contingencies such as Haiti, major efforts like those underway in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines present a huge drain on

resources. Until recently active duty military and volunteer Reserve and civilian employees have risen to meet every challenge.

From interview responses with senior DCMA employees, it was learned that personnel selected for deployment today may be either DCMA or other Military personnel (Active and Reserve), emergency essential (EE) personnel or eligible civilian volunteers. Regardless of their status, deployment eligible personnel must meet pre-deployment, deployment and post-deployment requirements prior to being deployed including, but not limited to:

- Certified Level I, II or III (as appropriate) in accordance with the DAWIA⁴⁹
- CCAS Basic Contingency Operations Training (BCOT)
- CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) Processing
- Administrative
- Medical
- Basic skills and Military weapons qualification

Typical deployments are 179 days, which includes the entire period from home station departure to return to home station. Personnel are available on the CCAS roster based on their current Permanent Change of Station (PCS) tour arrival date, the date they accept an EE position or their volunteer date. Generally, personnel will not be selected for deployment within 90 days of arriving to the Agency. Personnel will deploy as required; however, the Agency tries to ensure that no less than 12 month increments exist between deployments. Of course, this caveat is subject to personnel availability. Personnel are not to be selected for deployment if the projected deployment return date places them within 30 days of PCS or six months of retirement or other separation. Personnel may request, through their respective chains of command, to be deployed more frequently with less time between deployments. These volunteers may request a specific assignment; however, actual placement may be based on Agency needs. Deployment roster positions are reviewed and validated quarterly, or as required, and identify minimum resource requirements based on operations planning and execution.

⁴⁹ Certifications are based on formal education and levels of experience in 14 defined career fields.

DCMA uses an internally developed Microsoft Access database to track all individuals—Military (Active and Reserve) EE personnel, and civilian volunteers—eligible for deployment. This database, which is continuously updated, allows the CSC to query and build consistently accurate deployment rosters. When it is time to review/validate deployment roster positions each quarter, new contingency requirements are identified or existing requirements are changed, a database query is initiated to determine which individuals are eligible for deployment. Contingency contracting support demands are tracked using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. A manual “rack and stack” process is used to match personnel from the eligibility list with the identified contingency contracting support requirements. Every 15 days, DCMA validates the current deployment roster and follow-on rotations by issuing a new Fragmentation Order⁵⁰ (FRAGO).

b. The Limitre Personnel Assignment Model⁵¹

Utilizing data provided by the DCMA, three NPS Business Modeling students decided to seek a resolution to this issue by developing the Limitre Personnel Assignment Model (LPAM). The standard Microsoft Excel Solver uses a basic implementation of the primal Simplex method to solve linear programming (LP) problems. However, this method is limited to 200 decision variables. This constraint mandated that they “chunk”⁵² the data to build a model which Solver could solve. The steps involved with shaping the data to facilitate chunking are described below:

i. *Data Standardization:* In order to evaluate personnel and billets, Limitre had to standardize the data between the Personnel Roster spreadsheet and the Billet Roster spreadsheet provided by DCMA. For instance, one spreadsheet had 05

⁵⁰ The Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks (http://smct.armystudyguide.com/skill_levels_2-4/071-326-5502.htm) states that “The FRAGO provides timely changes of existing orders to subordinate and supporting commanders while providing notification to higher and adjacent commands. A FRAGO is either oral or written and addresses only those parts of the original OPOD that have changed. The FRAGO differs from the OPOD only in the degree of detail provided.”


⁵¹ In May 2005, the LPAM was shared with DCMA CSC. Limitre Consulting may pursue further development of their model during their 4th and 5th academic quarters (July – December 2005).

⁵² When the number of decision variable exceeds the parameters of the Solver software, developers must “chunk” or group data so that the number of decision variables is reduced.

and one had O5. Also, the team had to break down and rearrange several data elements to sort on additional unique variables.

ii. *Data Prioritization:* Upon reviewing the desired attributes of each billet, the team determined that five differentiating data elements exist. Since position (career field), military/civilian, rank, DAWIA certification, and time represent qualitative characteristics, the data needed to be changed to a quantitative format for both personnel and billets.


POSITION FIT



Data prioritization resulted in a composite code for each person and billet. Congruence or “best fit” between faces (personnel available) and spaces (open billets) was determined by subtracting the composite codes. A difference of zero meant that a perfect fit was achieved when matching an available asset with an open billet.

iii. *Maximum Deployment Strategy:* In order to scale the time remaining variable Limitre assigned values to the number of months remaining. Honoring DCMA’s prerogative that no one deploys during the first or last three months of their tour, the team assigned a value of 700,000 to those time periods. DCMA deploys personnel for six month tours and requires a minimum of 12 months between deployments. Within a 36-month tour, an employee will deploy no more than twice unless they volunteer to do so more often. Therefore, a person that had between 27 and 33 months remaining received a value of 1 to denote the opportunity of two deployments within their DCMA tour.

PRIORITY BASED ON TIME REMAINING



Maximum = 2 deployments per 36 month tour

iv. *Rank Chunking:* Limitre knew that Solver had a maximum matrix size of 12 x 15. Therefore, they had to chunk their data into understandable and useable chunks to optimize the assignments. By using the list data function, they established twelve categories based on the number of billets and the number of personnel competing for those billets. Each chunk has its own Solver solution and the solutions are reported to the Deployment Roster (output). The Limitre model is based on the assignment model; however, to solve their assignment model, they needed to construct three matrices:

- *Matrix 1:* Matrix 1 represents the absolute value of the difference between the composite codes.
- *Matrix 2:* Matrix 2 represents Solver's solution set. These are the cells that can change in accordance with the objective function. In the end, Solver assigns a person to a billet. Solver uses a 1 to denote an assignment and a 0 to denote no assignment.
- *Matrix 3:* Matrix 3 is the product of Matrix 1 and Matrix 2. The value of the Matrix 1 block is multiplied by the value of the Matrix 2 block.

The Limitre model is a minimization model. Its objective function is set to minimize the summation of columns in Matrix 3. Due to the duplicative nature of the data, numerous optimal solutions exist, which is acceptable since the objective is to optimize congruence

between faces and spaces. The final product is an electronically generated deployment roster that displays the employee's name, rank and their assigned deployment site.

c. Lessons Learned

Several lessons were learned from Limitre's analysis. First and foremost, it is much more difficult to go from concept to a working functional model than originally envisioned. Solver's limitations coupled with the large amounts of raw data and dynamic nature of DCMA's CCAS mission led to unique data challenges. The volume of the data was overwhelming at times. Based on these challenges, Limitre structured a model based on chunks of data with iterative, nested IF, THEN statements.

Limitre learned that their model must provide valuable solutions to potentially real problems and be exportable to DCMA management. The LPAM is designed to make personnel assignments; however, it does so in "starts and stops" by career field. This feature is necessary to work around Solver's limitations, but will also allow DCMA to conduct "what if" scenarios by position. For example, a change in a Level III ACO billet does not need to impact all team assignments, just Level III ACOs.

d. Areas for Follow-on Analysis

The LPAM project developers would like to pursue flexibility for adding and deleting billets and/or personnel as well as executing surgical additions/deletions to accommodate emergency changes. For example, if a person was scheduled to go to Baghdad and fell and broke their hip, then they would like to be able to easily find a new solution for that one billet without disturbing the other matches.

If time permitted, Limitre would like to improve the user interfaces to make solving for positions more intuitive and include a "glossy front end" that would have resulted in a more user-friendly tool.

A more straightforward, streamlined model could be pursued if a more powerful LP software tool was made available. If DCMA decides to pursue an LP model to solve their assignment problem, a software investment would be required since the standard Microsoft Excel Solver is limited to 200 decision variables. For example, the MOSEK Solver includes a state-of-the-art primal and dual Simplex method that also

exploits sparsity and uses advanced strategies for matrix updating and refactorization. It handles problems of unlimited size, and has been tested on LP problems of over a million decision variables.

If Limitre is able to successfully pursue the areas for follow-on analysis described above and develop a quicker, more user friendly model, then adoption of the LPAM upgrade should provide DCMA a structured approach to staffing CCAS support teams that lends itself to predictable planning and execution of its CSA role.

I. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

In a time of declining budgets and shrinking personnel, the Services and DCMA must periodically access new personnel into their respective organizations to ensure that they remain relevant to support the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). Without the infusion of new personnel, their level of support to the warfighter could be severely hindered and the DoD's transformation could be stalled.

The Services and DCMA are making strides but there is still work to be done. They need to continue to fill the acquisition and contracting personnel pipeline with long term solutions rather than quick fixes. Based on this research, they need to increase their end strength by actively recruiting and accessing contracting personnel through various vehicles to ensure that there are appropriate numbers of trained and competent personnel to conduct contingency contracting.

Additionally, the research team observed that contingency contracting is a very detailed and coordinated effort that spans not just one Service but requires the efforts of many individuals who may affect the outcome of the entire operation. Programs such as CAP are geared to provide immediate relief vice long term support due to their potential high cost. The research group strongly recommends that DoD conduct a cost benefit analysis to determine if these programs truly provided cost effective savings for DoD and ultimately the U.S. taxpayer.

As discussed previously, the hybrid accession model should provide the Services the flexibility they require to ensure their acquisition pipeline remains full. LPAM provides DCMA the flexibility to rapidly model multiple contingency contracting "what

if” scenarios and project current and future resource requirements based on these scenarios. A long term commitment is required to improve the DoD’s contingency contracting organizations.

The next chapter will compare the approaches used by two COCOMs to plan, integrate and execute their contingency contracting missions. Issues stemming from these processes are explored and recommended solutions are proposed.

IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO COMBATANT COMMANDS

A. OVERVIEW

Planning for contingency contracting is a complex process. When the planning process is not robust enough, problems may surface. This chapter focuses on two Combatant Commands' (COCOMs') distinctive approaches to this key process, and their respective issues and lessons learned. In conducting the research, the group decided that the best approach to gather information would be through face-to-face interviews with the personnel tasked to conduct contingency contracting at the Joint Staff level in the United States (U.S.) Pacific Command (PACOM) and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The researchers were interested in determining if the Contingency Contracting Officers (CCO) in both organizations had similar education, training, and Joint experiences and if both employed Contingency Contracting Support Plans (CCSPs) to guide their efforts.

The first part of this chapter provides the reader with information about the different COCOM Areas of Responsibility (AOR). The second part highlights the internal problems each COCOM deals with when contingency contracting operations are conducted with specific emphasis on planning, communication, integration, and execution. The final section proposes a suggestion on how the Department of Defense (DoD) could possibly improve contingency contracting among the Services.

B. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

In order to fully understand how contingency contracting operations work, it is essential to grasp how information flows from the Joint Staff through the COCOM before ultimately reaching the CCO in theater. The research team explored various doctrinal publications to become familiar with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Joint Operation Planning Execution System (JOPES), Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS), Time-Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), and CCSP. To identify if the CCO was truly prepared to enter a contingency, the group analyzed whether the COCOM had the right people at the right time with the right education to perform contingency contracting.

A bigger issue of interest to the research team was to determine if the CCSP is robust enough to effectively guide a CCO's actions. If not, the research team hoped to identify issues and recommend possible solutions. Of special interest was the incorporation of the CCSP into the COCOM Operation Plan (OPLAN), Concept Plans (CONPLAN) and Operation Order (OPORD). To gain this information, the group interviewed senior representatives from each COCOM and Service Contracting Components to understand how PACOM and CENTCOM were organized and structured and if the contracting officers (CO) had the right education.

As the research team conducted the research, the group realized that there were several Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) related issues. For example, the research team discovered that DCMA did not have a full-time liaison officer (LNO) assigned to PACOM, and there were problems with DCMA contingency contracting entry and exit criteria. These and other relevant issues are addressed in Chapters III and V.

C. BACKGROUND

1. PACOM

PACOM Headquarters is located at Camp Smith, Hawaii. Their Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompasses more than 50 percent of earth's surface, for a total of approximately 105 million square miles (nearly 169 million square kilometers) (Figure 13). It covers a total of 43 countries, 20 foreign territories and possessions, and includes 10 U.S. territories. In addition, within the AOR, six of the world's largest armed forces exist: (1) People's Republic of China, (2) U.S., (3) Russia, (4) India, (5) North Korea, and (6) South Korea.⁵³

⁵³ U.S. Pacific Command, Retrieved April 21, 2005 from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml>




Figure 13. U.S. PACOM AOR
 (Source: From <http://www.pacom.mil/about/aor.shtml>)

PACOM is organized into staff elements similar to that of the Joint Staff. The PACOM J4 is further organized into sub-elements, with a division called the J42, Logistics Support. It is within that division that the J424, Sustainment and Logistics Branch creates the PACOM CCSP. Their organizational chart, depicted below, illustrates that no CCO billet is included in the branch. This finding shows that the division is not optimally structured for planning contingency contracting operations.

Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) expressed frustration that PACOM did not have a person in the J4 coordinating contingency contracting. According to a senior representative, this void created a situation where the Services begin competing for scarce resources. This leads to increased prices on some critical supplies.




Figure 14. PACOM J42 Logistics Organization Chart
(Source: From <http://www.pacom.mil/staff/staff-J4.shtml>)

2. CENTCOM

CENTCOM Headquarters is located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. Like PACOM, it is one of the nine Unified Combatant Commands (UCC) assigned operational control of U.S. combat forces. CENTCOM's AOR includes 27 nations which are economically and culturally diverse (Figure 15). These nations are located throughout the Horn of Africa, South and Central Asia, Northern Red Sea regions, the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq. To compare this to the U.S., the entire AOR is larger than the continental U.S. (CONUS). The AOR stretches more than 3,600 miles north to south and 3,100 miles east to west. It includes mountain ranges that have elevations of over 24,000 feet, to desert areas below sea level, and temperatures ranging from 130 degrees to below freezing.




Figure 15. CENTCOM AOR
(Source: From <http://www.centcom.mil/aboutus/aor.htm>)

The CENTCOM Contracting Branch is newly established within the CENTCOM J4, Director of Logistics staff section. The branch has a total of three Officers and one Noncommissioned Officer (NCO). The Branch Chief is an Air Force O-5, and the branch also includes an Army O-5, an Air Force O-4, and an Air Force E-6 (Figure 16) for depiction of this new organization. All contracting personnel have achieved at least Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level II certification in contracting.

The CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch's mission is twofold: (1) develop the CENTCOM AOR contracting policy and (2) monitor and synchronize the AOR contracting support. The J4 Contracting Branch's focus areas are:

- “Establish and facilitate clear lines of command and control for AOR contracting.
- Establish AOR reporting requirements/process for securing visibility into AOR contractor, numbers of contract dollar amounts, etc.
- Coordinate, direct and control contracting support within the CENTCOM AOR.”⁵⁴




Figure 16. CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch
(Source: From CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch Roadshow Brief)

In response to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) lessons learned, CENTCOM established the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) (Figure 17). The JCC-I is serving as a Joint theater logistics support command. Its purpose is to (1) achieve, through unity of effort, economies of scale that exemplify best business practices; (2)

⁵⁴ CENTCOM Contracting Branch Brief, p. 2.

establish common procedures for other Service Component contracting offices; (3) establish theater CO warrant procedures; (4) establish a Joint Logistics Procurement Support Board (JLPSB); and (5) serve as a model for commerce in Iraq and a catalyst for economic growth.




Figure 17. Contracting Organizations in U.S. CENTCOM AOR
(Source: From CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch)

D. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

1. Issues

Several issues were identified that reflect unfavorably on the current contingency contracting policy, guidance and doctrine. Not all the issues were found in both

commands. The following are overarching observations pertinent to both COCOMs. The next section will present specific observations noted at each COCOM.

- There is a lack of sufficient personnel with the appropriate education, training and experience to conduct contingency contracting at both the strategic and operational level,
- OPLANs do not adequately address contracting, and in some cases, even the Annex D (Logistics) did not have sufficient contracting information,
- OPLANs and CCSPs lack detailed information as to what DCMA needs to do to support contingencies, and
- COCOM J4 contracting section is not robust enough to conduct contingency contracting operations.

2. PACOM J4 Contingency Contracting Observations

a. Lack of Appropriate Personnel

PACOM apparently lacks the people to conduct contingency contracting in the PACOM J4 office. Once PACOM receives a tasker from the Joint Staff, the PACOM J424 Sustainment and International Logistics Branch is supposed to create the CCSP for the AOR. Currently, there is not a dedicated person or persons available who have been trained to do this. Once the J424 Branch designates one of the Service Components to be the “... executive agent and lead contracting service for coordinating contingency contracting planning and support,”⁵⁵ it has total responsibility during the execution of the OPLAN or CONPLAN. The research team observed that once the executive agent (EA)⁵⁶ has been assigned, the PACOM J4 does not get involved unless the EA has problems conducting the operation.

PACOM J4 should add a contingency contracting billet or branch to the J42 Logistics Support Division. At a minimum, the J4 should have at least one CCO assigned to its organization. This would fill the void by having someone assigned to produce the J4 CCSP resulting in critical information being transferred to the Service Components. Moreover, this person is necessary so that the J4 has a knowledgeable, experienced and trained contracting professional who would be responsible for reviewing

⁵⁵ Pacific Command Appendix 9 of CONPLAN XX, section #2 Concept of Operations.

⁵⁶ PACOM’s use of the term Executive Agent is in conflict with the doctrinal term. Only the Secretary of Defense may appoint an Executive Agent (refer back Chapter I).

subordinate organizations' CCSPs, OPLANs, OPORDs, and CONPLANs to ensure potential contingency contracting issues are identified and addressed. The level of review would be consistent with the PACOM training event, exercise or contingency.

b. Inefficient Organizational Structure

PACOM does not currently have the organizational structure in place to conduct and manage contingency contracting. This issue is closely related to the previous issue. The lack of a CCO or contracting cell means the PACOM J4 has to rely on the Service Components to develop the plan instead of PACOM creating a robust CCSP based on key stakeholder's inputs. There is a void in terms of having an organization at PACOM that meets with each Service's contingency contracting representative to talk about relevant issues and to work out any problems that the PACOM-assigned EA may have in executing the mission. Requesting additional billets and creating a contingency contracting cell would be a step in the right direction. This would ensure the ultimate responsibility of developing the CCSP and reviewing the Service Components' CCSP is at the appropriate level (the COCOM), and not the Service Component.

c. Lack of Personnel with Optimum Skills and Experience

The lack of personnel who can easily assume the job as a PACOM J4 CCO has made PACOM more reliable on the designated EA for management and execution of contingency contracting operations. The ideal person to fill the billet would need to have sufficient Defense Acquisition University (DAU) contracting education, be a senior company grade or mid-grade officer with at least eight to ten years experience, be knowledgeable of the military and be less likely to retire at this point of his or her⁵⁷ career.

The potential candidate needs to have the right experience to truly provide value to PACOM. This would include contracting command experience where the candidate would have been a CO or CCO and worked with other Services (e.g. a Joint Contracting Command). This person would then understand the role and missions of

⁵⁷ While the research group recognizes that non-combat or civilian positions may be filled by qualified men or women, the team unanimously decided to use the masculine pronoun for ease of readability.

contracting in a Joint contingency operation. At a minimum, the person who is selected to fill this billet should be DAWIA Level II certified in the contracting career field; however, a Level III certification is preferable. In addition, he should have completed Command and General Staff College (CGSC) or be Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I certified. The right rank would be at least a senior 0-3 or junior 0-4, or civilian equivalent.

d. CCSP Lacked Clear Information

The CCSP the group reviewed during the PACOM trip lacked clear information as to exactly what duties the CCO was to perform during the contingency. The CCSP is critical to the success of the contingency contracting mission. It describes the contracting actions that need to be accomplished in an operation, exercise or training environment. PACOM's CCSP was in Appendix 9 to Annex D. It consisted of the following one line which identified an EA and provided top-level guidance: "[HQ PACAF] coordinates joint service contingency contracting planning for this CONPLAN."⁵⁸ Making the CCSP more detailed may assist the PACOM staff and Service Components in the execution of their assigned contingency contracting missions. Detailed information such as that found in Field Manual (FM) 100-10-2's Appendix D: Sample Contracting Support Plan should be considered. Guidance should specify what each Service Component contracting office does to support the operation. This would clarify subordinates' roles and responsibilities.⁵⁹ In addition, this would add robustness to PACOM's CCSP.

e. Lack of Service Representatives in a Contingency Cell/Branch

Even though each Service is represented in sub-branches, the PACOM J424 Sustainment Branch still lacks a contingency contracting cell comprised of each Service Component. Therefore, it fails to have a truly Joint vision when it comes to contingency contracting in theater. If there was at least one representative per Service, then all would be able to ensure contingency contracting, and contracting in general, are

⁵⁸ PACOM Appendix 9 to Annex D to USPACOM CONPLAN XXXX-04, paragraph 3b.

⁵⁹ U.S. Army FM 100-10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield, Appendix D Sample Contracting Support Plan, pages D-4 to D-5. August 4, 1999.

performed correctly. The research team's recommendation is that PACOM modify the organization and structure the PACOM J42 division. To easily facilitate Joint contingency contracting operations, there should be a requirement that the Service Components provide COs to work in a contingency contracting cell/branch.

f. Lack of a Theater Level Contracting Board

Up until January 2002, PACOM performed this function through an organization called the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Logistic Procurement Support Board (CLPSB). The CLPSB served to provide assistance on contracting matters and operations within PACOM. The PACOM Contingency Contracting Officer Working Group (PCCOWG) was made up of representatives from PACOM Service Components, subordinate UCCs and other contracting team members including: U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC); U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT); U.S. Pacific Air Force (PACAF); MARFORPAC; U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC); U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ); U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK); Alaskan Command (ALCOM); DCMA; and the Army Corps of Engineers. Members consisted of senior enlisted, O-4s, O-5s, and GS-12 to GS-14 civilians.⁶⁰

One of the major reasons the PCCOWG was formed was to ensure "...service components are not bidding against each other for the same commodity or service..."⁶¹ The PCCOWG also had the ability to leverage all the Services' contracting manpower in PACOM so the work load could be equitably divided. Another aspect of the PCCOWG was that it coordinated the assignment of military CCOs. In this way, the organization was able to ensure that the right CCOs with the right experience were properly utilized.

The PCCOWG became the PACOM Commander's contract clearinghouse. According to the charter, the PCCOWG included:

- "Develop a Joint service standardized Deployable Contracting System,
- Develop and maintain a contingency contracting source database,

⁶⁰ LTC Minear, Steven J. *Contingency Contracting in the Pacific Command*, p. 2.

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 1.

- Coordinate contingency contracting warrants (authorizations to award contracts), and
- Coordinate and recommend contingency contracting assignments.”⁶²

The PCCOWG spurred an innovative policy that ensured warrants from all Service Components were accepted and recognized by all other Services. It is interesting to note that the warrant issue was a problem when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was still in charge of Iraq during the U.S. occupation from 2003 to 2004. While in theater, CCOs would have to wait for their new warrants to be issued from U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) which was located at Fort McPherson, GA. A reciprocal agreement for warrant recognition, such as that established by the PCCOWG years ago, would enable CCOs in Joint contracting cells to begin work more expeditiously and avoid the unnecessary time delay associated with reprocessing each CCO warrant after arrival in theater.⁶³

The PCCOWG was also used to address the assignment of Procurement Instrument Identification Numbers (PIINs). PIINs are the alphanumeric method of identifying contract actions. During training exercises or actual missions, only one set of PIINs are used at a time. This allowed different CCOs to continue using existing contracts and PIINs as the CCOs rotated to support the exercise or mission. Having only one set of PIINs proves important in a Joint contingency contracting operation as it helps prevent duplication and subsequent payment problems.

g. Insufficient Manning

As stated previously, PACOM recently experienced a 15 percent staff reduction. This results in PACOM not having the same amount of billets available as CENTCOM does for contingency contracting management and administration. In addition, with the highly visible Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), attention seems to have shifted to CENTCOM’s AOR in terms of national priority. This has caused PACOM to do more with less. Additionally, some of PACOM’s subordinate commands,

⁶² Ibid, p.3.

⁶³ Ibid, p.3.

(e.g. the 25th Infantry Division in USARPAC), have been tasked to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq which is CENTCOM's AOR.

Each Service needs to evaluate the PACOM billets it has to support contingency contracting to ensure it is adequate. Also, if PACOM feels it needs more people to conduct contingency contracting or manage it at the COCOM level, PACOM should request new positions through Service channels.

h. J4 Staff Officers Lack Contingency Contracting Education

At the time of the group's visit in January 2005, no one in the PACOM J424 Branch had attended the DAU course CON 234, Contingency Contracting. If the Services are not going to send DAWIA Level II contracting certified officers to fill PACOM J4 jobs, an alternative would be to send those people who will work contingency contracting issues to CON 234. This way someone will have some basic knowledge on how to conduct contingency contracting and what the CCSP should contain. Services can identify people for the job and program the CON 234 course into their schedule as part of a Permanent Change of Station move to PACOM.

3. PACOM Service Components and Agencies

While conducting research on PACOM contingency contracting, the research team interviewed representatives from PACOM's major subordinate Commands (USARPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, and MARFORPAC) to gain some insight on some Service related issues. Unfortunately, due to time constraints the group was not able to do the same for CENTCOM since its Service Components are not co-located. Below is a synopsis of the PACOM's Service Component and Agency issues with contingency contracting.

a. USARPAC

The research team spoke with senior representatives from Army Contracting Agency (ACA), Regional Contracting Office (RCO) Hawaii. At the time of the group's visit, some personnel expressed concerns about the structure/organization of the contingency contracting office. During the visit in January 2005, the Chief, Contingency Contracting Division, was assigned to the 25th Infantry Division (ID)

(Light) and attached to the RCO. The matrix structure caused some conflict due to the differences between the contracting and operational chains of command. In addition, this would sometimes result in the added frustration when these officers received their evaluation reports.

During normal operations, the CCO would be providing garrison contract support and would work at Fort Shafter, HI. When the 25th ID conducted training, the CCO would go to Schofield Barracks and work there. The group must note for the readers, there is quite a distance between Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. So, unless the CCO was needed to provide support during a training or deployment, he would not be seen by his performance evaluators (e.g. rater or senior rater). This structure needs to be changed so that the CCO is assigned to the RCO. The Chief of the RCO needs to be the one who decides which CCO should provide matrix support to a particular operational unit. The goal should be to provide the warfighter with an educated, experienced and qualified CCO, and not to fill a requirement with a “warm body.”

b. PACFLT

The research team spoke with a senior representative in Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific (NAVFACPAC). For contingency contracting requirements, the Navy relies on existing Navy Region Contracting Centers (NRCC) “husbanding” contracts. This representative expressed concern that the Navy did not have a true acquisition corps. Also, in NAVFACPAC, enlisted troops are not authorized warrants, which could possibly degrade contracting operations.

During the interview, the senior NAVFACPAC representative was very supportive of reinstituting a PCCOWG or PCCOWG-type organization. He admitted that there was somewhat of a gap in terms of PACOM contingency contracting when it came to planning and communicating. In general, he felt the Navy had disruptive competition between the NAVFAC and the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP). According to this representative, the current Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between NAVSUP and NAVPAC is very confusing and ambiguous.⁶⁴ For example, the MOA states:

⁶⁴ Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command, Transmittal Memorandum of Agreement Between NAVSUP and NAVFAC, May 5, 1997.

For those functions not under the purview of either NAVFAC or NAVSUP, the parties agree that the Command whose mission it is to procure such functions shall have first right of refusal with respect to contracting for such functions.

Because of this memorandum, different Commands could possibly “shop around” to try to get the cheapest price.

c. PACAF

The group interviewed a senior enlisted contingency contracting manager at PACAF who was heavily involved in the management of the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept of operations. As a quick review, the AEF uses a 20-month cycle during which a four-month deployment period exists. Before the four-month deployment period begins, the Airman undergoes two months of tailored training in preparation for the upcoming mission. When the person is not in a deployed status, he performs normal duties and assignments.

During the conversation, the PACAF representative indicated there was a coordination issue with PACOM’s contingency contracting planning, communicating, and execution process. He indicated that establishing or recreating a PCCOWG-type organization would be of great help.

PACAF has experienced problems in the “rank versus capabilities” issue when it comes to participation in PACOM-specific training exercises. For instance, it has been observed when PACAF sends a senior enlisted Airman as their representative for planning meetings, some Services seem to prefer an officer participate instead. This leads to a perception that rank is more important than capabilities, experience and education.

Unlike the other Services, the Air Force has more enlisted members who have received DAWIA contracting certifications. The enlisted members are usually more experienced having served in a contingency contracting environment; as a result, PACAF sends them to meetings and authorizes CO warrants. What needs to be explored are the cultural issues and problems that exist between enlisted and officers. The EA or PACOM

J4 needs to identify their desired participants in terms of desired capability, education and training versus expressing needs via rank.

d. MARFORPAC

MARFORPAC serves as the Marine Corps Component Headquarters for PACOM and CENTCOM. Marine Corps Central Command (MARCENT) supports CENTCOM. During the interview with the Chief of the Multinational Logistics Branch, MARFORPAC's current structure was reviewed (Figure 18). The research team observed that the organization lacked a full-time active duty CCO. This deficiency manifests itself whenever MARFORPAC is tasked to send a participant to support training exercises or support the GWOT by deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. The CCO billet is only filled on an as-needed basis; to achieve mission efficiencies, this billet should always be activated. Qualifications were another issue. The Multinational Logistics Branch does not have anyone with DAWIA contracting certifications. This lack of an experienced and educated person with the proper certifications can result in a reduced ability to adequately write/review OPLANs, OPORDs, Annex D and the CCSP to ensure all vital documents have accurate contingency contracting information.




Figure 18. Multinational Logistics Branch Organizational Chart⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Created by the research team based on researched data collected/analyzed.

4. CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch

a. Lead Component for Logistics and Contracting

The CENTCOM Contracting Branch has established a Lead Component for Logistics and Contracting (LCLC) for each country in theater. The Contracting Branch decided to coin the term LCLC instead of EA to avoid confusion with the official term EA used by the SECDEF and Joint Staff. The LCLC is:

...a component assigned responsibility by USCENTCOM as the lead for coordinating joint logistics and contracting common item and common service support or other administrative and support functions. Individual OPLAN/CONPLANS or OPORDs published by USCENTCOM address specific support responsibilities. The lead component ensures efforts are coordinated through the theater security POC.⁶⁶

b. CENTCOM Regulation (CCR) 700-2

CENTCOM created CCR 700-2: Outsourcing Logistical Support: Host Nation Support (HNS), Other Nation Support (ONS), Contracting and Civil Augmentation Programs (CAP) on August 15, 2004. While 700-2 has many objectives, its purpose is to “optimize efficiency for all customers, make effective use of available resources/people, organize contracting support for contingencies, serve as effective force multiplier and provide (conceptually) for centralized coordination/decentralized execution to enhance war fighting capabilities.”⁶⁷

It is the research team’s opinion that the CCR 700-2 is a great step in the right direction to understand what the CCO must do in CENTCOM’s AOR. In addition to the objectives stated above, the purpose of the regulation is to have a document that establishes and provides guidance on outsourcing logistical support that will be used to support U.S. forces. Since this is a CENTCOM regulation, it applies to those designated units, Service Components, and DoD Agencies that require or need to have contracted support within CENTCOM’s AOR.

⁶⁶ J4 Branch brief, p.7.

⁶⁷ CENTCOM Joint Staff, J4 Contracting Branch brief, p. 3.

The CCR's outsourcing goal for contracting support is to improve the AOR's supportability so that the supported units' operational risk is reduced. To accomplish this, CENTCOM has planned to leverage the HNS, ONS, contingency contracting and CAP. This is also the order of preference CENTCOM wants the COs to follow.

c. CENTCOM Contingency Contracting Observations

The following are issues and lessons learned from the fact finding interview session with the CENTCOM J4 Contracting Branch.

(i) Joint Theater Logistics. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) has responsibility for theater level logistics. CENTCOM lacks a subordinate commander or organization that is charged with executing theater logistics. This presents a conflict in that the JFC needs control over all Joint logistics, but there is no doctrinal requirement for a theater level logistics commander. The theater logistics commander should have responsibility for theater distribution (logistics planning), medical, munitions, services (post office and mortuary affairs), contracting (HNS), and infrastructure (civil engineering). A solution would be to develop doctrine to support this requirement followed by the creation of an organization that can perform some of the functions previously mentioned.

(ii) Early problems in OIF Joint theater contracting and contracts management. First, it appeared that there was a gap in the ability to capture the visibility of all the contractors and contracts that are in theater. There was not a consolidated theater- level reception center where all the contractors would report so that all could be identified and their data captured in a database. There is a lot of competition for limited resources which creates scarcity, and it is very inefficient for DoD Services and Agencies to "out bid" each other for services or products. Because of this competition, DoD was not able to take advantage of economic order quantities to get lower prices. CAPs are a quick fix to many problems. The group cautions that organizations need to ensure a shift to a sustainment contract occurs sooner rather than later since CAPs are usually very costly.

The research team recommends that all the Services in theater have a good understanding of how to conduct contingency contracting. This requires review of pertinent Federal, DoD, and Service specific procedures, policy and doctrine. The role and responsibility of a Joint reception center in the JCC-I must be defined to ensure compliance with CENTCOM AOR procedures. In addition, all contractors need to in-process through the JCC-I so visibility can be established and all contracting actions are filtered through the JCC-I.

d. Contracting Command & Control During OIF/OEF

It was observed that the initial contracting organizational structure was not adequate for OIF. The ACA placed the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) in Kuwait. Unfortunately, this was not where the Combined Joint Task Force Commander was located. This resulted in a duplication of contracts and created competition between U.S. entities.

The JFC needs to have the PARC co-located with them so the PARC can provide the correct oversight of the contract support mission. The PARC was moved further forward into the JCC-I to facilitate contracting actions. Admittedly, this should have been decided in the planning process.

e. Contractor Management During OIF/OEF

There was a lack of situational awareness regarding the extremely high numbers of contractors on the battlefield and understanding the enormity of its impact on the security/support requirements for the fielded forces. During planning, the scope and breadth of the contractor support that would be required in theater was not thoroughly explored. For example, there was a major problem when it came to giving weapons to contractors. The problem was exacerbated because the process was not consistent and would change with each new request. In addition, the terms under which the contractors were authorized to possess a weapon were not clear. DoD needs to create clear, concise policy and guidance that governs issues affecting contractors deploying with the force.

Another problem with contractor management occurred when it came to the deployment of contractors into the battlefield. It should have been regarded with the

same attention to detail as the deployment of troops into theater. One of the first steps is the arrival at the CONUS Replacement Centers (CRCs) prior to the arrival in the AOR. This would be followed by the monitoring of the contractors' arrival through a Joint operation reception center.

Clear guidance needs to be issued that addresses all issues in terms of contractor deployment. As of today, there are two Joint Staff documents, DoD Directive (DoDD) 1400.31 and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3020.37, that address this issue. In addition, there are two draft documents (DoDD and DoDI) and a Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) case, 2003-D087 pending promulgation. The Joint Staff, COCOM, and Services have provided input on the language of this policy. Once the guidance has been given to CENTCOM, it is then passed to the LCLC. The LCLC could then ensure each contract let within the CENTCOM AOR follows the approved DoD guidelines. The result would be all of the appropriate clauses would be properly incorporated in existing and new contracts.

f. Contractor Officer Deployment in OIF/OEF.

At the onset of OIF/OEF, the Services did not have joint visibility of where other Services were deploying COs. There was little coordination of effort with no one clearinghouse tracking a CO's mission. One suggestion is to have a periodic review of each Service's contracting plan. At the review, each Service could ensure there was the proper skill and grade match for the positions that are required.

The research team believes this review is a responsibility of a theater-level contracting command. CENTCOM needs to ensure that the JCC-I, which was stood up in October 2004, fulfills this need. As CENTCOM continues to support the GWOT, a decision needs to be made as to how the JCC-I will evolve. The group believes the JCC-I should ensure all Services have representatives who meet and review the status of their COs in the AOR to ensure the right mixes of people are doing the right jobs. Concurrence from the Joint Staff and CENTCOM would give the JCC-I the support it needs to make this happen. In addition, the issue of a theater logistical support command and the relationship to the JCC-I needs to be explored by the CENTCOM J4.

5. CENTCOM J4 Plans

The CENTCOM J4 Plans office is one of the participants in the CENTCOM planning process (Figure 19). The Plans office consolidates all J4 inputs into the CENTCOM OPLAN, CONPLAN or OPORD. J4 Plans has overall responsibility for Annex D (Logistics), Annex L (Environment Considerations) and Annex P (HNS). On the contingency contracting side, the collected information is found in the Appendix 9 (CCSP) to Annex D (Logistics).

The research team's observations are that the J4 Plans officer ensures all contingency contracting issues are addressed. He will task the Contracting Branch to submit input to any OPLANs, CONPLANs or OPORDs. By doing so, the proper people (Contracting Branch) are inserting information to enable the CCSP to be written. This approach provides the opportunity to plan for, communicate, integrate and execute better contingency contracting operations.




Figure 19. CENTCOM Joint Planning Summary
(Source: From CENTCOM J4 Plans Brief)

CENTCOM has a robust planning process, and there are several meetings held to execute the Joint Planning Summary and facilitate adaptive planning. For example, the Joint Planning Group (JPG) is a CENTCOM directorate-level group that meets every two weeks. The members are directors, the Deputy CENTCOM Commander, and the CENTCOM Chief of Staff (O-6 and above). The Operations Planning Element (OPE) meets three times a week (members are O-4s and O-5s). The Operations Planning Team meets once a week, dependent on the task at the time (members are O-3s to O-5s). Last, there is a Coalition Planning Group (CPG). Membership is comprised of countries who make up the Global Counter Terrorism Force (GCTF) and the Multi-Coalition Force-Iraq (MCF-I).

The research team was shown an unclassified CENTCOM CCSP during the visit to CENTCOM. Comparing it to the one the research team reviewed at PACOM, the

group observed that the CENTCOM CCSP is much more detailed in terms of the purpose, role, guidance and expectations of all the relevant contingency contracting stakeholders. In the research team's opinion, the guidance actually seemed like it would be helpful for the Service Component commands to use in formulating policies and procedures for contracting in the CENTCOM AOR.

The researchers asked CENTCOM about JULLS and TPFDD. The research team discovered that J4 does not always use the JULLS. CENTCOM does document the lessons learned from both OIF/OEF. Instead of using the TPFDD, the group observed that CENTCOM used a Request for Forces (RFF). Simply stated, when CENTCOM needs forces, it sends the RFF to the Joint Staff to request support. If the Joint Staff can not get forces from CONUS, then the RFF goes to outside continental U.S. (OCONUS) commands such as the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) or PACOM.

E. THE JOINT CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING COMMAND

1. Establishing the Need

As the research team was conducting research, the group discovered that CENTCOM stood up a variation of the JCCC in its AOR called the JCC-I. This is a great step in the right direction; however, there is no such organization in PACOM at this time, nor is there an organization responsible for synchronizing the entire Joint contingency contracting actions for DoD. The contracting organizations in theater are currently addressing some of these issues, but there is still a gap between the Joint Staff, COCOM and Service Component when it comes to the execution of the CCSP. The research team envisions that a JCCC would be located in CONUS and would assist in planning operations before a COCOM's forces deploy for a contingency.

2. Background

The group believes the current organization for contingency contracting is not robust enough to address the intricacies of today's complex contracting world. One of the main reasons for this lack of robustness is the cavalier approach some planners apply to contracting. It is not due to neglect, but to a lack of fundamental knowledge about this vital resource. The Military Services become nervous as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) determines which one will serve as the EA. This designation is important

because as the old adage goes, “he who holds the gold makes the rules,” meaning that Service is in charge and the remaining Services must follow their lead. Second, not having the proper structure to integrate contingency contracting means there is a misalignment of contracting plans and OPLAN via the Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN).⁶⁸

When this happens there are many real world repercussions. For example, during OIF, the omission of the CCSP, which ensures that contracting plans receive the correct emphasis in all logistics planning, created problems with the LOGPLAN. Specifically, the long logistics lines from Kuwait into Iraq put a huge strain on the line haul assets used causing us to continually stop for a “tactical pause” to allow the logistics structure to catch up to the ground forces. It was noted that a “better alignment of the LOGPLAN with the CCSP could have increased line haul assets through the contracting of additional lift capabilities to augment HNS and theater vehicles.”⁶⁹

Another example deals with the shortage of supplies. According to some OIF planners, there were not enough Class II (clothing and equipment), Class III (petroleum, oil, lubricants), and Class IX (repair parts and components) items. These categories of supplies were apparently overlooked, and the result was that mission accomplishment was possibly jeopardized. The CCOs had to react quickly and contract for these items, but the shortage could have been avoided in the first place if the lead times for the items had been identified and put into the CCSP. All too often the job of the CCO is one of being reactive vice proactive. The CCSP is a vital part of contingency contracting. The CCSP needs to be thoroughly addressed during the planning process, especially since this issue continually comes to the forefront *after* operations are completed.

3. What to Change

In developing a solution or recommendation, the group considered what should be changed and/or modified. Several options warrant consideration: (1) a review/modification of the design factors of the organization; (2) institution of a new structure to ensure contingency contracting is routinely considered in the Joint Staff and COCOM’s

⁶⁸ Appendix F, Joint Planning Summary.

⁶⁹ Anderson, M. and Flaherty, G. MBA Professional Report: *Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan within the Joint Planning Process Framework* (Monterey: NPS, December 2003), 41.

planning exercises; (3) examining ways of lessening the parochial nature of the Military Services; and (4) setting requirements for the educational level, training and experience of those who serve in contingency contracting organizations.

According to Henry Mintzberg, “the structure of an organization can be defined simply as the sum total of the ways in which its labor is divided into distinct tasks and then its coordination is achieved among these tasks.”⁷⁰ Mintzberg also notes that, “the elements of structure should be selected to achieve an internal consistency or harmony, as well as a basic consistency with the organization’s situation...”⁷¹ Through research the group has come to recognize that Mintzberg’s book has great merit in regard to the case of structuring the JCCC.

Understanding its environment and setting a well-defined strategic direction are essential elements for any organization’s success. A good fit between these elements and the design factors will ensure outputs and outcomes are directly linked back to the strategic direction. Mintzberg highlights five coordinating mechanisms that explain the way organizations could do their work, “...mutual adjustment, direct supervision, standardization of work processes, standardization of work outputs, and standardization of worker skills.”⁷²

Taking this into account, the group feels the time has come and a new organization should be created to instill a culture of Jointness instead of Army green, Navy blue, Marine Corps scarlet, and Air Force blue. The time is right for a truly Joint organization to emerge, especially in light of the military’s current activities. As the U.S. conducts the GWOT, the U.S. military will find itself deployed more often to new countries that exhibit Second or Third World qualities.

As the U.S. downsized the military following the Cold War, contingency contracting operations have been increasing as the major source of support. The current paradigm is that the military provisions in forward theaters because of the reductions in

⁷⁰ Mintzberg, Henry. *Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993), 2.

⁷¹ Ibid., 3.

⁷² Ibid., 4.

organic (non-contracted) support capabilities. A new JCCC would enable the theater combatant commanders to provide improved support to coalition forces and to achieve a transformation of the economic landscape which is vital for accomplishing theater objectives.

There have been many critics on how the military operates. The General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office (GAO)) is the first one that comes to mind. It has been noted that the military has not learned the hard lessons from previous contingencies, namely to improve the ability to effectively and efficiently conduct coordinated contracting support. Also, the military must integrate the “combatant commander’s theater objectives with the myriad of stakeholders deemed essential for success.”⁷³ Through research, the group reached a conclusion that an inclusive, collaborative approach, which involves key stakeholders, is vital to the future success of contingency contracting operations.

4. The Yoder Three-Tier Model

a. Organization

The Yoder Three-Tier Model and “its employment will allow for better planning and coordination, tactical, operational and theater force and objective support.”⁷⁴ Using this model as a baseline could improve the current state of Joint contingency contracting. The Yoder three-tiered model for contingency contracting operations consists of three levels:

- Ordering Officer (OO)
- Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO)
- Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE)

The first level is the OO. The OO does the most basic contracting support; specifically, reviewing contracts that are in theater and placing orders against them. This action does not require any knowledge of the strategic theater operations. The OO should have completed some business-related courses and have at least one year

⁷³ Yoder, E. C., "The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and Execution," Naval Postgraduate School, Working Paper, 2004.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 2.

of contracting experience. As for training, he should have completed the Level I requirement for DAWIA certification, and a sufficient rank would be junior enlisted/officer or civil servant.

The second level is the LCO. The LCO should be able to perform those basic OO duties, but must have the skills of “leveraging the capacities and capabilities of the local and regional economies in the contingent theater.”⁷⁵ Due to the increased responsibilities, the LCO must be able to interface with the local businesses, higher military organizations, and any non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the area.

The LCO should have a graduate degree in a business-related field. The LCO should have at least two years of contracting experience, and their training should have consisted of completion of all the DAWIA Level II certification requirements. The rank of these members should be senior enlisted, junior to mid-grade officers or mid-grade civil servants.

The third level is the IPE. This is the highest of the three levels. The rank of the IPE should be at least an O-6 (Colonel, or Navy Captain). The IPE must have completed at least a master’s level education in a business-related field. The IPE should have vast contracting experience and training should have included all coursework for DAWIA Level III certification.

The CCOs are integral into the operational planning phases of contingencies. This is important because traditional contingency contracting and the duties of CCOs during contingencies are missing from Joint Staff and COCOM OPLANs and OPORDs. This position should rotate among the Services, much like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in order to ensure an equitable disbursement of perceived power.

With a fully functioning IPE, the new organization will be able to ensure that contingency contracting operations are planned and executed to meet U.S. National strategic and theater objectives. In addition, the IPE will work with any NGOs in the local or regional area to increase their overall efficiency and effectiveness of operations

and integrate them into the planning and execution of contingency operations. The researchers agree with the Yoder Three-Tier Model when it proposes that “the integrated planner and executor CCO (IPE CCO) be utilized in a broader planning and execution environment. The CCO, with higher-level certification, education, and experience, should be integrated within J-4 and J-5 Logistics and Planning/Operations and Exercise organization structure.”⁷⁶ The researchers want to note that the IPE will also have a warrant.

b. The Foundation

Utilizing the Yoder Three-Tier Model can lay the framework for a new structure and the creation of a new organization, the JCCC. This command would be able to make certain that the Joint Staff and COCOM operational planners can leverage integration of all key stakeholders (military, contractors, NGOs, Defense Agencies or Cabinet level posts (inter-agency)). A by-product of this will be the elimination of competing and conflicting demands of the participants. A core competency of the command will be to “allow for the creation of robust CCSPs, and integrate such plans into broader operational plans in support of theater operations.”⁷⁷

Mintzberg would probably describe this organization as a professional bureaucracy. Organizations like this rely on the “skills and knowledge of their operating professionals to function.”⁷⁸ The skill sets needed for this are identified in the DAWIA contracting certification matrix. Like any other professional bureaucracy (hospitals, schools, or production firms), the JCCC would need to have its people embody skills of the Level One COs. According to Mintzberg, these personnel would be the organization’s “operating core.”⁷⁹

The research team believes that through implementation of the Yoder Three-Tier Model, the JCCC will address some of the current problems and issues with

⁷⁵ Ibid., 15

⁷⁶ Ibid., 16-17.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 17.

⁷⁸ Mintzberg, H., 189.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 190.

how the DoD conducts Joint contingency contracting (Figure 20). At each level, it would be valuable if members from all the Services were represented. In addition, if DCMA had a member in Level Two, it would enable that person to liaison back with DCMA and inform them of upcoming contingency contract management missions.

<u>Model Tier Level & Model Title</u>	<u>Functions/ Education/ Rank</u>	<u>Highlights and Drawbacks</u>
Ordering Officer- Tier One	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • basic ordering • some simplified acquisitions • training: DAU CON 234 • DAWIA Certified CON Level I or II • junior to mid-enlisted, junior officers, GS-7 to GS-9 1102 series civilians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • simple buys • little integration • no operational planning • no broad liaison functions
Leveraging Contracting Officer- Tier Two	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • leverages to local economy • reduces “pushed” material support • training/education: DAU CON 234, recommended higher education • DAWIA Certified CON Level II or III • senior enlisted, junior to mid-grade officers, GS-11+ 1102 series civilians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • better local operational planning • some integration • more capability for the operational commander • no planned theater integration • no broad liaison functions • may perform to optimize local operations at the detriment to theater ops
Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) Tier Three	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • highest level of planning and integration - joint • linked/integrated with J-4 and J-5 • creates and executes OPLAN CCO strategy • provides direction to tier two and one • links operations strategically to theater objectives of COCOM • education: master(s) degree or higher and, JPME Phase I and II • DAWIA Certified CON Level III, and other DAWIA disciplines (LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc) • senior officers (O-6+), senior civilians, GS-13+ or SES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • performs operational and theater analysis, integrates results into OPLAN • link between COCOM and OPLAN to all theater contracting operations • coordinates theater objectives with best approach to contracted support • can achieve broader national security goals through effective distribution of national assets • includes planning, communication, coordination, and exercising with NGO and PVO in theater

Figure 20. The Yoder Three-Tier Model
(Source: From the Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and Execution)

c. Stakeholders

The stakeholders affected by this proposed new organization have been identified (Figure 21). First, OSD shall be addressed. Having been sanctioned and approved, the JCCC will be able to conduct integration from its inception. The JCCC could even provide input to the Joint Staff, J-4 and J-3 (Operations) as to what Service should be appointed for the contingency under discussion.

Second, the Joint Staff, J-4 (Logistics) has its focus on logistics instead of the function of integrative contracting and logistics. A new organization would enable all stakeholders to see the “Big Picture.” It would provide the link between logistics and Strategic Plans and Policy by working with the Joint J-5. In this way, the OPLANs and OPORDs would have better logistical support due to the integration of all theater assets including contracting.

Third, the COCOMs are usually more focused on getting warfighters into theater and accomplishing the mission than what happens on the ground with contracting. Without having the JCCC, the COCOM J4 and the Joint Staff will not be able to effectively or efficiently utilize all participants. The researchers believe the COCOMs would benefit significantly from more integration.

Fourth, Military Services and their respective COs all have a stake in the model. If there is better integration of what CCOs need to do when the OPLAN is developed, everyone in the contracting chain of command wins. Since each Service will have a representative in Level One and Level Two of the Three-Tier Model, the link between the Joint Staff, COCOM and Military Service will occur and no one will be left out of the information loop.

There are some costs associated with adopting this proposed structure. First, for the COCOMs it adds a layer of bureaucracy. This results in the combatant commander having a reduced internal contingency contracting capability because the resources would now fall under this new organization. Upon deployment the JCCC would send the appropriate amount of COs with the COCOM. The COs would assist the COCOM’s J4 to make sure contingency contracting is conducted appropriately. The

individual Military Services may lose personnel to this organization and without additional manning authorized by Congress, these additional billets would cause other billets in the various Services to remain vacant. Where to locate this organization and how much money to give it to operate needs to be researched further.

Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder	Type	Primary/ Secondary	Key?
OSD	Supportive	Primary	Yes
Joint Staff, J-4	Supportive	Primary	Yes
Combatant Commands	Supportive	Secondary	Yes
Services	Marginal	Secondary	Yes
Contingency Contracting Officers	Supportive	Secondary	Yes

Figure 21. Stakeholder Analysis⁸⁰

5. The Vision of the JCCC

The research team's vision of the JCCC is that it would consolidate each Service's contingency contracting organizations into one entity. Utilizing a modified version of the Yoder Three-Tier Model, the assigned personnel would have the right education and training, and the organization would have the right structure to perform its mission. Again, this would enable more synchronization of missions among the Joint Staff, COCOMs and contingency contracting organizations. Buy-in from the following offices would be needed: the ACA, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)), Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF(AQ)), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) and Headquarters, Marine Corps.

The location of the JCCC could be near Washington, D.C. with separate regions (north, south, east, west, Pacific, Europe) that would provide support to nine UCCs. The region itself would have responsibility of serving as the COCOM's contingency

⁸⁰ Created by the research team based on research and data collected/analyzed.

contracting requirements board, much like the PCCOWG did for PACOM. Specifically the JCCC would:

- Provide an environment for centralized coordination and decentralized execution.
- Establish common contracting procedures for the Service Components.
- Establish a JLPSB for each COCOM.
- Ensure Service Components are not bidding against each other for the same commodity or supplies.
- Develop and maintain a contingency contracting source database.
- Coordinate contingency contracting warrants.
- Coordinate and recommend contingency contracting assignments.
- Leverage each Service's contingency contracting resources.
- Coordinate the assignment of military CCOs to ensure the right person with the right experience is put in the right job.
- Ensure contracting authority flows from the Head of Contracting Agency (HCA) to the PARC to the CCO.

If a COCOM deployed its headquarters into theater (like CENTCOM during OIF), then the JCCC region supporting that COCOM would send a branch/cell forward to assist with setting up a mini-JCCC. Allowing the commander of the JCCC to rotate enables it to remain truly Joint and not just one Service's new "rice bowl." It would provide an incentive for the Services to groom the personnel necessary to fill the billet. It would still need to be decided if the JCCC should be an independent DoD entity or fall under the Joint Staff J4.

6. JCCC Recommendations

There are several ways one can modify/fix the perceived shortcomings with Joint contingency contracting. The research team will offer some suggestions. The first is to let everything remain as it is and to maintain the status quo. Second, establish a PCCOWG type organization within each COCOM. Third, establish the JCCC by implementing a modified version of the Yoder Three-Tier Model. The Mintzberg principles of structure to design an organization could be applied to ensure contingency contracting is integrated in the Joint and COCOM task orders, OPLAN, and OPORDs.

Each option has its pros and cons which are captured in the Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat (SWOT) Analysis (Figure 22 and Figure 23).

If the first option was selected, then DoD would continue to muddle through eventually getting the job done. The current ad-hoc methods have minimal integration of contingency contracting plans, which is inefficient and ineffective. Are the Services better off continuing to conduct Joint contingency contracting in this manner? Should DoD create a new organization? The group believes that DoD should create a new organization. There must be a fundamental redesign of existing organizations or the creation of a new structure to fit the strategic needs of the contingency contracting community. The research team believes the benefits of undertaking this endeavor significantly outweigh the costs associated with it.

<p><u>Strengths</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Each service can currently handle individual operations on their own. ▪ Commanders have the ability to “do what they want” because all of their contractors work for them. 	<p><u>Weaknesses</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Each service handles their contracting (and the training of personnel) differently. ▪ Current personnel vary significantly according to rank and experience. ▪ Those services with more robust structures end up shouldering more of the burden. ▪ Intra-service rivalry threatens working environment.
<p><u>Opportunities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maintain the Status Quo (“Muddle Through”) ▪ Restructure or create a new contingency contracting organization. 	<p><u>Threats</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Service parochialism ▪ A structure that isn’t flexible and cannot react to the ever increasing “joint contingencies” can result in increased friction and eventually loss of human life.

Figure 22. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats: Current Structure⁸¹

⁸¹ Created by the research team based on research and data collected/analyzed.

In the research group's opinion, the JCCC SWOT analysis reveals that the JCCC is better suited to fill the void that exists in conducting strategic contingency contracting operations. There is no one organization that has this responsibility today. Therefore, the JCCC will be able to accomplish the planning, communication, integration, and execution required in contingency operations. In addition, the JCCC will be able to ensure all the CCOs, no matter what level in the Yoder Three-Tier Model, have the right DAWIA education, perform the proper jobs, and provide contingency contracting support to the warfighter. The JCCC will be able to facilitate the creation of more robust CCSPs, OPLANs and OPORDs.

<p><u>Strengths</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Form one new organization that will liaison with Joint Staff and Combatant Commands ▪ Ensure that Defense Acquisition University certified and trained contracting officers are used ▪ The Commander will be educated, have Joint experience, and be JPME/CGSC qualified ▪ Contingency contracting will be integrated in CCSP, OPLAN, and OPORD 	<p><u>Weaknesses</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DoD and Military Services will be resistant to change ▪ Services will have to give up people to man this organization ▪ Must get buy-in from key stakeholders (OSD, Joint Staff, Combatant Command, Services) ▪ No linkage between creation and implementation
<p><u>Opportunities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Blocking by Services who don't support this ▪ Change in director might become political much like the position of Chairman of the Joint Staff 	<p><u>Threats</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Service parochialism ▪ Scarce resources

Figure 23. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats: JCCC

F. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

Contingency contracting is a fluid environment that must have the right people in the right place at the right time. The troops on the ground expect and deserve the best; therefore, it is critical that CCOs perform this mission as efficiently and effectively as possible.

The research team believes the Yoder Three-Tier Model and the creation of a JCCC are keys to success. Remember, the IPE is the one with wisdom to ensure a comprehensive CCSP integrates contracting into the theater objectives of the OPLAN for the combatant commander. If structured and organized properly, the IPE will be “integrated at the J-4 level, will plan, exercise, and call for adequate theater contingency contracting personnel provisioning (which may vary depending on the phases of the contingency operation) to effectively and efficiently meet theater objectives.”⁸²

In order to get the Yoder Three-Tier Model implemented, it would take buy-in from all the stakeholders and consensus that it is worth pursuing. The group recommends getting buy-in from the Military Departments and AOs, COs, and CCOs who are already part of contingency contracting community to validate this idea. If proven worthy, the research team believes it should be presented up the Services’ acquisition and contracting chain of command. The group would suggest it then be sent through the Joint Staff, J4 and finally, the Joint Staff and OSD.

With the military’s operational tempo, there will be even more demands placed on the contracting community to provide services and theater support. It is now necessary to have an organizational structure that is designed and staffed to accomplish the COCOM theater objectives. The contingency contracting organizations must take a proactive approach instead of being reactive; the JCCC will allow the Services to do that and be successful.

If OSD approves the JCCC concept, it would have to tie some incentive/cost to making this happen so it is not just given “lip service.” The JCCC would have to work

⁸² Yoder, E., 21.

closely with all the UCCs, especially the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), since it is “the single manager of America's global defense transportation system...”⁸³

This chapter discussed COCOM's diverse approaches to planning for and conducting contracting support operations. The research team's recommendation to mitigate the wide variety of issues discussed includes the establishment of the JCCC and adoption of the principles presented in the Yoder Three-Tier Model as a possible solution to improving DoD contingency contracting. The following chapter will analyze DCMA's role in contingency contracting and validate their proposed entry and exit criteria.

⁸³ Retrieved 6 May 05 from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/transcom.htm>.

V. VALIDATION OF DCMA ENTRY/EXIT CRITERIA

A. OVERVIEW

As of May 2005, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) have not established criteria outlining the initiation, duration and termination of DCMA's Contingency Contract Administration Service (CCAS) support during DoD contingency operations. This chapter evaluates DCMA's newly proposed standards upon which they would decide to deploy and re-deploy their CCAS support teams to and from a contingency. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of findings and associated recommendations.

B. BACKGROUND

In the early part of December 2004, the Commander of DCMA's International District (DCMAI) approached the applied research project team and asked if the team would be willing to expand the scope of the project to explore, "When and how does DCMA engage/disengage in contingency contracting operations?" His particular areas of interest were how DCMA received the "invitation to the ball" and once they were there, how was it determined that it was time to leave? In other words, what were the appropriate entry and exit criteria for DCMA's contingency contracting missions?

To answer this question, amongst others, an extensive literature review was undertaken and personal interviews were conducted with staff of Service Secretaries, Joint Staff, two unified combatant commands (UCC), several Service Component contracting offices, and DCMA. The purpose of the literature review and the personal interviews was to develop an understanding of how contingency contracting operations and policies, regulations and guidelines are planned, developed, established, implemented and executed. Interviews of particular importance to the DCMA contingency contracting mission include:

- January 17-21, 2005: United States (U.S.) Pacific Command (PACOM), each of the Service Component's contracting offices, and DCMA's liaison officer (LNO)
- February 22, 2005: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and DCMA's LNO

- February 24, 2005: DCMA Headquarters Combat Support Center (CSC) and DCMAI

C. DCMA'S PROPOSED ENTRY AND EXIT CRITERIA

DCMA's proposed entry and exit criteria⁸⁴ as presented to the researchers is provided below. This draft language has not been changed by the researchers. DCMA is proposing that the following language be included in the combatant command's (COCOM) deliberate and crisis action plans as follows:

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

DCMA Input to XXXXXX Plan XXXX

Para _ ~~(U)~~ DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY (DCMA)

DCMA Contingency Entry/Exit Criteria: Entry. DCMA provides contract management support to contingency operations for a period of one year or until sustainment contract operations commence, whichever is sooner under the following conditions:

- A. Contingencies include: 1) Limited Conflict; 2) Regional Conventional Conflict; and 3) Acts of Terrorism.
- B. The contract management support must be consistent with DCMA core competencies, or;
- C. Tasked by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with subpara 7.3, DODD 5105.64, Sep 27, 2000.

Exit. Whichever of the following conditions occurs first:

- A. At the end of one year from the declared contingency, or an earlier mutually agreed upon date;
- B. The mission area is no longer declared a contingency operation area or there is an Executive Order or law downgrading the operation, or;
- C. The supported customer establishes a garrison permanent party/Area Support Group with support of a Contracting Directorate.

⁸⁴ DCMA draft language provided by PACOM LNO, January 2005.

Contingency Operations Support.

1. ~~(U)~~ Upon receiving delegation from the procuring organization and approval from the Director, DCMA, an Initial Response Team (IRT) is deployed to provide quick response and short-term contract administration services. The IRT will perform site surveys in conjunction with the Civil Augmentation Program (CAP) and assess follow-on force requirements for remaining CCAS support. As a minimum, an Officer in Charge will be assigned to the IRT.
2. ~~(U)~~ Provide full service CCAS on contingency CAP and External Theater Contracts as delegated by the procuring organization and accepted by DCMA, at one or multiple sites (this does not include base, post, camp and station contracts). Provide CCAS in a declared contingency with the exception of services listed in Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 242.202 (a)(i) and (ii).
3. ~~(U)~~ Provide program awareness and visibility at the industry level for major weapon systems, fielding, modernization, recapitalization, and any depot level maintenance provided by contracted support for which DCMA has been delegated contract administration. Maintain readiness “Reach Back”⁸⁵ for major weapon systems for which DCMA has delegated contract administration services oversight. Provide actionable information as required on the status of aforementioned system that affects the COCOM during contingency operations. Leverage adjacent combat Support agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) or Program Executive Officers (PEO) to assist as required.
4. ~~(U)~~ Acquire, as required, industrial surge capability for critical component on contracts delegated to DCMA for oversight, as directed by the contracts’ Program Managers (PM). Work with PEOs/PMs/DLA by providing Industrial Analysis/Surge information and “Reach Back” capability for critical component shortages on contracts where DCMA has delegated oversight. DCMA can assist with accelerating such contracts upon request from procuring organizations.

⁸⁵ “Reach Back” is the ability to provide visibility into the industrial base for capability and capacity assessments, to influence processes affecting the development, production, inspection, delivery and transportation of critical weapon systems, items or replacement parts, and to expedite these processes as necessary to support the warrior. The LNO provides the link between the COCOM’s shortfalls and equipment needs with DCMA’s “reach back” capability to expedite/facilitate delivery and shipment.

The most obvious shortcoming of the proposed exit criteria is the void that would exist if DCMA withdrew from the contingency after just 12 months—who would perform the contract management function after the first year? Recommendations to avoid this void and improve or clarify this draft language are found in section E, Conclusions and Recommendations, of this chapter.

D. FINDINGS

1. PACOM

a. Span of Control

The DCMA liaison officer (LNO) serves many roles including, but not limited to: facilitate COCOM/DCMA information sharing, link COCOM shortfalls and equipment needs with DCMA's "Reach Back" capability, and assist with the Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) inquiries. DCMA's PACOM LNO is currently responsible for seven COCOMs including PACOM and is scheduled to retire mid-2005. The DCMAI's Pacific Commander also acts as PACOM's LNO since this COCOM falls within his area of responsibility (AOR). Most Services are experiencing difficulties filling their own acquisition billets, let alone those in DCMA, especially at this senior officer level. DCMA is initiating plans to hire civilians to fill several of these LNO positions; however, it is unclear whether this will be a permanent solution or a stop-gap measure intended to mitigate the Service's shortfalls.

b. Customer Relationship Management

At the time of the research group's January 2005 visit, the LNO had laid out an aggressive plan that would allow him to visit each of his assigned COCOMs over the coming months. The intent of each visit was threefold: (1) establish initial contact and begin the process of forging relationships with the J4 staff; (2) brief senior leaders (as well as the J4) about DCMA's mission, capabilities and core competencies, and current CCAS activities; and (3) secure a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or Understanding (MOU) that would define DCMA's entry and exit criteria for CCAS operations. The MOA/MOU could then be incorporated as an Appendix to the Logistics Annex of all

Operation Plans (OPLANs), Concept Plans (CONPLANs) and/or Operation Orders (OPORDs). It is highly reasonable to conclude two facets of his plan are feasible: establish initial contact and brief senior leaders. It is improbable that this LNO would be able to successfully fulfill the remaining elements of his plan given his delegated span of control and time constraints.

In any environment it takes considerable time and effort to identify the target audience, understand their requirements and design a product or service that meets those needs. The degree of dialogue and information exchange that would need to occur to establish and nurture these new relationships and negotiate an MOA/MOU would require a considerable investment of time. This LNO does not have sufficient time to accomplish these tasks given his wide span of control and pending retirement. Interviews with mid- and senior level officials on the J4 staff demonstrate that the DCMA LNO was respected and appreciated for his contract knowledge; however, it was also apparent the staff was not savvy enough about the contracting arena or the contingency contracting environment to determine if the proposed entry and exit criteria were acceptable or unacceptable. One staff member commented “that he trusted the LNO to lead him in the right direction... After all, DCMA knew what needed to be done.”

c. Integrative Planning

Prior to this LNO’s arrival, DCMA did not participate in planning meetings wherein OPLANs, CONPLANs or OPORDs are generated. The J4 Staff wants DCMA’s involvement in these planning activities. At this time, DCMA is the only contracting presence on the J4 Staff, which lends credibility to their contracting planning efforts.

This fiscal year, DCMA’s focus is on two specific mission areas: (1) provide acquisition life cycle support (Agency Mission Essential Task List (AMETL) 1-6) and (2) provide contingency contract management support (AMETL 7-9 in Figure 24). Mission Area (MA) 2, contingency contract management support (including “Reach Back” to the industrial base) accounts for just five to seven percent of DCMA’s current work load. The vast majority (95 percent) of DCMA’s resources is still devoted to MA 1.

As stated previously, DCMA currently staffs contingency contract management support on an ad hoc basis. While DCMA is prepared to provide this critical support during a contingency, they are not authorized sufficient resources to perform routine contract management activities in a mature, sustainable environment. With the exception of the Balkans Support Contract (BSC), DCMA does not typically provide contract administration for base, post, camp and station contract actions. In a later interview with a senior DCMAI representative, it was suggested that DCMA might pursue this type of business provided a fee for service arrangement could be reached or Congress authorized additional resources for this service.




Figure 24: DCMA Mission Areas
(Source: From DCMAI Briefing, April 28, 2005)

d. Initial Response Team

IRTs are normally made up of only military personnel; however, DCMA quickly rotates in qualified civilian employees to augment CCAS support teams. The IRT usually includes an Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) and a Quality Assurance Representative (QAR). IRT personnel complete the initial site survey and

recommend demographics for follow-on teams. Minimum skill sets for deployed personnel include Level II Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification in their applicable career fields; however, Level III personnel are preferred.

Interviews with mid- and senior level officials on the J3, J4 and J5 Staffs found that PACOM does not plan contingency contracting at the strategic level. OPLANs do not adequately address contracting; however, J4's annexes designate a lead service or "executive agent" (EA) for each plan. Responsibility for creating a comprehensive Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) is rotated between Services for Joint exercises and crises. No qualified DAWIA certified contracting personnel were found on the J3, J4 or J5. Neither J3 nor J5 had contact with the DCMA LNO, yet everyone interviewed indicated they would like to have a "knowledgeable contracting type" on staff. PACOM's current resource authorization levels will not support a contracting billet especially since most "plus ups" are only occurring in CENTCOM's AOR. In fact, the interviewees indicated that almost every COCOM was losing billets to CENTCOM. They shared with the research team that PACOM itself had recently experienced a 15 percent reduction in staff.

2. Service Component Contracting Offices

a. PACOM

Only Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) has any sustained dealings with DCMA. Pacific Air Force (PACAF) and Army Contracting Agency Pacific (ACA-Pacific) are knowledgeable of DCMA; however, they have no on-going interface with the Agency. Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific (NAVFACPAC) is primarily involved with military construction. NAVFAC typically retains administration of their own contracts and is not working with DCMA on any current construction capabilities (CONCAP) projects.

MARFORPAC's largest contract action is an on-going \$60M cost plus CAP effort for Camp Lemonier in Djibouti (Horn of Africa). The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract was awarded to Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), a Halliburton subsidiary, in mid-2002. MARFORPAC wants to replace the

LOGCAP contract with a firm fixed price (FFP) indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract vehicle. There are plans to restructure this effort by October 1, 2005. DCMA is currently providing CCAS support. MARFORPAC is satisfied with DCMA's performance and states there is no impetus for change. MARFORPAC was not aware of DCMA's proposed entry and exit criteria. Once MARFORPAC had the opportunity to review the draft language, they expressed reservations about DCMA's calendar driven exit criteria.

b. CENTCOM

Due to time constraints and the geographic dispersion of the Services' contracting offices supporting CENTCOM, it was not possible to conduct individual interviews with these offices.

3. CENTCOM

a. Span of Control

DCMA's LNO is currently responsible for CENTCOM and provides support on an as requested basis to the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Like his PACOM counterpart, the CENTCOM LNO is scheduled to retire mid-2005, and turnover to a civilian replacement LNO is in progress. However, the new LNO will be responsible for CENTCOM only. DCMA CSC plans to hire a qualified senior civilian to represent SOCOM and the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

b. Integrative Planning

Allegations were raised by the CENTCOM LNO that since the DCMA was stood up in March 2000, the DCMA CSC was never properly organized to accomplish their full mission including recruiting, training, and providing forces for deployment as well as participating in the Joint Staff and COCOM planning processes. For example, the LNO stated that even though CENTCOM knew U.S. forces were going into Iraq, DCMA was not involved in the advance planning. As a result, many DCMA representatives believed inadequate measures were taken to plan for the associated contracting mission. Once tasked to provide contingency contract management support, DCMA was immediately forced into a reactionary planning mode. In spite of the late

formal notification, the CSC as the force provider and DCMAI were ready to respond based upon informal communications received earlier. DCMAI was responsible for executing the mission including providing the IRT to perform mission analysis and early contingency contract management.

The DCMA LNO and J4 implied that the initial CCSP was not responsive to the OPLAN/OPORD and did not incorporate lessons learned from past operations. It was not clear how the contingency contracting team was going to contract for all the required logistics support. The establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian (ORHA), which was later absorbed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established the Army as the EA for contracting in Iraq. Unfortunately the Army's responsiveness to this new mission was slow, and resources were not immediately in place to execute the contracting mission. Since DCMA was already on the ground and ready to perform contract management, DCMA was granted a six-month waiver to perform preaward contract actions to alleviate the Army's position. In September 2003, DCMA began transitioning all preaward contract requirements back to the Army.


Senior officials with the J4 staff indicated that in the beginning the lack of organization and structure led to a communications breakdown. The first teams were only deployed in theater for six months, which resulted in a lack of focus on long-term (18+ months) needs such as heaters. Handoffs between rotation personnel were hit and miss. The Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) was not being fully utilized to capture lessons learned. In effect, the feedback loop for improving contingency contracting operations was broken. DCMA indicated they now stagger CCAS support team⁸⁶ rotations in an effort to alleviate this potential issue. Staggering rotations ensures incoming/outgoing team members overlap one another, which allows the Agency to retain and build upon its corporate knowledge.

⁸⁶ The CCAS teams consist of civilian and military contract administrators, property specialists, quality assurance specialists, and other functional specialists who are mostly volunteers for the six-month mission. The team personnel come from DCMA contract management offices (CMO) all across the U.S. Each team conducts a six-month tour.

4. DCMA International

a. *The Force Deployer*

DCMAI deploys the forces required to support contingency contracting management missions around the world. Trained, deployment ready forces are provided by the DCMA CSC. DCMAI's senior officials view the hierarchy within the Agency akin to the Army's structure:



DCMAI deploys CCAS support teams that are comprised of either military or civilian employees or both. For example, during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), there was a decision to limit the number of civilians forward deployed; therefore, DCMAI's initial CCAS team was comprised of only military personnel, many of who were not certified in the functions they were tasked to perform. Team members were deployed on January 3, 2003, with a cell phone and guidance literally tailored after the *Excel 2002 for Dummies* book series except the subjects addressed pertinent contract management career fields including, but not limited to: Contract Administration, Quality Assurance, Production Surveillance, and Property Management. When the forward deployed CCAS support team member ran into a situation they were not sure how to address, they used their U.S. Government issued cell phone to call back to the 32 member CCAS support team based in Kuwait. This team was comprised of experienced, trained, educated and DAWIA Level II and III certified acquisition personnel. These civilian technical experts "walked" their (novice) military counterparts through the respective contract management processes.

b. Planning and Communication

JP 4-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations, states:

Ultimately, commanders of geographic combatant commands are responsible for coordinating with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), [U.S. Transportation Command] USTRANSCOM, and Service component commanders to both provide an integrated distribution and support system from origin to destination during theater contingency operations and to develop a theater plan or capability for capture of related in-transit visibility (ITV) data.

DCMAI indicated that they rarely get an opportunity to plan for and coordinate contingency contract management support prior to the actual event. DCMAI indicated the LNO's lack of involvement during the planning stages affects their ability to ensure that the plan being developed is sustainable through the planned contracting vehicles. DCMAI acknowledged that resource constraints and the expansive span of control negated some of the LNO's ability to get involved early in the planning process; however, DCMAI believes the CSC could do a better job. Planning and coordination are typically reactive since notification is received so late.

The current language in JP 4-07 needs to be updated to reflect DCMA's capabilities, services and proposed entry and exit criteria. Based on today's language, disconnects exist between what the publication states DCMA can do and the mission DCMA is actually prepared to execute. For example, according to the JP 4-07, DCMA can manage multi-source and theater support contracts, yet problems arose in Iraq when 6,000 contracts were handed over to DCMA for contract administration and the majority of the effort was for commercial items (SF44) for which DCMA does not normally provide contract oversight.⁸⁷

In addition, the proposed entry and exit criteria language proffered by the LNOs for inclusion in the Appendix of the Logistics Annex is not in concert with the publication's language. In chapter IV.4.a: Contractor Planning, the JP 4-07 states,

⁸⁷ DCMA Guidebook, Supplier Quality Assurance, paragraph 1.1.11: Commercial Items, http://guidebook.dcmamil/45/guidebook_process.htm (last accessed June 2, 2005)

“Short-notice contingency contracting support commences immediately after the notification of an operation and generally continues until replaced by military capabilities or Host Nation Support (HNS) or until cessation of the operational requirement.” Appendix B.5.g: CCAS Teams, discusses developing an exit strategy for the CCAS team in conjunction with the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) requirements and states, “This decision will be based on the individual operational situation and will be made in concert with the supported combatant commanders and/or subordinate JFC’s staff and reassessed as the complexity of the theater changes.” DCMA’s proposed entry and exit criteria were developed without customer buy-in. As a result, resistance to the calendar-driven one year time limit is being experienced.

c. Contract Management Authority

DCMA provides CCAS in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 42 and DFARS Part 242. DCMA support three types of contracts:

- System Support⁸⁸,
- External Theater Support⁸⁹ (CAPs such as LOGCAP and Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP)), and
- Theater Support⁹⁰.

Contract administration delegation is pre-established with the Acquisition Executive for System Support contracts. DCMA normally administers LOGCAP and AFCAP. Theater Support contracts are awarded and administered by the Joint Task Force contracting chief.

DCMAI does not deploy a CCAS support team into a theater until contract administration authority is received, which is derived via a contract delegation from a Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO). Upon receipt of the PCO delegation, DCMA will

⁸⁸ Contract personnel, normally with high levels of technical expertise, hired to support specific military systems (JP 4-07, Glossary, p GL-11)

⁸⁹ US national or third party contract personnel hired from outside the operational area (JP 4-07, Glossary, p GL-7)

⁹⁰ Contract personnel hired in, and operating in, a specific operational area (JP 4-07, Glossary, p GL-11)

provide an IRT, conduct a site survey, and assess follow-on requirements. As detailed above, DCMA provides full CCAS support for System Support and External Theater Support contract; however, contract management support for Theater Support is negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Typical functions performed by DCMA CCAS teams include:

- Issue administrative modifications to contract
- Issue delivery and task orders
- Negotiate supplemental cost and price agreements
- Monitor costs
- Monitor quality assurance compliance and inspection of services
- Perform property administration
- Perform production surveillance
- Monitor contractor's safety program
- Provide technical support to negotiations
- Participate in award fee boards

DCMA is currently supporting both OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). OIF support is closely coordinated through the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) including the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC)-Forces and PARC-Project and Contracting Office (P&CO). In an effort to plan and coordinate future resource requirements, DCMA is pursuing a MOA with the PARC-P&CO. Initial estimates are that 24 contract management personnel will be required to provide CCAS support. DCMA recognizes that additional support will also be required as this P&CO mission grows. DCMAI indicated that numerous contracting offices as well as the Joint Staff keep asking for more support. Notwithstanding CENTCOM's recent attempts to consolidate contracting operations under the JCC-I, the Services' overall contracting mission is still fragmented. While individual offices are aware of the support they receive from DCMA, it is very difficult to maintain high level visibility of the entire effort. DCMA's contingency support to the warriors as of April 13, 2005, is depicted in Figure 25.




Figure 25: DCMAI CCAS Support
(Source: From DCMAI Briefing, April 28, 2005)

d. LNO Support

DCMAI's perspective of the LNO's performance is that each LNO brings a different set of experiences to the game, and an opportunity to engage on an overall Agency level is sometimes lost in this unstructured approach. For example, DCMAI stated that the LNO covering seven COCOMs was spread too thin, and he tended to stress MA 1, which he was most familiar with, over MA 2. On the other hand, the CENTCOM LNO stresses MA 2. In DCMAI's opinion, only one LNO (U.S. European Command (EUCOM)) was considered to provide the geographic combatant commander a balanced overview of the Agency's entire capabilities and services. The interviewees stated that this LNO was instrumental in securing DCMA's forward-leaning posture in supporting OIF's Northern front through Turkey, which was later abandoned. This same LNO also played a crucial role in extricating DCMA's CCAS support team from further contract management support of the BSC. Since the U.S. military presence in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary began with Operation Joint Endeavor in late 1995, the Agency, including the former Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC), has provided CCAS

teams to fill the logistics support needs in theater. According to JP 4-07, DCMA should continue to provide contract administration services as long as U.S. military forces remain in the Balkans region; however, DCMA's contingency contract management support mission in the Balkans will finally come to a conclusion at the end of this fiscal year since the Services have established a permanent party with support of a Contracting Directorate to support the customer.

3. DCMA Headquarters, Combat Support Center

Including DCMA, there are seven Combat Support Agencies (CSA) plus the Service Components' contracting offices currently operating in Iraq. Contracting is not Joint. Each Service brings their own supplements to the FAR and DFARS along with Service specific policies, regulations and guidance. Even though the Army was identified as the EA, resources requirements are being vetted through individual Service Components directly to the Department of Defense (DoD). Like their DCMAI counterparts, senior CSC officials expressed frustration with total visibility of DCMA's CCAS support. They indicated that visibility of total DCMA assets is lost since there is no central point of contact within the theater. It is hard for DCMA to make everyone aware that (as of February 2005) they had 90 resources deployed in support of these contingency operations. Often, a particular contracting office is only familiar with those DCMA resources they interact with on a day-to-day basis, which makes it difficult for the Joint Staff to understand DCMA's resource constraints in supporting these on-going missions.

DCMA CSC recruits, trains and assembles CCAS teams. Teams are made up of active-duty and reserve military members as well as two types of civilians: emergency essential (EE) and non-EE volunteers. Only active-duty military and EE civilians must be deployable, reserve military and non-EE civilians fill CCAS team vacancies on a voluntary basis only. DCMA is trying to recruit 200 EE civilians to establish a pool of qualified individuals for contingency contracting operations. As of February 2005, only 48 positions were filled. To try to encourage more civilians to apply for EE positions or volunteer for CCAS assignments, the following pay-related incentives are offered in addition to their base pay:

- Overtime
- Hostile Fire → Iraq: 25 percent of base pay
- Imminent Danger → Iraq: 25 percent of base pay
- Temporary Duty (TDY) Per Diem → Iraq: ~ \$11/day; Kuwait ~ \$350/day

Administrative incentives include one week of rest and recreation (R&R) upon return from deployment. In addition to these incentives, EE personnel may be temporarily promoted to the next highest grade for the length of their deployment (e.g. GS-12 to a GS-13). It is interesting to note that DoD civilians are not eligible for the tax free earnings incentive that their military and non-DoD civilian are entitled. The DCMA Director is aware of and attempting to work this issue at the highest levels. All civilians in theater should be treated equally.

As previously stated, DCMA CSC utilizes a self-developed Microsoft Access database along with the Military On-Line Personnel System (MOPS) to track and create team assignment rosters based on the best form, fit and function. Individuals can expect to deploy at least twice in a 36-month assignment; however, the first deployment will not commence before the member completes the first 90 days with the Agency. DCMA's goal is to space repetitive deployments 12 months apart.

The CSC realizes that it must step up its visibility on the Joint Staff as well as the UCCs. Aggressive plans are in place to place a LNO at each COCOM by the end of this fiscal year. Assignments may be through full-time hires with shortfalls covered on a TDY basis.

E. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Liaison Officer

Recruitment and assignment of qualified LNO candidates are critical to the success of the COCOM/DCMA information sharing process since the LNO serves as the DCMA focal point for planning and execution of deliberate and crisis action planning at both the Joint Staff and COCOM. The research indicates that for effective and efficient planning and coordination, it is imperative that LNOs are assigned to the Joint Staff and all UCCs. The ideal situation would be to assign a senior (O-5 or O-6) military member

and a senior civilian (GS-14 or GS-15) with a broad knowledge of DCMA's services and capabilities to each position; however, in today's resource constrained world that is not probable. In these circumstances, a civilian LNO might be the more ideal candidate since corporate knowledge would not be lost every few years when the military member rotates.

In addition to a broad knowledge of the Agency, candidates should complete at least Phase I of the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements and be willing to pursue JPME Phase II training as it becomes available. LNO responsibilities for two or more geographically dispersed COCOMs should be minimized especially if one or more of those commands are actively engaged in a contingency operation, military operation other than war (MOOTW) or Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). For example, one LNO should not be assigned to U.S. CENTCOM and SOCOM even though they are co-located since each command is actively engaged in separate, current operations.

Based on the research each LNO should be familiar with both of DCMA's MAs and be prepared to educate each COCOM with regards to the Agency's services, capabilities, and core competencies. The LNO must facilitate information sharing and act as the focal point for deliberate and crisis action planning, exercise planning and execution. Additionally, the LNO should assist in the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) process and development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), OPLANs and CONPLANs. Finally, LNOs need to be prepared to leverage DCMA's capabilities to meet the COCOMs needs by providing "Reach Back" into the industrial base for capability and capacity assessments, acquisition life cycle support, especially supply chain interventions to expedite/facilitate delivery and shipment and contingency contracting management support including IRT and tailored CCAS team site support.

2. Initial Response Team

DCMA's IRT reaction to contingency contracting opportunities is impressive considering the consistently late notification of impending operations. This process can be improved dramatically once the assigned LNOs establish and nurture the COCOM/DCMA relationship. This information sharing will lead to more timely

notifications, which should feed back into the mission planning cycle and the IRT processes.

Working around current resource constraints, DCMA needs to develop a cadre of qualified military acquisition professionals, DAWIA Level II certified in the contracting, property, and quality and production career fields. As part of the IRT, this cadre should have the knowledge, experience and skills needed to provide effective initial CCAS support.

3. Mission Planning

The research shows that it is difficult for DCMA to plan for their CCAS mission. It is difficult to know when a mission will arise and how long it will last. Yet based on past experiences and lessons learned, it is possible to project what core competencies will be required. Based on the unique characteristics of each contingency contracting operation, DCMA can tailor the specific core competencies required to support the contingency. As previously proposed, the Limitre Personnel Assignment Model (LPAM) will allow DCMA to rapidly review different scenarios and estimate resource needs.

4. Entry and Exit Criteria

While the proposed language the LNOs is offering the COCOMs for inclusion in the Appendix of their Logistics Annex represents a good initial effort, the research shows that DCMA should delay having this language incorporated until differences can be resolved with their customers. For the most part, the research indicates the entry criterion are acceptable to their COCOM customers; however, there is significant resistance against the proposed calendar-driven exit criteria, especially to the one-year time limit requirement.

DCMA CCAS on-going support in the Balkans spans nearly a decade, and DCMA is already well into their third year in Afghanistan and second year in Iraq. Contingency contract management operations cannot be held hostage to a one-year moratorium for CCAS support. Straightforward, honest dialogue needs to be opened with the Joint Staff, the COCOMs and Service Components. These exit criteria must be thoroughly discussed and agreed upon. Whatever language is eventually agreed upon

should be incorporated in JP 4-07. In the interim, the research group recommends that paragraph “A” of DCMA’s proposed exit criteria be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:

A. Each year on the anniversary of the declared contingency, or an earlier mutually agreed upon date, key stakeholders will participate in a collaborative summit to determine the extent of DCMA’s contingency contract management support that will be required in the coming 12 months to support the Combatant Commander’s tactical, operational and strategic goals. Future requirements will be based on current capabilities already available in theater, the phase of the operation, dependence on CAP contracts and national directives and objectives.

While the proposed exit criteria are calendar driven, the review process described above needs to be capability/capacity driven, especially in the dynamic contingency environment. Performance metrics need to be developed that would enable key stakeholders (Joint Staff J4, Combatant Commander, COCOM J4 Staff, Service Components, LOGCAP and AFCAP contractors, and DCMA) to focus this periodic decision-based review on established capability and capacity, which are in turn linked to available resources. In this manner, the continued need for DCMA’s presence could be determined with the Joint Staff’s, Combatant Commander’s and Services’ buy-in. In addition, this capability/capacity driven decision process would enable the team to develop time-phased plans for DCMA’s disengagement and transferring contract management to permanent garrison party, area support group, host nation or other identified responsible party.

F. SUMMARY

Before DCMA can define the standards or criteria for entering and exiting contingencies, they must first listen to their customers. Hiring qualified, knowledgeable LNOs and placing them at the Joint Staff and COCOMs is an effective first step in that direction. The LNO must establish and nurture relationships that allow them to facilitate COCOM and DCMA information sharing, assist in the JSPS development process, and link COCOM shortfalls and equipment needs with DCMA’s “Reach Back” capability. The development of mutually agreeable entry and exit criteria should be by-product of

this relationship—a negotiated set of standards agreed upon by all key stakeholders. Finally, entry and exit criteria must be capability, not calendar, driven.

The next chapter provides overall findings, conclusions and recommendations. Additionally, this chapter will provide answers to research questions and suggest related areas for further research.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. OVERVIEW

The purposes of this Master of Business Administration (MBA) Professional Report were to investigate and analyze the means by which Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) can effectively operate in a Joint contingency environment and to validate the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) entry and exit criteria. This chapter provides overarching conclusions regarding improvements in how CCOs operate within the Service Components and DCMA in Joint contingency operations. Three options are presented for improving current contingency contracting operations. These options may be adopted in whole or on a case-by-case basis. Major recommendations include: (1) adopting the Yoder Three-Tier Model for the Department of Defense (DoD) to improve manning, experience and billeting; (2) establishing a Joint Contingency Contracting Command (JCCC); and (3) creating universal guidance, regulations, and policies to govern contingency contracting. Lastly, this chapter provides answers to the original research questions and suggests areas for further research.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The findings and analysis conducted throughout this report brought to light several deficiencies in the way Service Components conduct contingency planning. The common threads that link these findings primarily stem from process deficiencies that affect planning, integration, communication, and execution. Conclusions summarizing these major deficiencies are listed below.

1. Planning

As highlighted throughout the research, Services can improve their planning processes when it comes to Joint contingency operations. Chapter IV cites specific examples of two combatant commands' (COCOM) [United States (U.S.) Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)] contingency contracting planning process. The research indicates that although a contingency contracting planning process is in place, the resultant contingency contracting support plan (CCSP) is not always detailed or specific enough.

2. Integration

As discussed in Chapter IV, it is paramount that COCOM billets are staffed with qualified personnel at the appropriate levels to properly create, review and influence Joint contingency contracting planning documents such as the CCSP, Operation Order (OPORD) and Operation Plan (OPLAN).

3. Communication

When standing up a contingency contracting cell, there is often a lack of communication between the participating units/Services. One such instance is the discussion of capability versus rank. When one Service (or unit) requests support from another, the requesting unit currently asks for personnel of a specific rank vice the more logical approach of requiring a certain certification or experience level.

If the Services would make the effort to communicate their actual needs, they would be able to discuss the issues and develop the requirements to meet the current mission demands and not plan for the last mission or to a standard that is not required. Additionally, as mentioned in the matrix organization debate (e.g. a person working under two chains of command), effective two-way communication may alleviate sub-optimization, foster more cooperation, and facilitate improved contract support.

4. Execution

During the conduct of this MBA Professional Report, the project team became aware that CENTCOM had established a variation of the JCCC in its Area of Responsibility (AOR), the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I). To date, this approach appears to be an effective clearing house for contract requirements; however, it was noted that PACOM does not have a similar organization. Nor is there an organization responsible for synchronizing the entire Joint contingency contracting effort across DoD. The contracting organizations in theater are currently addressing some of these issues, but there remains a capability gap between the Joint Staff, COCOM and Service Components when it comes to the execution of the CCSP.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Since the advent of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), there has been an increase in the number of contingencies (as well as their length) throughout the world. This coupled with the downsizing of our Services has put an increased emphasis on performing Joint operations in order to capitalize on each Service's inherent strengths. If adopted, the following recommendations will assist DoD in ensuring the CCO can provide the warfighter with the appropriate products, services and construction necessary to complete their vital missions as effectively and efficiently as possible.

1. Adopt the Yoder Three-Tier Model

As highlighted in Chapters IV and V, the Services and DCMA would greatly benefit from adopting the "Yoder Three-Tier Model" approach with respect to manning, experience and organizational structure requirements. Implementation of this proposed structure or a modified variant will not only ensure that DoD has the right person in the right job, it will allow for better planning and coordination of tactical, operational, and theater force objective support.⁹¹

2. Establish the JCCC

As stated previously, we propose that a JCCC be established, within the continental U.S. The JCCC should be responsible for setting the strategic direction for contract planning in a contingency. Some of the tasks this command would assume are: (1) coordination of contingency contracting assignments; (2) development and maintenance of a contracting source database; and (3) coordination and conferring of contracting warrants. The JCCC should have the authority to leverage each Service's contingency contracting resources.

Planning for today's contingency contracting operations must occur at a strategic level. All key stakeholders need to be involved early in the process—this would ensure that each facet of the operation is considered and that processes and resources are optimized to attain superior contingency contracting support.

⁹¹ Yoder, E. C., "The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and Execution," Naval Postgraduate School, Working Paper, 2004.

3. Create Universal DoD Contingency Contracting Guidance, Regulations, and Policies

Regardless of which Service is appointed the Executive Agent (EA) for contingency contracting, DoD should formulate policy that ensures all Service supplements to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) are set aside when conducting contracting operations in this environment.

It is recommended that DoD create a Joint contingency contracting guidebook based on the best practices captured in each Service's individual appendices, instructions, and orders, as listed in Table 1 in Chapter II.

DoD should create a Joint Publication (JP) for contracting and consolidate JP information/guidance (JP 3-0, JP 4-0, JP 4-07, and JP 4-08) on contingency contracting into a detailed and robust publication. While all of these publications touch upon broad, top-level aspects of contracting, none provide a detailed strategic approach for articulating and understanding the mission, objective, purpose of the operation, and commander's intent.

D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This MBA Professional Report and the aforementioned conclusions and recommendations addressed our primary research question—how can the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and DCMA organize to better conduct Joint contingency contracting? There needs to be one overarching organization that maintains the responsibility and oversight for contingency contracting. A possible solution to this is the establishment of the JCCC. This organization would be tasked with assisting in the creation of the doctrine and policies necessary to conduct Joint contingency contracting organizations. In addition they would maintain oversight of the CCO community and theater requirements and be able to more rapidly match requirements and resources to accomplish the mission.

The following section provides answers to secondary research questions.

1. Is the current Joint contingency contracting guidance/policy/doctrine useful?

The literature review and interviews conducted by the project members led the team to conclude that the current Joint contingency contracting guidance, policy and doctrine does not adequately address today's challenging contracting environment. The current guidance is too broad and sweeping to provide practical guidance for day-to-day operations.

2. Is it appropriate that only one Service is designated the EA for contingencies?

Yes, it is appropriate to designate one service as the EA for contingencies. This approach potentially provides the following benefits:

- A single point of contact for Joint logistics and Joint contingency contracting support.
- Realization of dollar savings through economies of scale.
- Reduction in support footprint in theater of operations.
- Ability to anticipate warfighter needs and match to available resources.

However, it was noted that DoD does not fully capitalize on all of the stakeholder inputs. Despite having an EA, the Services still operate in a stovepiped manner and fail to coordinate Joint requirements. This may lead to sub-optimized support to deployed units. Regardless of which Service is designated as the EA, the EA should have the requisite authority to integrate and prioritize all stakeholder inputs during contingency planning and execution.

3. Do PACOM and CENTCOM have qualified personnel and the appropriate structure to effectively plan contingency contracting operations?

As the research reflects, these commands are extremely diverse in their ability to effectively plan contingency contracting operations. Some of the reasons CENTCOM is more advantageously positioned to conduct this planning and execution is they were

forced to develop the requisite skills and personnel during previous and ongoing contingencies. As a result of increased operational tempo, their staffing requirements are more robust than those at PACOM. They have had the ability to develop and train their staff in the requisite skills required to prosecute the mission. In contrast, PACOM lacks the manning, education, and structure of a CCO cell (or branch) in their J4 office.

4. Is the DoD truly moving to a Joint contingency contracting environment?

Due to the numerous conflicts DoD has been involved in since 1990, DoD has been induced into moving toward a Joint environment. As Services have been downsized, each Service now more than ever has to rely on the strengths of its sister Services to complete the assigned missions. As Services enter a theater of operations, they are forced to work together as a part of the whole. Together they shape the Joint contingency contracting environment. The only option available to a Service working individually is inefficiency. By working together, the Services are able to effectively deal with the issues of scarcity and can often achieve greater savings by effecting economies of scale.

5. Should all the Services recognize each other's warrants during contingency contracting operations?

It would be ideal if each Service would recognize each other's warrants. Based on interviews the research team conducted with each Service Component, warrant recognition seems to be a continuing issue. For example, interviewees shared with the team that Air Force personnel's warrants tend to be readily accepted due to the fact that Air Force personnel usually have significant experience. This may be attributed to how the Air Force views contracting and how they focus on early entry into the career field. Conversely, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps contracting personnel who were accessed into the contracting field at mid-career may not have the same level of contracting knowledge and experience as their Air Force counterparts. As such, their warrants may be subject to greater scrutiny.

The time required to re-issue a warrant in theater is too long. Stories abound that delays of up to five to six weeks occurred between the time a CCO arrived in theater and

the EA issued a warrant. Since the creation of the JCC-I and the appointment of a Head of Contracting Agency (HCA), the cycle time has decreased approximately 50 percent (three weeks); however, this is still unacceptable. The establishment of a JCCC would resolve this issue since the resident HCA could provide all warrants for deploying CCOs prior to their deployment.

6. Should all Services' CCOs have the same length (time) of deployment?

The researchers concluded it would be in the best interest of the Joint contracting operations that its personnel be synchronized to avoid any shortfalls due to uncoordinated rotations. Historically, Army contingency contracting personnel deploy for one year, whereas the Navy and Marine Corps deploy for six months and Air Force contingency contracting personnel deploy for four months. This disjointedness permits opportunities for requirements to get overlooked and provides an opportunity for contractors to "play" CCOs against one another.

The above situation could also give rise to Service rivalries. For instance, during an Army CCO's one-year tour he could see three Air Force CCOs come and go, which might lead to feelings of unfairness. Finally, a shorter deployment cycle is severely impacted by the warrant re-issue cycle time. New CCOs in theater cannot perform a full range of functions until their new warrant arrives. This fact, coupled with short deployment times, could cause those "long-term" personnel to be continually forced to shoulder an inordinate amount of the contracting burden. For this reason, deployment times should be of a similar nature. Short deployment times (between four to six months), are desired. It may be appropriate to have longer deployment periods for senior contracting personnel to maintain continuity of service.

E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This report covers many issues dealing with Joint contingency contracting, but there is still much research that could be done in this area. Major areas requiring further research include:

1. Conduct a more thorough analysis of JPs and Service specific information on contingency contracting and develop the aforementioned JP or Joint Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (JFARS) document.
2. Conduct a critical analysis on why DCMA needs clear contingency contracting entry and exit criteria.
3. Draft a robust CCSP model that can be easily adapted for incorporation in deliberate, crisis action and concept plans.
4. Develop a business model that would optimize DCMA Contingency Contracting Administration Service (CCAS) support team assignments based the best fit for each operational requirement. Ideally, the assignment model would allow DCMA to create personal profiles for each military member or civilian employee upon entry to the Agency and rapidly respond to changes in mission requirements.
5. Research issues associated with Contractors Deploying with the Force (CDF).

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Anderson, M. S., and Flaherty, G. P., *Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan within the Joint Planning Process Framework.*, p.41, Naval Postgraduate School Printing Office, December 2003.
2. Bolton, Claude M., Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology). *Appointment Letter for General Seay as the Head of Contracting Agency*, October 27, 2004.
3. Expeditionary Engineering Division home page. Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from http://www.afcesa.af.mil/cex/cexx/cex_afcap.asp
4. Global Security home page. Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/logcap.htm>
5. Global Security home page. Retrieved on May 18, 2005 from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/transcom.htm>
6. McMillon, Chester L., *Contingency Contracting within the Department of Defense: A Comparative Analysis*, p.5, Naval Postgraduate School Printing Office, December 2000.
7. Mintzberg, Henry. *Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organization*, p.2, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, December 1993.
8. Navy home page. Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from <http://www.c3f.navy.mil>
9. U.S. CENTCOM home page. Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from <http://www.centcom.mil/home>
10. U.S. EUCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from <http://www.eucom.mil/home>
11. U.S. JFCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from <http://www.jfcom.mil/home>
12. U.S. NORTHCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from <http://www.northcom.mil/home>
13. U.S. PACOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from <http://www.pacom.mil/home>

14. U.S. SOCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from <http://www.socom.mil/home>
15. U.S. SOUTHCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005, from <http://www.southcom.mil/home>
16. U.S. STRATCOM home page, Retrieved on April 11, 2005 from <http://www.stratcom.mil/home>
17. U.S., Defense Acquisition University, *Contingency Contracting Student Handbook*, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., December 2000.
18. U.S., Defense Contract Management Agency, *DCMA Instruction and DCMA Guidebook*, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC., January 2005.
19. U.S., Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms homepage. Retrieved on April 8, 2005 from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/s/05084.html>
20. U.S., Department of Defense, *Federal Acquisition Regulation Case 2003-D087*, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., December 2003.
21. U.S., Department of Defense, *Federal Acquisition Regulation Case 2003-022*, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., January 19, 2005.
22. U.S., Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*, page V-1, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., December 2001.
23. U.S., Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Appendix CC-102*, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., December 2002.
24. U.S., Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual 100-10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield, Appendix D Sample Contracting Support Plan*, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., December 2002.
25. U.S., Department of the Army, United States Army Pacific Command Appendix 9 to Annex D to USPACOM CONPLAN XXXX-04. Retrieved on January 18, 2005.
26. U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command, Memorandum of Agreement Between NAVSUP and NAVFAC, Transmittal on May 5, 1997.
27. U.S., Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate School, NW3276 (*Joint Maritime Operations*) and MN3303 (*Principles of Acquisition and Contract*

- Management) Course Handouts*, Naval Postgraduate School Printing Office, Monterey, CA, January 2005.
28. United States Central Command J4 (Logistics) Branch Brief. Received on February 22, 2005.
 29. United States Pacific Command home page. Retrieved on May 18, 2005 from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml>
 30. Walker, David M., United States Comptroller General, *Testimony before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives*, General Accounting Office, Washington D.C.
 31. Yoder, E. C., "The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and Execution," Naval Postgraduate School, Working Paper, 2004.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

1. Bazin, Christopher P., GS-13, Chief, Multinational Logistics Branch, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), Camp Smith, HI. Personal interview conducted on January 18, 2005.
2. Booker, Col, USAF, J4 Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Liaison Officer (LNO), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), Camp Smith, HI. Personal interview conducted on January 18, 2005.
3. Breen, Greg, CDR, USN, and Lowery, Bruce, CIV, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition), Pentagon, Arlington, VA. Personal interview conducted on September 22, 2004.
4. Broadwell, Gary A, CDR (P), USN, Joint Staff Logistics, J-4, Pentagon, Arlington, VA. Personal interview conducted on February 24, 2005.
5. Brundidge, Lawrence A., Lt Col, USAF, PACOM J3 Future Operations Planning, Camp Smith, HI. Personal interview conducted on January 18, 2005.
6. Campbell, Gordon L., CIV, Principal Deputy to the Commanding General for Acquisition, Combined Arms Support Command. Fort Lee, VA. Personal interview conducted on February 23, 2005.
7. Cannaday, John E., Lt Col, USAF, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) J4 Multinational Logistics & Contracting Branch Chief; Perry, Steve, COL, USA, DCMA LNO; and Riordan, Matthew T., LTC, USA, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) J4 Acquisition Officer, MacDill AFB FL. Personal interview conducted on February 22, 2005.
8. Culbreth, Edward, Maj, USAF, Secretary of Air Force/Acquisition and Contracting, Washington, D.C. Personal interview conducted on September 23, 2004.
9. Davis, Chris, LTC, USA, Chief of Contingency Contracting, Army Contracting Agency-Pacific, Fort Shafter, HI. Personal interview conducted on January 19, 2005.
10. Davis, Herman, LTC, USA, PACOM J4 Sustainment & International Logistics Branch Chief, Camp Smith, HI. Personal interview conducted on January 18, 2005.

11. Fearn, Judy, Lt Col, USAF and Wical, Steve, LTC, USA, Defense Contract Management Agency Headquarters, Combat Support Center, Springfield, VA. Personal interview conducted on February 24, 2005.
12. Fowler, Matthew J., Maj, USMC Staff Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps, Arlington, VA. Phone interview on September 23, 2004.
13. Fowler, Matthew J., Maj, USMC Staff Officer, Headquarter Marine Corps, Arlington, VA. Personal interview conducted on February 25, 2005.
14. Hayes, Sean D., Maj, USMC Staff Officer, Arlington, VA. Personal interview conducted on February 25, 2005.
15. Jarrett, Steven M., GS-14, CENTCOM J4 Joint Logistics Planner, MacDill AFB, FL. Personal interview conducted on February 22, 2005.
16. Keener, Richard, U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific (NAVFAC PAC), Lead Contract Specialist (GS-13), Pearl Harbor, HI. Personal interview conducted on January 20, 2005.
17. Kness, LTC, USA, PACOM J4 Plans, Camp Smith, HI. Personal interview conducted on January 18, 2005.
18. Lowry, Doug, CIV, Assistant Secretary to the Navy for Research Development and Acquisition, Pentagon, Arlington, VA. Personal interview conducted on February 24, 2005.
19. Timberlake, Craig, LtCol, USMC and Walker, Charlie, LtCol, USMC, PACOM J5 Current Plans, Camp Smith, HI. Personal interview conducted on January 18, 2005.
20. McKeithins, LTC, USA, Joint Staff, J4, Pentagon, Arlington, VA. Phone interview conducted on September 22, 2004.
21. Ramirez, Rolando, LCDR, USN, CENTCOM J3 Plans Officer, MacDill AFB FL. Personal interview conducted on February 22, 2005.
22. Risser, Scott, COL, USA, Army Contracting Agency, Falls Church, VA. Personal interview conducted on September 22, 2004.
23. Scullion, Bill, CDR, USN, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) J3. Phone interview conducted on February 9, 2005.

24. Short, Constance, GS-15 and Wical, Steven, LTC, USA, Defense Contract Management Agency Headquarters, Combat Support Operations Center, Springfield, VA. Personal interview conducted on September 23, 2004.
25. Smith, MSgt David, Contingency Contracting Manager, U.S. Pacific Air Force (PACAF), Hickam AFB, HI. Personal interview conducted on January 19, 2005.
26. Tillman, Mark, COL, USA, J5 Plans Deputy. Phone interview conducted on February 9, 2005.
27. Timperley, Bill and Schneider, Susan, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Pentagon, Arlington, VA. Personal interview conducted on September 22, 2004.
28. Timperley, Bill and Schneider, Susan, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Pentagon, Arlington, VA. Personal interview conducted on February 25, 2005.
29. Tryon, Michael, CAPT, USN, DCMA District International Commander, and Watson, Herbert, DCMA International, Springfield, VA. Personal interview conducted on February 24, 2005.
30. Varner, Cynthia R., CAPT, USN, Assistant Secretary to the Navy for Research Development and Acquisition, Pentagon, Arlington, VA. Personal interview conducted on February 24, 2005.
31. Weaver, Michael S., LTC, USA, CENTCOM J5 Long Range Plans, MacDill AFB FL. Personal interview conducted on February 22, 2005.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

FY 2005 SPONSORED ACQUISITION RESEARCH PRODUCTS

Sponsored Report Series

- [NPS-CM-05-015](#) Joint Contingency Contracting
June 2005
- [NPS-AM-05-014](#) Innovations in Funding the Maritime Prepositioning
Ships Program - A Case Analysis
June 2005
- [NPS-CM-05-013](#) Update of the Navy Contract Writing Guide Phase III
June 2005
- [NPS-PM-05-012](#) The Raven Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (SUAV), Investigating
Potential Dichotomies between Doctrine and Practice
June 2005
- [NPS-AM-05-011](#) Spiral Development: A Perspective
June 2005
- [NPS-FM-05-009](#) Budgeting for National Defense Acquisition: Assessing System
Linkage and the Impact of Transformation
June 2005
- [NPS-LM-05-008](#) A Decision Support Model for Valuing Proposed Improvements in
Component Reliability
June 2005
- [NPS-PM-05-007](#) Determining the Best Loci of Knowledge, Responsibilities and
Decision Rights in Major Acquisition Organizations
June 2005
- [NPS-AM-05-006](#) Navy Acquisition Via Leasing: Policy, Politics, and Polemics with
the Maritime Prepositioned Ships
April 2005
- [NPS-CM-05-003](#) Commodity Sourcing Strategies: Supply Management in Action
January 2005

Working Paper Series

- [NPS-AM-05-010](#) From Market to Clan: How Organizational Control Affects Trust in
Defense Acquisition
June 2005
- [NPS-AM-05-005](#) Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV): Front-End Approaches to
Achieve Reduction in Total Ownership Cost
June 2005
- [NPS-AM-05-002](#) The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency
Contracting Planning and Execution
December 2004



ACQUISITION RESEARCH
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

[NPS-AM-05-001](#) Engagement versus Disengagement:
How Structural & Commercially-Based Regulatory Changes have
Increased Government Risks in Federal Acquisitions
November 2004

Acquisition Symposium Proceedings

[NPS-AM-05-004](#) Acquisition Research: The Foundation for Innovation
May 2005

FY 2004 SPONSORED ACQUISITION RESEARCH PRODUCTS

Sponsored Report Series

[NPS-CM-04-019](#) Contractor Past Performance Information (PPI) In Source
Selection: A comparison Study of Public and Private Sector
December 2004

[NPS-LM-04-014](#) Optimizing Phalanx Weapon System Life-Cycle Support
October 2004

[NPS-AM-04-013](#) Business Case Analysis and Contractor vs. Organic Support:
A First-Principles View
September 2004

[NPS-CM-04-006](#) Measurement Issues in Performance Based Logistics
June 2004

[NPS-CM-04-004](#) Update of the Navy Contract Writing, Phase II
June 2004

[NPS-CM-04-001](#) Update of the Navy Contract Writing, Phase I
December 2003

[NPS-CM-04-002](#) Marine Corps Contingency Contracting MCI
December 2003

Working Paper Series

[NPS-PM-04-017](#) The New Joint Capabilities Integration Development System
(JCIDS) and Its Potential Impacts upon Defense Program
Managers
December 2004

[NPS-CM-04-016](#) An Analysis of Industry's Perspective on the Recent Changes to
Circular A-76
October 2004

[NPS-CM-04-012](#) Air Force Commodity Councils: Leveraging the Power of
Procurement
September 2004

[NPS-CM-04-011](#) Using Metrics to Manage Contractor Performance
September 2004



- [NPS-LM-04-009](#) Improving the Management of Reliability
August 2004
- [NPS-AM-04-007](#) The Impact of Software Support on System Total Ownership Cost
July 2004
- [NPS-LM-04-003](#) Enablers to Ensure a Successful Force Centric Logistics Enterprise
April 2004

Acquisition Case Series

- [NPS-CM-04-008](#) Privatization of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division,
Indianapolis
July 2004
- [NPS-PM-04-010](#) The Army Seeks a World Class Logistics Modernization Program
June 2004

Acquisition Symposium Proceedings

- [NPS-AM-04-005](#) Charting a Course for Change: Acquisition Theory and Practice for
a Transforming Defense
May 2004

FY 2003 SPONSORED ACQUISITION RESEARCH PRODUCTS

Sponsored Report Series

- [NPS-AM-03-003](#) Centralized Control of Defense Acquisition Programs: A
Comparative Review of the Framework from 1987 – 2003
September 2003
- [NPS-AM-03-004](#) Reduction of Total Ownership Cost
September 2003
- [NPS-CM-03-006](#) Auto-Redact Toolset for Department of Defense Contracts
September 2003

Working Paper Series

- [NPS-CM-03-002](#) Transformation in DOD Contract Closeout
June 2003

Acquisition Case Series

- [NPS-CM-03-005](#) Contract Closeout (A)
September 2003

Other Sponsored Research

- [NPS-CM-03-001](#) Transformation in DOD Contract Closeout
MBA Professional Report
June 2003

Copies of the Acquisition Sponsored Research Reports may be printed from our
website www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/acqn/publications



ACQUISITION RESEARCH
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL



ACQUISITION RESEARCH PROGRAM
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
555 DYER ROAD, INGERSOLL HALL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93943

www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/acqn